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Hemisphere
A MAGAZINE OF LATIN AMERICAN AND CARIBBEAN AFFAIRS

September 1988
Dear Reader:
In this and future issues, Hemisphere analyzes a region whose most salientfeature is
change. Hemispbere's guiding principle is that responsible analysis of change cannot
flow from only one sector of society or from only one part of the Americas. On the contrary, responsible analysis is a collective enterprise, and it requires the free and respectful expression of dissenting ideas by the gamut of concernedpeoples from throughout
society and the Americas. Hemisphere is therefore committed to publishing a variety of
viewpoints that reflects the range and complexity of challengesfacing the peoples of
Latin America and the Caribbean.
Reflecting this commitment is the varied composition of Hemisphere's editorialstaff
and editorial board. They include scholars and practitionerswho represent a diversity of
nationalitiesand political perspectives. What they share is a view of Latin America and
the Caribbean in the midst of change and a multifaceted approach to the region's
challenges and prospects. As editor,my policy will be to listen carefully to their opinions
and to involve them in planning each issue. The first issue is a product of their considerable involvement.
The location of Hemispbere's editorial office in Miami, a true crossroads of the
Americas, insures the publication'saccess to talent and information. So, too, does the
sponsorship of Florida InternationalUniversity and its Latin American and Caribbean
Center Together, this location and sponsorshipfacilitate hemispheric-wide dialogue on
the problems, initiatives, and achievements of Latin America and the Caribbean.
On behalf of the editorial team and sponsoring institutions, I invite you to read
Hemisphere and to give us your opinion. Subscribe to it and have your university,
organization, or public library do the same. I promise-you a magazine of interest and
quality

Anthony P. Maingot
Editor

Latin American and Caribbean Center
Florida International University
The State University of Floridaat Miami

Miami, Florida 33199 * Telephone (305) 554-2894 * FAX: (305) 554-3593
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Latin American Scholarship
From Princeton
Condemned to Repetition
The United States and
Nicaragua
Robert A. Pastor
Here is an insider's account of
U.S. policy making toward Nicaragua, written by a major participant. Robert Pastor was Director
of Latin American Affairs on the
National Security Council from
1977 to 1981, a crucial period in
U.S.-Nicaragua relations. With
scholarly evenhandedness he offers
a new interpretation of the kinds of
choices that U.S. policy makers
faced as they responded to the
Nicaraguan crisis during the Carter
administration, in which
he served, and through the
Reagan years.
Pastor presents a wealth of
original material from his own
experience, classified government
documents, and interviews with
nearly 100 leaders from the United
States, Nicaragua, and throughout
Latin America. What emerges is a
picture of the United States and an
entire region haunted by the spectre
of Cuba and yet "condemned
to repetition."
"Robert Pastor is uniquely
qualified to write a definitive
book of this kind about the
relationship between Nicaragua
and the United States.. .what it
has been, is now, and what it
ought to be.
For anyone deeply interested
in this crucial subject, Condemned
to Repetition is an unequaled
source of interesting facts
and ideas:'
-Jimmy Carter
Cloth: $24.95 ISBN 0-691-07752-5

Patterns of Development
in Latin America

Textiles and Capitalism
in Mexico

Poverty, Repression, and
Economic Strategy
John Sheahan

An Economic History of
the Obrajes, 1539-1840

In this major work an economist
with long experience as an advisor
in developing countries explores the
conflict between market forces and
political reform that has led straight
into Latin America's most serious
problems. John Sheahan addresses
three central concerns: the persistence of poverty in Latin American
countries despite rising national
incomes; the connection between
economic troubles and political
repression; and the relationships
in trade and finance between Latin
America and the rest of the world.
Paper: $12.95 ISBN 0-691-02264-X
Cloth: $47.50 ISBN 0-691-07735-5

The obrajes, or native textile manufactories, were primary agents of
developing capitalism in colonial
Mexico. Drawing on previously
unknown or unexplored archival
sources, Richard Salvucci uses
standard economic theory and
simple measurement to analyze the
obraje and its inability to survive
Mexico's integration into the world
market after 1790.
Cloth: $40.00 ISBN 0-691-07749-5

U

RichardJ.Salvucci

AT YOUR BOOKSTORE OR

Princeton University Press

41 WILLIAM ST. * PRINCETON, NJ 08540 * (609) 452-4900
Orders: 800-PRS-ISBN (777-4726)

COMMENTARY

A New Caribbean Politics
for a New World Economy
by Anthony P Maingot

W
h the admission of Greece,
Spain, and Portugal to the EEC, that common market contains virtually all the
climates and production capabilities of both
the North and the South. The EEC is indeed
an economic powerhouse. Compare it to
the USSR, using the Purchasing Power
Standard as our measure (PPS = a common unit representing an identical volume
of goods and services for each country); the
per capita PPS of the EEC as a whole is
10,012, nearly three times that of the USSR.
Evidence of the USSR's relative economic
stagnation is the fact that its per capita PPS
is 1,000 units lower than that of the EEC's
Portugal. The disparity promises to widen
in 1992 when all trade barriers are lifted and
the twelve-member EEC becomes a true
common market. The benefits to be derived from the removal of customs formalities
and barriers to production, the harmonization of investment codes, and the advantages of economies of scale are expected
to be in the neighborhood of $230 billion of
added GDP. The present growth rate of 2
percent is expected to jump to 4 percent in
a short time.
Is it any surprise that Mikhail Gorbachev
should be calling for Perestroika ("radical transformation") not only in the Soviet
economy but, as he notes in his 1987 book
by that name, in the "moral and psychological situation in society"? Is it any surprise that he should be advocating the concept of "a common European home...from
the Atlantic to the Urals,...a culturalhistorical entity united by the common
heritage of the Renaissance and the
Enlightenment..."? The danger Gorbachev
perceives is the same one Japan and the
United States perceive: an EEC approxAnthony P.Maingot is professor of sociology at
Florida International University and editor of

Hemisphere.

imating autarky threatens to become highly
protectionist.
Interestingly enough, similar trends are
under way on the North American continent. On the northern border, the free-trade
agreement between Canada and the
United States creates an enormous and
relatively self-contained market with its own
energy sources. An example is the $15
billion in energy sales to New England by
Hydro-Quebec, a company owned by the

...this region of sovereign but
balkanized and fragile states
might be reaching the limits of
its privileged bargaining with
the United States and the EEC.
Province of Quebec. Neither Quebequois
nationalism nor the tenacious opposition of
the U.S. coal industry could stop this
development. On the southern border, a
new geopolitical world is taking shape
through the expansion of the maquiladora
industries. Over 3,000 factories import raw
materials from the United States and use
cheap Mexican labor to process them for
export to the U.S. market. Today, the
dynamics of that border area respond more
to the needs and moods of the American
market than to those of Mexico City. This
fact will contribute to new U.S.-Mexican
problems, but such problems will not stop
the border's growth. Such growth responds
largely to the danger of future U.S. protectionism. It should come as no surprise that
almost one-third of the maquiladoras are
Japanese, eager to secure a window to the
American market before the anticipated
barriers are erected.
The EEC and the North American freetrade area are the two mega-markets

whose business practices are creating
waves worldwide. Together with Japan,
they form the three polar points of the
world's future economic activity.
It is evident that the remaining economies of the world will be dwarfed in comparison with the EEC, Japan, and the North
American free-trade area. What is the
future for the mini-economies of the Caribbean? Until now, much of the relationship
between these small economies and the
EEC and the United States has been
governed by privileged treatment under a
series of multilateral and bilateral arrangements, towit: the L6me conventions
of the EEC, the CBI with the United States,
and, on a much smaller scale, CARIBCAN
with Canada.
But global trends indicate that we need
to start discussing the future of these arrangements. The most generous by far
have been the provisions of the three L6me
conventions negotiated since 1976. L6mb
III comes to an end in 1990, and there is
little possibility that any new negotiation
will cover more than the traditional exports
it has always covered. Inadequate economies of scale, high wages, and sociocultural attitudes antagonistic to agricultural labor all indicate that there is not much
future for traditional Caribbean commodities such as sugar, bananas, and
cocoa. Despite its generosity, the privileges
of L6me will operate only on the margins of
Caribbean development needs.
Caribbean relationships with the U.S.
market promise to be even more difficult.
Traditional exports are facing the protectionist political power of Florida, Louisiana,
and Hawaii, semitropical areas that produce virtually everything the Caribbean
does. Since 1984 the United States has cut
75 percent of its Caribbean sugar quotas;
the Dominican Republic alone has lost
$500 million in sugar sales. If there is no
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future for traditional Caribbean exports to
the U.S. market, what about non-traditional
goods?
The CBI was launched to encourage
non-traditional exports to the U.S. market.
Certain islands-the Dominican Republic in
particular-have benefited from this arrangement. Yet the CBI has had marginal
impact on overall Caribbean development.
Inglobal terms, the share of the U.S. market
held by the 14 CBI-eligible countries of the
Caribbean has dropped from 3.3 percent in
1982 to 1.7 percent in 1986. Granted, the
decline stems from the phenomenal drop
in oil prices, but the CBI has hardly picked
up the slack.
One of the fastest growing areas of
Caribbean export manufacturing, apparel,
is excluded from the CBlI's duty-free provisions. Apparel enters the United States
under the TSUS 807.00 program: only the
part manufactured from U.S.-produced raw
materials is duty free. Assembling U.S. produced and cut fabric provides jobs, but it
certainly falls short of generating any of the
local economic linkages associated with
development. The Caribbean's position
regarding 807 is fragile: there is the threat
from U.S. protectionists who wish to scrap
it; and if it survives, there is competition
from Mexico, where 807 covers the maquiladoraindustries and where the capacity to devalue can make even Haiti's $3 a

day minimum wage uncompetitive. The
1984 Mexican devaluation, for instance,
cost Haiti 10,000 manufacturing jobs.
Potentially more profitable than the CBI
is Puerto Rico's use of "936" funds to encourage twin plants. Again, the Dominican
Republic has benefited most from this arrangement. But this is a privileged arrangement made possible by an act of Congress,
one which has been under attack in the
United States on several occasions.
By far the most tenuous aspect of the
CBI and its sister plan, Puerto Rico's 936,
is their original geopolitical justification:
the fear of the spread of communism.
Though this fear was alive and well in the
late seventies and early eighties, four facts
have removed the sense of threat: the
assassination of Grenada's Maurice
Bishop by his fellow communists; the
disastrous economic performance and
high political costs of Cuba; the economic
failure of the other "socialist" experiments
in the area: Guyana, Suriname, and
Jamaica under the Manley administration;
and most important for the future, the U.S.Soviet detente. Ultimately, detente will
mean the acceptance of spheres of influence. Devoid of a direct threat, the major powers will be satisfied to engage in a
policy of either benign neglect or at best
"strategic denial." But the anti-communist
mood of the early Reagan administration,

which impelled the CBI and saved 936 for
Puerto Rico, will probably not be revived

soon.
Bereft of this geopolitical card, this
region of sovereign but balkanized and
fragile states might be reaching the limits
of its privileged bargaining with the United
States and the EEC. Since there are no
other major markets to turn to, the Caribbean states will have to compete economically like everyone else, or at least
create new non-economic rationals for additional attention.
However we analyze trends in the Caribbean, it is clear that the small islands have
to begin addressing new economic
realities. One way to do so is to start assessing the economic effectiveness of their
political structures. Is the individual ministate, constitutionally sovereign to be sure,
the most appropriate institution from which
to confront this brave new world? What are
the costs and benefits of closer association,
even federation? How can closer association be initiated, given existing linguistic and
institutional divisions? How can the Caribbean states move toward closer association in light of the dominant concepts of national independence and sovereignty?
Whatever the answers, present trends
show us the outlines of the twenty-first century, and we at least need to be asking the
A
right questions.

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

Hemisphere welcomes letters to the editor. Letters must be
typed, double-spaced, and may be submitted in English,
French, Portuguese, or Spanish. Brief letters are more likely
to be published, and all letters are subject to editing for clarity and length.
Please address letters to:
The Deputy Editor
Hemisphere
Latin American and Caribbean Center
Florida International University
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University Park
Miami, FL 33199
FAX (305) 554-3593
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Swapping
Debt for
Nature?
by BarbaraJ.Bramble

A

n obscure tax ruling has opened
the doors for U.S. commercial banks to
dispose of some of their uncollectible Latin
American debt through "debt-for-nature"
swaps. In what the Ecuadoran ambassador
to the United States recently called "a
creative and problem-solving scheme," the
swap plans link two grave problemsmounting external debt and accelerating
environmental degradation that jeopardizes the economic future of many Latin
American countries. Revenue Ruling
87-124, issued November 23,1987, allows
a bank to take a full face-value tax deduction for a donation of debt for use in debtfor-nature swaps, even though the donated
portion would sell on the secondary market
at a substantial discount.
Debt-for-nature swaps-modeled on
debt-for-equity swaps-offer an ingenious
way to turn the debt stalemate into a
gesture of good will and a means of promoting sustainable development in Latin
America.

Debt Swaps in Principle
The principle is simple: a bank either
sells (through the secondary market) or
donates (receiving a charitable tax deduction) a sharply discounted portion of the
debt to a conservation group that negotiates the terms of settlement with the debtor government. The government agrees to
set aside and manage an important area of
tropical forest or wetlands; alternatively, it
pays some portion of the acquired debt's
value in local currency (usually in the form
of interest-bearing government bonds) to a
domestic conservationist organization
working with a sister group in the United
States. The interest on the bonds isthen invested in programs of resource conservation. Conspicuously absent in many Latin
American countries, such programs help
guarantee that forests, water supplies,
fisheries, and arable soils will be available
for long-term economic development. Too
often a nation's ecological capital has been
squandered for short-term development

and the search for quick financial returns
to service the debt.
Debt-for-nature swaps are no panacea
for Latin America's debt crisis; only a
small fraction of the outstanding debt can
be usefully absorbed in conservation projects. But modest debt relief through such
swaps could go a long way toward safeguarding natural resources for sustainable
development.
The debt-for-nature scheme makes
sense for two reasons. The first is what,
until the recent wave of write-offs, bankers
have been afraid to say out loud: many
debts are not being serviced and will never
be paid in full. There will have to be some
debt forgiveness, and U.S. taxpayers and
bank stockholders will share in the inevitable losses. The conservation of
precious natural resources would be a fair
exchange.
Which leads to the second point: the high
cost of short-run development schemes
jeopardizes the future economic potential
of Latin America.
A key example is the plight of tropical
rainforests. Such forests are the genetic
library for all biotechnological research:
they are the storehouse of half the earth's
species of plants and animals, the
moderators of regional climate, and the
sponge that holds more than 25 percent of
the world's fresh water supply. And they are
disappearing at the rate of 100 acres per
minute.
Borrowers and lenders alike have contributed to the destruction of tropical rainforests through badly planned projects
funded by international loans. For instance,
private banks and corporations are in-

Too often a nation's ecological
capitalhas been squanderedfor
short-term development and the

searchfor quick financial
returns to service the debt.
vesting in dozens of pig-iron smelting plants
in the Brazilian Amazon. These plants will
be fueled by charcoal made from local rainforest wood. Brazil, in effect, is burning
down its rainforest to produce pig iron for
export. The international price of this product is so low that, if the cost of replanting
the forest were included, the iron would be
selling at a loss. Since there are no plans
for reforestation, once the nearby rainforest
is gone so also is the viability of the smelting

plants.
Another case is that of the austerity
programs imposed by the International
Monetary Fund, which make the introduction of new conservation initiatives extremely difficult. One particular consequence is that Brazil's plan to reduce rainforest devastation has been put on hold
because of a personnel freeze. More generally, Latin America's natural resources
became increasingly vulnerable to destructive exploitation as environmental protection programs joined the ranks of the many
victims of fiscal austerity.

The goal is "sustainable
development" that meets
a country's needs and

aspirationswithout
jeopardizingthe living
standards of its future

generations.
Yet another example is the common
policy of boosting export production to
service the foreign debt. This policy forces
many Latin American countries to step
up pressures on already overworked
ecosystems, such as marginal farmlands
and tropical forests. Thus, Mexico is mining the groundwater of its dry northern
zone to irrigate the farms that produce
vegetables for the U.S. market. But tomatoes for the California-based Safeway chain
today come with a stiff price tag of rendering the region barren tomorrow. Irrigation
pumping in northern Mexico will be
economically viable for just a few more
years. Mexico is literally sucking dry the
potential of its own northern territory.

Poicy Initiatives
As the links between environment and
sound economic development are becoming apparent around the world, a not-soquiet revolution is brewing in several international financial organizations and
development banks. Fueled by a citizens'
lobby from around the world and by
pressure from the U.S. Congress and
several European and Latin American environmental agencies, the campaign to
reform the environmental policies of the
banks is yielding its first results. For example, the World Bank has announced a series
of reforms: the formation of an environmental department; the addition of environmen-
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tal and social scientists to the policy staff
and to each of the four regional departments; the launching of studies to determine the priorities of countries in conserving their natural resources; and a major increase in lending to forestry projects. Comparable reforms are being contemplated by
the Inter-American Development Bank.
U.S. legislation has pushed for such
changes since 1985. This year's Continuing Resolution calls for scrutiny of the impact of policy-based loans and adjustment
programs on natural resources and on the
legal rights of indigenous peoples. The U.S.
Treasury Department now has a modest
staff to assist the nation's executive directors on the boards of international financial
organizations and development banks in
making voting decisions on specific projects. And the U.S. Agency for International
Development has established an "early
warning system" to alert the Treasury
Department to questionable projects from
the field.
Such steps are promising, but no great
improvements in the lending portfolios are
yet evident. What is ultimately needed are
smaller, more efficient projects that fulfill
the needs of local people. The goal is "sustainable development" that meets a country's needs and aspirations without jeopardizing the living standards of its future
generations.
Until now, debt-for-nature swaps have
depended on discounted-debt purchases
by environmental organizations. Like the
current phase of debt-for-equity swaps, in
which a thin market seems to be getting
thinner, this may be coming to a close.
Since the financial resources of environmental groups are restricted, the
secondary market in debt-for-nature swaps
may be drying up for lack of buyers.
With the new tax ruling, however, it may
be fiscally advantageous for some banks
to donate the debt instruments rather than
attempt to sell them on the secondary
market.
In such swaps, environmental groups
play an essential role, whether or not they
act as purchasers. They are the agencies
that hold the expertise, the credibility, and
the capacity to locate and design management plans for conservation programs.
Why should a bank settle a loan for conservation, rather than simply sitting on a
bad debt and hoping for the best? First,
because the amount of money involved is
small in comparison with the entire debt
problem, a bank does not stand to lose
much. Second, these debts are probably
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not fully collectible in any event. And third,
as the debt crisis has mounted, the reputation of private banks has taken a beating
throughout Latin America.
In sum, debt-for-nature swaps emerge
as a cheap investment in public relations
and in the future development of a borrower. Banks that choose to go public with
their swaps can improve their image as
responsible investors, not only in the borrowing country but throughout the industrialized world, where conservation has
achieved high visibility. A banker does not
have to be a tree-hugger or an altruist to find
the good news in debt-for-nature swaps.
For lenders and borrowers alike, these
deals make good sense in a bad time.
Barbara J. Bramble, a lawyer, is director of
international programs at the National Wildlife
Federation, in Washington, D.C.

Conserving
Nature,
Reducing Debt
by Roque Sevilla

Bolivia
During the summer of 1987, Conservation International, a U.S. non-governmental organization, used $100,000 to purchase $650,000 of Bolivia's external debt.
The organization subsequently worked out
an accord with the Bolivian government to
exchange the purchased debt for the
management and protection of the Beni
Biosphere Reserve in northeast Bolivia.
The Bolivian government consented to:
* Strengthen the legal status of the
reserve.
* Enlarge the reserve by adding
350,000 hectares from the Yacuma
National Park and the Cordobeni
watershed.
* Create the Chimane Forest Reserve,
a buffer zone of over one million
hectares.
* Establish an endowment in local currency for the management and protection of the Beni Biosphere
Reserve, with Conservation International providing consultation on
resource management through a

counterpart Bolivian non-governmental organization.

Ecuador
In September 1987 Fundaci6n Natura,
an Ecuadoran non-governmental organization, submitted a debt-for-conservation proposal to the Monetary Board of Ecuador's
Central Bank. As approved, the agreement
stipulates that:
* Fundaci6n Natura will be allowed to
buy up to $10 million of Ecuador's
foreign debt with funds from international organizations.
* The Central Bank will exchange the
debt for government bonds with the
same nine-year term as the purchased debt.
* The Monetary Board will fix the interest rate of these bonds above the
country's rate of inflation and pay the
interest to Fundaci6n Natura every
six months.
* Fundaci6n Natura will invest the interest payments in Ecuadoran national parks, field research, the acquisition of key ecological zones, and
the protection of the Machalilla and
Galapagos marine reserves.
* The principal of the Ecuadoran
bonds will constitute a trust fund to
cover the future operating costs of
Fundaci6n Natura.
So far, Fundaci6n Natura has swapped
one million dollars of Ecuador's debt, which
it purchased at 35.5 percent of face value,
thanks to a donation by the World Wildlife
Federation. The bonds currentlyyield an interest rate of 33 percent.
The financial terms of the swap are attractive. Every $100 in donations purchases $282 in Ecuadoran debt. During the
first year, the latter amount will yield $93 in
interest; during the nine-year term of the
bonds, the swap will yield eight dollars for
every dollar in donations.

Costa Rica
In 1987 the Costa Rican government offered to exchange with international conservation groups part of its external debt for
government bonds. In turn, the groups
would invest the earnings of the bonds in
the management and protection of Costa
Rica's national parks. The proposed exchange required that:
* The international conservation
groups raise funds for the purchase
of up to $5.4 million of Costa Rica's
debt at a substantial discount.
* The Costa Rican government swap

the debt for government bonds
issued in local currency and worth
75 percent of the face value of the
corresponding debt, the term of the
bonds being 20 years with an interest
rate of 6 percent net of devaluation.
* The interest and principal be invested in national parks according to
the government's priorities.
In this case, it was a government that
took the initiative. In February 1988 the
first transaction took place as four
organizations-Conservation International,
the Environmental Defense Fund, the
Nature Conservancy, and the World
Wildlife Fund-purchased almost $3.3
million of the nation's foreign debt at 17 percent of face value.
Roque Sevila, a businessman, is director of
Fundacion Natura, in Quito, Ecuador.

The Political
Eclipse of
Mario Vargas
Llosa
by CarlosMonge

President Alan Garcia's July 1987 announcement of the nationalization of Peru's
banking and financial system served as a
political boon to his conservative opponents: itprovided the conservatives with
catchy banners, significant social support,
and potential new leadership.
Garcia's 1985 presidential campaign
had captured the country's rejection of the
disastrous economic policies of the conservative Fernando Belaunde. As the candidate of the Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana (APRA), Garcia emphasized the need for economic programs
aimed at reversing the deteriorating living
standards of the Peruvian masses. He also
called for a strategy against Sendero
Luminoso based on social and economic
reforms meant to undercut the bloody
movement's constituency. The electoral
results confirmed Garcia's reading of the
country's mood: his decisive victory went
unquestioned by both the conservative and

the radical electoral oppositions.
During the first 18 months of his administration Garcia took significant strides
toward his programmatic goals. Dwindling
inflation and the rising real income of
workers were reflected in public opinion
polls that indicated the president's immense popular support.
Garcia also forged an alliance with
Peru's entrepreneurs and middle classes,
traditionally the political bulwarks of conservative movements. A key aspect of Garcia's economic policies was that the reactivation of mass-based demand was to be
satisfied by private-business enterprises.
The direct, personal relations between Garcia ("the Messiah") and the heads of Peru's
leading business conglomerates ("the
twelve apostles") were reflected in the
"sweetheart" relationship between APRA
and the economic elite. Their good relations
eroded the social underpinnings of rightist
and center-right alternatives.
Only in late 1986 did Garcia's popularity
begin to slide. Economically, inflation reappeared and foreign monetary reserves
shrank. Politically, there was the massive
murder of surrendered senderista prisoners in the jails of Lima, as well as recurring rumors that Garcia would flout the constitution by seeking reelection. By early
1987 challenges to the administration
arose from the left and right.

The RightistResponse
The rightist challenge escalated in
response to the announced nationalization
of banks and financial institutions. Peruvian
entrepreneurs closed ranks not only in
defense of the bankers, but also against
what they perceived as the beginnings of
a more general aprista drive against private
property. This closing of ranks allowed
Belaunde'sAcci6n Popular(AP) and its ally the Partido Popular Cristiano (PPC)previously on the defensive in the aftermath
of the Belaunde presidency-to voice conservative criticism of the Garcia administration. At the same time, it gave rise to a brand
new political phenomenon: the "new right,"
incarnated in the figure of novelist Mario
Vargas Llosa and the Movimiento Libertad.
The political emergence of Vargas Llosa
and Libertad expressed both the exhaustion of the two traditional conservative parties and the push by the younger conservative generations for a new political vision.
Mario Vargas Llosa was the ideal person
to incarnate the newvision. True, Belaunde
had once offered him the post of prime
minister, and in 1985 Vargas Llosa had

expressed his electoral support for Luis
Bedoya Reyes and the PPC. But the famed
novelist was generally regarded as an independent, somebody who defended conservative views without directly participating in party politics. Vargas Llosa
was likewise regarded as a reasonable
critic of Garcia. In an interview in Caretas
(February 22, 1988), he had even approv-

The rightistchallenge escalated
in response to the announced
nationalizationof banks and
financial institutions.
ed and saluted some of Garcia's accomplishments prior to the nationalization. And
given Vargas Llosa's stature as a wealthy
and internationally famous novelist, nobody
could attribute his involvement in politics to
base personal interests.
The birth of Libertad announced the promise of a redefinition of Peruvian conservative politics. AP and PPC, in the tradition
of Peruvian politics since the 1930s, had
always recruited popular support only for
electoral purposes and on the basis of personalist loyalties and rewards in the form
of state jobs and resources. Libertad
emerged as a modernized conservative
alternative. In spite of its dependence on
the personal prestige of Vargas Llosa, it attempted to articulate a true ideology and
program as the basis of a multi-class movement. This movement's ideology is espoused in Hernando de Soto's Elotro sendero,
which criticizes Peru's traditional elite and
calls for a kind of popular capitalism in
which the entrepreneurs of the "informal
economy" would play a leading role.
The first of Libertad's rallies, at the Plaza
San Martin in Lima on the evening of August
21,1987, illustrated just how the new movement sought to redefine the conservative
agenda. While members of the Lima
aristocracy and upper-middle classes comprised the majority in attendance, the rally
included significant numbers of middle and
lower-class people. Even the speakers,
who included Agripina Urquizo, the leader
of a Lima shantytown, were recruited to
underscore the open, democratic style of
Peru's new right.
But this initial rally also illustrated the
limitations of the new right in espousing
such an alternative. Aside from Urquizo,
the other speakers were clear-cut representatives of the Peruvian aristocracy. The
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presence of Miguel Cruchaga Belaunde
(a nephew of Fernando Belaunde and very
close to AP), de Soto, and Vargas Llosa
himself demonstrated that continuity with
aristocratic leadership was at least as important as popular support in forming the
movement's foundation. Even the newspaper Caretas, which nobody would seriously accuse of having leftist inclinations,
complained about the patronizing way in
which Urquizo was presented to the crowd.

Libertad at the Crossroads
This contradiction eventually forced
Libertad's leadership to choose between
two lines of development. On the one hand,
de Soto proposed that the movement maintain its independence from the other traditional parties and strengthen its links with
the urban populace, especially the workers
of the informal economy. On the other
hand, Vargas Llosa worked toward a common political strategy with AP and PPC.
Vargas Llosa himself has acknowledged
this difference of opinion and the fact
that de Soto is not an active participant in
Libertad's coalition with AP and PPC. As he
puts it, there is little time to prepare for
the electoral campaigns of 1989 and 1990,
and the alliance between AP and PPC must
be solidified to avoid a split of the conservative vote that could open the way to electoral triumph by APRAor the left. While this
stance may be valid, its political implications are far-reaching.

The politicalemergence of
VargasLlosa andLibertad
expressed both the exhaustion
of the two traditional
conservativeparties and the
push by the younger
conservative generationsfor
a new politicalvision.
In the early stages of Libertad Vargas
Llosa was identified with the radical conservatism advanced most prominently by de
Soto. The latter's basic argument was and
remains that the development of Peruvian
capitalism has been stunted by the state's
alliance with groups such as labor unions
and big corporations, which block the
emergence of a free-market economy and
push the majority of the population to the
fringes of legal economic life. The call for
a "free-market" society formed the
Hemisphere /Fall 1988

ideological core of Libertad.
This is why Libertad initially succeeded
in avoiding the image of a movement
dedicated to the defense of the expropiated
bankers, presenting itself instead as a reaction against a statist measure and, more
important, against several decades of
statism at the cost of personal political and
economic freedoms. Libertad'sopposition
to the nationalization of banks and financial
institutions was therefore understood as
the defense of a principle and as a campaign to prevent the further erosion of personal liberties.
But Vargas Llosa, in eventually aligning
Libertad with the traditional parties,
diverted the movement from its original
course. He stressed that this alignment was
not only desirable but virtually inevitable,
since the older parties were Libertad's
primary means of bolstering its political
leverage. On February 1, 1988, the alliance
of Libertad with AP and PPC was formalized with the establishment of the Frente
Democrdtico (FREDEMO).
What are the characteristics of
FREDEMO's leadership? Heading the
coalition are Bedoya Reyes, Belaunde,
and Vargas Llosa, the leaders of its three
components, along with a commission of
nine, comprised of three representatives of
each group. The three Libertad delegates are Miguel Cruchaga Belaunde, Luis
Bustamante Belaunde, and Miguel Vega
Alvear. The first two are nephews of
Belaunde, and Cruchaga in particular is
known to be very close to the former president and his party-essentially an AP man
within Libertad. Vega Alvear is neither
related to Belaunde nor a member of AP,
but he is a representative of the RomeroRaffo group, Peru's biggest economic conglomerate and, as owners of the Banco de
Credito, the principal victim of the nationalization. There is little new in a group
whose leadership is so clearly tied to traditional political and economic interests.
The failure of Libertadto put its founding
ideology into practice has occasioned
criticism not only by leftists and by Garcia
supporters but by rightists as well. For example, even before Libertad's coalition with
Bedoya and Belaunde was formalized,
Alfredo Torres Guzman, an analyst for the
influential private consulting firm APOYO,
observed that, "As Alan Garcia veered to
the left, his growing distance from the electoral center precipitated the appearance on
the scene of a leader such as Mario Vargas
Llosa, who worked to coalesce the Peruvian center and right. But a public opinion

poll...by APOYO indicates that the writer
has jeopardized his mass following by
prematurely cultivating the right. If he is to
regain his broader base, he'll have to move
back toward the center with a renewed
message of social solidarity" (Caretas,
September 21, 1987).
Later, after the formation of FREDEMO
was announced, de Soto chose to further
distance himself from the political course
of Libertad by launching the formation of a
coalition between formal and informal entrepreneurs, La Alianza Formal-Informal.

Political Consequences
It is difficult to speculate about the future
course of political events in Peru and the
political role of Vargas Llosa and Libertad.

There is little new in a group
whose leadershipis so clearly
tied to traditionalpolitical
and economic interests.
For example, the FREDEMO alliance now
appears to be the right's only viable shortrun alternative. Nevertheless, while many
politicians and commentators view Vargas
Llosa as the coalition's "natural" leader
and its best candidate for 1990, Belaunde
himself has not ruled out the possibility of
running for a third term as president.
In any case, Libertad has accommodated itself to traditional Peruvian conservative politics, a fact not lost on the
nation's electorate. A March 1988 public
opinion poll by APOYO asked respondents
what political party they would support,
independent of the candidate, if the elections were held tomorrow. Twenty-nine percent said they would favor IzquierdaUnida,
26 percent APRA, and 23 percent
FREDEMO. But, when the answers were
grouped according to the socioeconomic
status of the respondents, APRA and IU
received disproportionate support from the
popular sectors, while more than half of
FREDEMO's support was drawn from the
middle and upper strata. When respondents were asked what candidate they
would vote for, Barrantes won by some ten
points, and Vargas Llosa received more
votes than the aprista Alva Castro. But,
again, Vargas Llosa's support was heavily
concentrated in the upper socioeconomic
groups. In sum, wealthier voters tend to
support FREDEMO and poorer voters tend
to support leftist or aprista parties and
candidates.

No matter what immediate course
Vargas Llosa and Libertad might take with
respect to FREDEMO, AP, and PPC, Peru's
political right has already missed the opportunity to transform itself into a modern,
massive, and democratic political alternative. Libertad could have initiated a profound redefinition of Peruvian politics. For
the first time in Peru's modern history, there
could have been a conservative political
alternative based not on personalist loyalty and patronage, but on a multi-class program of national development. Yet the
combination of electoral exigencies and the
Peruvian elite's inability to democratize its
political practices led to Libertad's accommodation to the ways of the traditional right.
As a result, the promise of a new right and
of new conservative leadership for Peru
has been postponed-perhaps for good.
Carlos Monge is a research associate at the Centro
Peruano de Estudios Sociales, in Lima, Peru.

Chilean Fruits
of Counterrevolution
by Walter L. Goldfrank

Chile

since 1970 grimly mirrors the
agony and the contradictions of Spain in the
fascist era. A fractious left-wing coalition
with revolutionary dreams has yielded to a
right-wing military regime with counterrevolutionary projects: death, exile, repression, piety. A messianic general delivers his
beloved country from the threat of communism, no price too high in lives, wellbeing, or international esteem. An exile
community repeats the anti-fascist alarm,
while beneath the rhetorical surface,
economic and social changes irrevocably
transform the conditions and prospects for
struggle. One of those transformations is
the export boom in Chilean produce, the
fruits, if you will, of counterrevolution.
Chile falls squarely among the midranking countries of the world economy.
Its mix of productive activities and production relations includes subsistence agriculture by small holders and tenants and automated manufacturing by unionized wage

workers. It exports primary products to
developed countries and manufactured
goods to less developed countries. Its product per capita situates it at an intermediate
position. Its politics, as suggested above,
have been unusually conflictive, and its
state much more involved in economic life
than its free-market pronouncements
would indicate.
Given the initial directions taken by the
Pinochet regime after the 1973 coup, it was
not unreasonable to expect decline toward
the periphery of the world economy. Many
professionals and skilled workers were
among the executed, the disappeared, the
jailed, and the exiled. Deindustrializationthe reversal of years of import substitution-was occurring on a significant scale.
Government economists, the famous
"Chicago boys," preached an extreme version of free-market ideology, openness to
the world economy, and massive restructuring. They stressed primary-product exports as a source of foreign exchange, going beyond copper to subsidize expansion
in timber, fish, and produce.
But the current picture, despite certain
appearances and perhaps some decline
relative to more thriving newly-industrializing countries, suggests that Chile remains
among the world's mid-ranking economies.
Rather than regressing to the periphery, the
merciless rule of Pinochet has succeeded
in restructuring and redistributing its "middleness." The state-directed industrialization and welfare model of the Frei (1964-70)
and Allende (1970-73) years has given way
to a market-driven and export-led model,
with concentration and enrichment at one
pole, unemployment and immiseration at
the other. State industries have been bankrupted or sold to the private sector, and
despite some improvement in the last five
years, the standard of living of the popular
classes is significantly lower than during the
Allende years. Meanwhile, the export diversification projected in the 1960s and propelled by Allende has come to fruition: moving from an almost total dependence on
copper for foreign exchange, Chile now has
found significant markets for fish, timber,
produce, and assorted manufactures.
Given the recent conjuncture of cheap oil,
the weak dollar, rising copper prices, and
an increased inflow of foreign investment,
relative prosperity may well carry Pinochet
through the plebiscites scheduled for 1989
and 1990. Thus it is misleading to focus too
heavily on repression and popular misery
in considering counterrevolution in Chile.
In substantial part because of fruit exports,

the economy is not so badly off as it would
otherwise be and as many on the left portray it; nor would the right so readily find an
example of the miracles of the market in
promoting growth.

Dimensions of the Fruit Boom
Chilean fruit exports to the United States
alone have become a billion-dollar business. Fruit production has been growing
rapidly in the 1980s, with new lands being
converted to or opened up for orchards. In
1975 the United States and Canada took 29
million pounds of Chilean grapes; by 1985
the figure was 395 million. Beyond their
contribution to foreign exchange, orchards
provide an increasing proportion of
agricultural employment, with many more
workers in packing sheds, internal transportation, and in the revitalized port of
Valparaiso.
The Chilean fruit boom is one aspect of
the internationalization of an economic
sector that for centuries had been local or
regional and only recently has become national. New cooling and freshnesspreserving technologies-the world's
largest artificially cooled packing shed is in
Curic6, south of Santiago-along with faster
ships and air freight have facilitated a
"winter" produce boom from Southern
Hemisphere countries, where the seasons
are reversed. U.S. and European importers
who deal with Chile in grapes, apples, and
stone fruits (peaches, nectarines, apricots,
plums), also sell apples from South Africa
and New Zealand and kiwis from the latter,
in addition to the more traditional tropical
and sub-tropical products such as
bananas, pineapples, and citrus. Swiss investment houses and Saudi oil money
finance part of the Chilean trade, and
Italians operate one of the largest exporting

... the export diversification
projectedin the 1960s and
propelledby Allende has
come tofruition....
firms. Three large international exporters
that came on the scene with dollars during
the 1982 Chilean crisis already control 27
percent of the market.
Changing consumption patterns provide
part of the explanation, and where consumption changes are involved, one is likely
to find aggressive marketers and promoters. In the present case we can point
to the Association of Chilean Fruit ExHemisphere / Fall 1988

porters, which budgets substantial sums
for radio advertising in the United States
and is trying to persuade Europeans that
seedless grapes are a snack food. Health
notions and the "yuppification" of tastes
have contributed to the growing preference
for fresh produce over canned or frozen
and to a widening market for exotic species
and for unusual varieties of traditional ones.
Where there are markets, there is likely
to be competition. Chilean growers face
long-term threats from other Southern
Hemisphere potential producers such as
Australia and Argentina, current challenges
in avocados and asparagus from Mexico,
and a struggle about overlapping seasons
from growers in the Coachella Valley of
Southern California. These growers want
Chilean grapes out of the United States
after April 1, although their own product is
not usually ready for markets until late April.
New technologies could conceivably extend the growing and/or shipping seasons
of the developed countries, creating additional competitive constraints. Already the
European Community has instituted a
license payment for Granny Smith apples
that compete with their red varieties.
A final aspect of the fruit export boom is
its capacity to generate political protest. Activists in several U.S. cities have sought to
mobilize opinion against the fruit and its
country of origin, mostly via boycotts, to
pressure for human rights improvements
in Chile and for changes in U.S. policy. This
movement has not yet achieved much successor recognition. The obstacles it faces
are especially strong in Philadelphia, where
about 80 percent of the Chilean fruit destined for the United States arrives. The port city's government has leased a warehouse
and two docks for 18 years to a consortium
of Chilean firms, expecting this to account
for 25 percent of all waterfront labor. It is
not inconceivable that a new round of
savagery in Chile and/or a Democratic party capture of the U.S. presidency might
breathe new life into a boycott, say in the
winter of 1990. Central America and
Southern Africa, however, appear more
likely candidates for the sympathetic
energy of left-wing activists in North
America.

Dependency, Food,
and Class Relations
Three aspects of the fruit boom offer insights into the complex changes effected
or facilitated by counterrevolution. Has
Chile's increased reliance on primaryproduct exports resulted in growing
Hemisphere / Fall 1988

economic backwardness? How has the expansion in acreage devoted to orchards
and vineyards affected food production and
supplies? How have agrarian class relations shifted, and what are the possibilities
of revived organizations and social
movements?
As primary-product exports, minerals
and agricultural raw materials symbolize
economic dependency. Yet one cannot
judge dependency from the nature of the
product alone. U.S. or Canadian wheat,
Danish or English cheese, and French or
Italian wine suffice as counter-examples.
Of basic importance is the nature of pro-

The net effect of these
changes, combined as they
were with severe political

repression, has been the
creation of a reconstituted
and newly capitalized landed
class at one extreme and an
impoverished, dispossessed,
and semi-urbanized working
class at the other
duction relations in the economy's
agricultural sector and the linkages between that sector and others. In terms of
technology, ownership/remuneration, and
linkages, Chile's fruit sector is less dependent, less backward, than it might appear.
At the same time, it does not yet approach
the above examples of agriculture in
developed countries.
Technologically, Chilean horticulture is
rather advanced, especially in grapes. The
newest producing zone, on the edge of
the desert in the north, uses Israeli computerized drip irrigation/fertilization to meet
North American demand in November,
commanding a premium price at that
monopolized moment. Computers monitor
temperatures and track pallets from packing sheds to market. Electronic sizing, the
world's largest low-oxygen cooling facility,
and sulfur-dioxide pads for slow release of
spoilage retardant are among other
technically sophisticated features of this
sector. The Fundaci6n Chile, a joint venture
of the government and the ITT corporation,
acts as a center for technology transfer and
innovation in the export industries. In fruit,
it stresses quality control and grafting
techniques that enable growers to respond

quickly to shifts in consumer preferences
for different varieties-for example, the current spurt in Granny Smith apples. Chilean
agronomists make independent scientific
and technical contributions to horticulture.
On the ownership side, virtually all of the
growing and much of the shipping is under
Chilean ownership and control. Of the
seven major shippers (there are about 200
exporting firms in all), three are foreignowned; Chileans are to a degree integrated
into the control structure of these international firms. The smaller growers have
recently formed an association to protect
their interests against the large growershippers. The largest Chilean firm has 12
agronomists on staff and publishes a
quarterly magazine.
Besides small amounts of juicing and
drying, the "downstream" linkages of fruit
production are negligible, but "upstream"
effects are proving considerable. Fruit
shipments have revitalized the ports of
Valparaiso and Coquimbo. The demand
for containers has stimulated the forestry
sector; it has also provided orders for
refrigerated containers for air shipping
asparagus, apricots, cherries, and raspberries to Cardoen Industries, better known
for its armaments and explosives. In sum,
the picture comes closer to "dependent
development" than to growing backward-

ness.
A second major issue is the relationship
between the fruit boom and domestic food
production: the competition for land between the food needs of the people on the
one hand, and the profits of the growers and
the pleasures of the international consumers on the other. We are, to varying
degrees, familiar with Central American
deforestation to raise beef cattle for
McDonald'sand Burger King, with Sahelian
drought caused by the millet and sorghum
giving way to peanuts for French cooking
oil, with strawberries, melons, and
vegetables displacing Mexican corn and
beans. Although some croplands have
become orchards, the Chilean situation has
little in common with these disgraces-the
nutritional deficiencies of the Chilean poor,
perhaps 25-30 percent of the population,
have non-agricultural causes. Rather, due
to the scant purchasing power of the
popular classes, the crisis-induced (1982)
introduction of price supports, and the
belated arrival of "green revolution"
technology, over the last five years Chile
has approached self-sufficiency in most
basic agricultural commodities. Under
Pinochet's original free-market policies, per

P-

capita production of wheat had fallen to
nineteenth-century levels, but it has since
surged to new highs; between 1980 and
1986 the yield increased more than 50
percent. Supply of other basic commodities-dairy, sugar (beet), oils, legumes-is strong, but high unemployment,
low wages, and high prices make demand
weak. Although the rural and semi-rural
poor would probably be better nourished if
they regained or received direct access to
cultivable plots, Chile is a heavily urbanized country: its nutritional deficit results far
more from a highly skewed income distribution than from devoting prime lands to fruit
production for export.
Raising the question of access to land requires discussion of the changed agrarian
class structure, both cause and consequence of the boom in fruit exports. Here,
consideration of the fruit sector leads to the
analysis of rural Chile in general. There
have been significant changes at the top
and at the bottom, while intermediate strata
continue to exist, much recomposed.
Under the Frei and Allende administrations, the state introduced a series of land
reform measures that greatly altered the
countryside. Simultaneously, the export
diversification into fruit began, as envisioned and fostered by CORFO (the state
development agency). Through the reform,
many inquilinos (resident laborers on large
estates paid in part via usufruct) received
individual parcels. Estate owners bent on

... Chile'sfruit sector is less
dependent, less backward,

than it might appear.
evading the reform process artificially divided some of their lands and "sold" them to
relatives and/or friends; others accepted
the indemnification payments and invested
elsewhere. Roughly 80 percent of rural
wage workers joined unions, while small
holders were organized into peasant
associations seeking credit and technical
assistance from the state. Leftist parties attempted to hasten the reform and consequent organizing efforts, contributing to
destabilization during the Allende years,
while the large landowners played a major
role in destabilization from the right.
The military coup that brought General
Pinochet to the presidency accelerated
some changes (commercialization of land

and increase in wage labor) and utterly
reversed others (redistribution of land and
organization of labor). The small farmers
and the rural poor, beneficiaries of the
reform, were systematically denied
resources. This denial stemmed partly from
politics, partly from the free-market orientation of the new economic planners, and
partly from the mistaken view-really part
of the Chicago boys' ideology-that large is
more efficient than small. Legalization of
corporate farming gave a further boost to
large growers. Counterreform restored
many lands to their former owners and
difficult conditions induced some beneficiaries to sell their parcels. The net effect
of these changes, combined as they were
with severe political repression, has been
the creation of a reconstituted and newly
capitalized landed class at one extreme
and an impoverished, dispossessed, and
semi-urbanized working class at the other.
In the fruit sector, two organizations
have developed, one representing the large
grower-shippers, the other representing the
medium and small producers who bear a
disproportionate share of the risks. The
former occupies a handsome suite of offices, the latter two tiny rooms. Agriculture
has become more of a business than a way
of life; commercialization from the right has
completed the task which reform from the
left had begun, that of removing nonfreehold peasants from the historical stage.
Land and equipment sales are brisk;
Chilean rural social organization is coming
more and more to resemble that of California, to which its physical resemblances
have long been noted.
In terms of the rural working population
(roughly 20 percent of the paid labor force),
there remain some beneficiaries of the land
reform along with scattered small holders,
especially in marginally productive areas.
But the vast majority are now wage
workers, many living in shabby new
hamlets, many in towns and cities. Most
employment in the fruit sector is seasonal
and temporary, often unstable from yearto-year as workers seek alternative employment in urban construction or services. The
largest grower has a year-round work force
of 500; his rolls reach 5,000 at the peak
harvest season and include 13,000 different individuals throughout the year, as
the picking, packing, and shipping move
from north to south. Many of these workers
are female, especially in the packing sheds.
This is a major change in agricultural labor
patterns with as yet unknown conse-

quences for family structure. Low wages
make Chilean fruit affordable in the Northern Hemisphere in spite of the high transportation costs, a semi-luxury for middleclass Americans rather than a total indulgence. Exposure to unregulated
chemicals adds injury to insult.
Worker organization has thus far proved extremely difficult and is to date negligible. What the politics of rural workers will
be when politics are again possible in Chile
is difficult to foresee. Perhaps we can expect unionization and wage struggles,
although the experience of going through
a subsequently nullified land reform might
conceivably affect rural politics in an
unusual manner. It is idle to speculate
about what could have been. An Allendesponsored, cooperatively organized fruit
exporting system might have brought considerable prosperity to the countryside (a
number of small growers, land reform
beneficiaries, are in fact thriving). Instead
we see the flow of hefty profits to a handful
of growers together with misery for the
semi-employed workers who tend to be
young, uncommitted to agriculture beyond"
a year-to-year basis, and difficult to
organize.

What the politics of rural
workers will be when politics
are again possible in Chile is
difficult to foresee.
During the past 15 years, the most
developed countries of South America
have been abandoning import substitution
and adopting neo-liberal economic policies.
In Brazil, Uruguay, Argentina, and Chile,
this attempt to cope with a stagnant global
economy was associated with right-wing
regimes, preemptively if not explicitly
counterrevolutionary. It is perhaps not accidental that only Chile has continued to
resist a pendular swing back toward
democracy, since only Chile implemented
so severe a version of neo-liberalism,
privatizing even the social security system
and enforcing pitiful wages in export
agriculture. The fruits of counterrevolution
may be sweet to the wealthiest nations, but
for the producers they represent a bitter
harvest.
Walter L. Goldfrank is professor of sociology at the
University of California, Santa Cruz.
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Cuba to the
Aid of
Noriega?
by Andres Oppenbeimer

at has been the true measure of
W
Cuba's assistance to Panama's military
chief General Manuel Antonio Noriega?
A careful examination of Cuba's interests, as well as intelligence information
from U.S. military officials based in
Panama, indicate that Cuba's role in
Panama is smaller than that portrayed by
some Panamanian opposition leaders and
Washington-based U.S. officials.
Allegations of massive Cuban involvement in Panama have mushroomed since
the Noriega-engineered February 26
ouster of Panamanian president Eric Arturo
Delvalle. Some of these accounts, such
as that of former Panamanian Air Force
Major Augusto Villalaz, who claims to have
flown arms from Cuba, deserve some credibility. Villalaz, after his defection in March,
said that he helped fly munitions from
Havana to Panama on three occasions. He
added that 16 flights were planned to carry
a total of 50,000 pounds of weapons to
Panama. The shipments carried by Villalaz
were to be stashed outside Panamanian
military facilities so that Noriega could then
turn them over to supporters "when he

wants."
Other accounts, such as a variety of
second-hand reports of large numbers
of Cuban troops in Panama, should be viewed with skepticism. Among the most
widespread of these allegations:
* Several Panamanian opposition
leaders, quoting witnesses in the
area, have reported the presence of
more than 1,200 Cuban troops and
military advisers in the mountains of
the northern province of Chiriqui. A
similar account-or perhaps the
same one-was reported as a fact by
the conservative daily Washington
Times.
* Ousted President Delvalle, whom
the U.S. government continues to
recognize as Panama's legitimate
president, gave further credence to
this claim by saying that his country
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is "being invaded" by Cuban troops.
* In an April 29 interview with The
Miami Herald in Panama City,
Delvalle said he had "reliable
reports" that Cubans had set up
military camps in Chiriqui as part of
a plan to intervene if Noriega were
ousted by U.S. or Panamanian
troops.
* "In some parts of Chiriqui, the
Cubans are descending from the
mountains in search of food,"
Delvalle said. "People have seen
them grabbing cows and other
animals."
* The ABC network and The San Francisco Examiner in late April quoted
unidentified U.S. officials as saying
that Cuban troops or military advisers were behind mysterious night
incursions into U.S. military facilities
in Panama. According to an April 28
ABC broadcast, at least one intruder
died during the April 20 incursion by
about 30 unidentified men into a U.S.
observation post near Howard Air
Force Base, and one body was taken
to a Cuban ship passing through the
Panama Canal.
* On April 22 The Examiner quoted
"knowledgeable Pentagon sources"
as attributing the nighttime raids on
U.S. installations to "highly trained
Cuban commandos."
But officials of the Panama-based U.S.
Southern Command, which is in charge of
all U.S. military activities in Central America
and South America, say they have not
found hard evidence of recent Cuban
weapon shipments or training camps. Nor
have they found a Cuban connection in the
nighttime incursions into U.S. military
bases in Panama.
CIA director William Webster said in early May that, while U.S. intelligence services
have detected some Cuban flights to
Panamanian bases, "there are no indications" that large numbers of Cubans arrived
or that Noriega asked for help from Cuban
leader Fidel Castro.
Though some mid-level Pentagon and
Reagan administration officials have
leaked unconfirmed reports of a major
Cuban military involvement to journalists,
officials of the U.S. Southern Command
have expressed amazement at the claims
emmanating from Washington. "We have
no conclusive evidence of a large-scale
Cuban military presence in Panama," Com-

mander Mark Neuhart, a spokesman for
the Southern Command, said in late April.

Small Numbers
The consensus among U.S. military and
diplomatic officials based in Panama is that
a small number of Cuban advisers, probably fewer than a dozen, are helping the
Noriega regime. One U.S. military source
said privately that U.S. intelligence officers
have evidence of the arrival of about a
dozen Cuban advisers since the beginning
of the crisis.
Apparently, most of the Cubans are
civilians who are helping the Defense
Forces with tasks such as mapping antiU.S. propaganda campaigns in the militarycontrolled media. The Defense Forces'
daily Critica, for instance, has suddenly
started printing more sophisticated antiAmerican slander campaigns, twisting
legitimate news stories rather than making
off-the-wall claims as in the past, U.S. officials say.
On the nighttime incursions into U.S.
military bases, U.S. Southern Command officials say privately that the intruders were
probably Panamanians linked to the
Defense Forces. Noriega denied any
knowledge of the incidents, ridiculing the
U.S. soldiers as confused rookies who were
"shooting at palm trees" swaying in the
tropical night breeze.
The Southern Command denied knowledge that some of the intruders died or
were taken to a Cuban ship. According to
spokesman Neuhart: "We haven't found a
body, nor shells, not anything that would
support the reports that there were
casualties, or that they were taken into a
Cuban ship."
On the reports of the presence of 1,200
Cuban soldiers and military advisers in
Chiriqui, Southern Command spokesman
Colonel Ronald Slongers had this to say:
"We have no evidence that this brigade ex-

ists."
On the Villalaz allegations, Southern
Command officials say the former Panamanian air force major may have told the truth,
but the weapons he talked about had not
turned up as of early May.
Most Latin American and Western European diplomats in Panama say they have
no first-hand knowledge of major Cuban involvement to help Noriega prolong his rule.
They also point out that there are a number
of reasons why it would not make sense for
Cuba to get too involved in Panama.
They say that it would not make sense

for Castro to risk getting caught in a military
adventure in Panama when Cuba is trying
to mend fences with Latin American countries and, increasingly, with the United
States.
In March and April, at the height of the
U.S. offensive to oust Noriega, U.S. and
Cuban officials were beginning to implement a new immigration agreement signed
last November. At the time, the two countries were also drafting an agenda for their
first round of negotiations on a withdrawal
of Cuban troops from Angola. Regarding

... it would not make sense for

Castro to risk getting caught in
a military adventure in
Panama when Cuba is trying
to mendfences with Latin
American countries and,
increasingly, with the United
States.
Angola, U.S. and Cuban officials held their
first preparatory meeting January 25 in the
Angolan capital of Luanda, only days before
a grand jury in Miami indicted Noriega. The
talks began in early May.
Diplomatic sources in Panama say
Castro would hardly risk a breakdown in
Cuba's first series of major talks with the
United States in several years for an intervention to help an unreliable ally such as
Noriega. A fact lost on many observers of
the Panamanian crisis is that, to this day,
Cuba contends that Noriega is a former CIA
asset who may return to his old boss once
his current troubles are over.
Latin American and European diplomats
in Panama cite superpower politics as
another factor likely to discourage Cuba
from getting its feet too deep into the
Panamanian quagmire. Itwould be hard to
conceive of Cuba engaging in a new
military adventure at a time when Moscow
is pulling its troops from Afghanistan and
pursuing better relations with the United
States, they say.

Cuba's View
Cuban officials, as one would expect,
deny that there are even a handful of Cuban
advisers in Panama. The Cubans say
Panama would have a lot to lose if it received military assistance from Cuba.
"Any military help we could give Panama
would not be enough to offset the trouble

it would bring along with it," a high-ranking
Cuban embassy official said in an interview.
"The United States would have a perfect
excuse for an invasion."
Cuban diplomats also say that Panama's
military is among the best trained in Latin
America, even in areas such as irregular
warfare. Panama's Defense Forces would
hardly need Cuban assistance, they argue.
Cuban diplomats say rumors about the
alleged presence of Cuban soldiers in
Panama could have resulted from mix-ups.
There are about 3,500 Cuban exiles in
Panama; in a country rife with rumors,
many may have been mistaken for Cuban
advisers, they say.
The Cubans did not take those allegations lightly, however.
Reports of a massive Cuban military
presence in Panama troubled the Castro
regime enough to drive Cuba to lower its
profile in Panama-at least until the political
crisis is over.
Cuban fishing vessels that normally
change their 50-men crews in Panama
were ordered by Havana to temporarily
transfer that operation to Peru. Likewise,
many of the estimated 20 Cuban vessels
that used to stop for repairs at Panama's
port of Vaca Monte were sent to Peruvian
ports, according to Cuban officials.
Cuban sports and political delegations
that used to pass through Panama's Omar
Torrijos Airport on their way to other Latin
American countries were also re-directed
to Peru, the officials said.
"We want to avoid provocations," a top
Cuban embassy official said in an interview.
"We don't want to give anybody the pretext
to talk about a Cuban intervention that
doesn't exist."
Officially, Cuba has supported Noriega's
struggle against Yankee colonialism, and
has issued numerous public statements to
that effect. There are questions, however,
as to whether those statements have
translated into much more than moral
support.
A small detail that could shed some
light on Cuba's behavior was the muchpublicized shipment of Cuban medicines to
the Noriega regime. The Panamanian
government press said that as much as 14
tons of medicines have been donated by
Cuba to help offset the shortage of drugs
caused by the U.S. financial blockade of
Panama. Cuba's "act of solidarity" made
headlines in the government press.
But Panama's Ministry of Commerce officials told this correspondent privately that
the shipment was not really a donation, but

a barter operation. Panama was to send a
shipment of wood to Cuba in exchange for
the medicines.
Whatever the extent of Cuba's current
involvement in Panama, it is no secret that
Cuba has had close relations with Panama
in recent years.
The Cuban Embassy in Panama, its consulate, and two affiliated commerical offices employ a total of 20 officers. Along
with a group in Argentina, this is the largest
Cuban diplomatic mission in Latin America.
Cuban-Panamanian commercial ties
have grown steadily in recent years, partly
because Cuba uses Panama to circumvent the long-standing U.S. trade embargo. Cuba's imports from Panama's Col6n
Free Zone rose from $15.3 million in 1982
to $48.5 million in 1986, according to
Panamanian government officials.
Cuban officials say there are not more
than 80 Cubans based in Panama who have
any affiliation with the Cuban government.
This figure includes spouses and children,
they say.
The Cuban Embassy employs about 15
Cubans, while about five others work at the
consulate or at the two sister offices in
charge of economic cooperation and
import-export activities. A handful of
Cubans are also here as journalists or
academics, Cuban diplomats say.
The Cuban diplomatic mission in
Panama processes about 15 scholarships

... Cuba contends thatNoriega
is aformer CIA asset who may
return to his old boss once his
current troubles are over
a year for Panamanian college students.
About 100 Panamanians are studying in
Cuba, according to Cuban officials.
So what is one to make of claims that
Castro's Cuba has secretly launched its
latest military adventure in Latin America?
U.S. intelligence sources say the truth
lies somewhere between the bombastic
charges by some Panamanian opposition
leaders and the claims of innocence by
Cuban diplomats.
"We have evidence that there are about
a dozen Cuban military and civilian advisers
in Panama," one U.S. military source said.
A
"That's about all."
Andres Oppenheimer is a Latin American
correspondent for The Miami Herald.
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COMMENAR

After Reagan: Rethinking U.S.
Options in Latin America
by Mark B. Rosenberg

in

Tiempo Nublado, Octavio Paz laments

the fact that U.S. foreign policy flows more
from demands made at home than from
pressures generated abroad. As we turn into the homestretch of the U.S. presidential
campaign, there are fresh indications that
Paz's analysis is on target.
Serious debate about U.S.-Latin American relations has not been a feature of the
1987-88 presidential campaign. Yet, at the
margins of the campaign, a series of efforts
are afoot to formulate guidelines for U.S.
foreign policy toward Latin America during
the next four years.
True, the candidates themselves will not
have a direct role in these efforts, but their
advisers and speech writers will certainly
give close study to foreign-policy recommendations. Such recommendations will
lay the groundwork for intense lobbying on
Capitol Hill aimed not only at elected
senators and representatives but also at
their staffers, whose power multiplies with
the specialized information and policy options that the lobbyists provide. The proposals will give direction to the panoply of
solidarity networks currently involved in lobbying and public education throughout the
United States on Latin America and the
Caribbean.
So, the efforts to develop policy recommendations are noteworthy: not only do
they span the U.S. ideological horizon,
they give testimony to the growing subordinance of U.S. foreign policy to competing
domestic initiatives.
At least five major proposals on U.S.Latin American relations are, or will soon
be, circulating. The Washington-based
Policy Alternatives for the Caribbean and
Central America (PACCA) was established

Mark B. Rosenberg is director of the Latin American
and Caribbean Center at Florida International
University and associate editor of Hemisphere.

in response to the Kissinger Commission's
report on Central America. PACCA's
Changing Course: Blueprint for Peace in
CentralAmerica and the Caribbean (1984)
was one of the first anti-Reagan documents
on the region. Recently, Forging Peace: The
Challenge of Central America has been
given wide distribution. Both PACCA
documents have generated ideas and lobbying strategies that led one academic

...the efforts to develop
policy recommendations are
noteworthy: not only do they
span the U.S. ideological
horizon, they give testimony
to the growlng suberdinance
of U.S. foreign policy to
competing domestic
initiatives.
observer to categorize the group as typical
of Washington's "clerico-leftist foreign
policy lobby." PACCA documents circulate
in the United States and Latin America
through the efforts of solidarity networks of
activists committed to re-directing U.S.
foreign policy in the region.
The Americas in 1988: A Time for
Choices is a report of the Inter-American
Dialogue, which also issued studies in
1983, 1984, and 1986. Many members of
the group, which consists of well-heeled
U.S. and Latin American citizens, have occupied influential positions in their respective governments. The composition of the
Dialogue's governing board and the tone of
its statements recall the membership and
recommendations of the Linowitz Commission, whose 1975 report set the framework
of U.S.-Latin American relations during the

Carter presidency. Sol Linowitz himself, the
co-negotiator of the Panama Canal Treaty,
co-chairs the Dialogue, which frequently
publishes op-ed articles in the nation's major newspapers.
In anticipation of the November presidential election, a new Miami Report has
been issued by the University of Miami's
North-South Center. Miami Report II: New
Perspectives on Debt, Trade and Investment-A Key to U.S.-Latin American
Relations in the 1990s represents the views
of a politically moderate segment of
Miami's internationally-oriented business
and academic communities. The Report
criticizes the United States for ignoring the
problems of Latin America to the detriment
of U.S. international objectives and national
well-being and details inter-American policy
issues in investment, debt, trade, and international education. Itserves as a vehicle for
members of the Miami international community whose interests in the region extend
beyond the confining East-West perspective associated with South Florida politics.
A new Santa Fe Report has been promised by the authors of the 1980 document
that set the tone for the Reagan administration's policy toward Latin America. Heading
the study's preparation are officials of the
neo-conservative Washington Times and
the Washington-based Inter-American
Security Council. Despite its conservative
agenda, we should anticipate surprises. On
the one hand, the document is likely to
underscore the economic dimensions of
U.S.-Latin American security relations-the
debt issue, the Caribbean Basin Initiative,
and the U.S. demand-side of narcotics trafficking. On the other hand, the Santa Fe
group is likely to take a pragmatic position
regarding Cuba, even arguing for a rapprochement between the United States
and Castro. The document will be highly influential among the many and often com-
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peting neo-conservative lobbies that have
emerged in response to the controversies
over funding the contra movement.
But even if the new Santa Fe Report is
issued in timely fashion, it may well play a
secondary role in the making of Republican
policy toward Latin America. Poised to
assume the leading role is the document
being prepared bythe Center for Strategic
and International Studies (formerly of
Georgetown University). CSIS's team consists of pragmatic Washington insiders,

many of whom have mid-level foreign affairs experience. This team will hasten to
distance itself from both the para-militancy
of the Santa Fe group and the conciliatory,
Carteresque quality of the Inter-American
Dialogue. Though the participants are bipartisan, the impact of their proposals will
be greatest if the Republican ticket wins.
Clearly, the emergence of such working
groups and the intensity of their efforts
reflect the growing interplay between
U.S. domestic concerns and developments

in the wider world. The political gamut of
working groups and proposals enhances
the democratic quality of debate and participation in the conduct of U.S. foreign relations. The flip side, however, is that the making of policy has become increasingly fragmented. While such fragmentation presents new opportunities to influence U.S.
policy toward Latin America, it complicates
the crafting of bilateral relations between
the United States and almost every country in the region.
A
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Passage of
Darkness

I

The Ethnobiology
of the Haitian Zombie

i

by Wade Davis
With Forewords by
Robert Farris Thompson
and Richard Evans Schultes

Exploring both the phar-

I

macological and cultural
bases of the zombie phenomenon, Davis demystifies one of the most exploited of folk beliefs, and
one that has been used to
denigrate an entire people
and their religion.

I ne roreign roiicy oraHnT-Lommunism
by Stephen G. Rabe
"First-class research and an important book. It
should become the standard account that analyzes
U.S. policy toward Latin America throughout the
1950s."-Walter LaFeber, Cornell University
Stephen Rabe presents a timely analysis of President Dwight D. Eisenhower's Latin American
Policy. His findings are supported by his examination of archival evidence, especially the recently
declassified materials in the Eisenhower Library
approx. 280 pp., $29.95 cloth, $9.95 paper
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Insider briefs on people and institutions
shaping Latin American and Caribbean affairs

On the Move
Pamela Constable, formerly the Latin
American correspondent for The Boston
Globe, is now its diplomatic correspondent.
Her responsibilities include the Department
of State and national security affairs.

Joan Dassin, staff associate on Latin
America for the Social Science Research
Council, has been named a representative
in the Ford Foundation's office in Rio de
Janeiro. Her replacement at the SSRC is
Silvia Raw, an economist specializing in
Brazilian development, who formerly
taught at Vassar College.

Cole Blasler, founding director of the
University of Pittsburgh's Center for Latin
American Studies, was recently named to
direct the Hispanic Division of the Library
of Congress. A political science professor
at Pitt for some 24 years, he has served on
the Division's board of directors during the
last 15 years.
PaulBoekeristhe new president of San
Diego's Institute of the Americas. A career
foreign service officer, Boeker has served
as U.S. ambassador in Bolivia and Jordan.
His mandate is to expand the Institute's role
as a catalyst for improved understanding
between the Americas and the Pacific Rim.

Thomas Skidmore assumed the Carlos
Nonna Parkeris the U.S. Agency for International Development's new officer in
charge of democratic development and administration of justice. Fresh from a tour in
Peru, Parker and other AID officials are now
shaping a strategy to fund programs that
promote Latin American democratization.

RodrigoFemndez has been re-elected as secretary general of the Confedera-

ci6n Universitaria Centroamericana.
Growth of CSUCA under Fernandez's
stewardship has been impressive. CSUCA's
budget is now about $3 million. More important, the organization enjoys added
credibility with the international education
community.
Guess who's involved again in the U.S.
policy initiatives in Central America? John

Dimitri Negroponte, who earned a
reputation while U.S. ambassador to Honduras (1981-85) as the "master of the
pointless interview," has been appointed
as deputy director of the National Security
Council. He reportedly presides over the
Central America Inter-Agency Policy
Group. Understandably, he's keeping a low
profile these days.
Jean Franco of Columbia University
narrowly edged out the University of
Southern California's Abraham Lowen.
thai for the presidency of the Latin
American Studies Association. Franco succeeds current LASA president Paul Drake,
whose term ends in September 1989.

Manuel de C6spedes chair at Brown
University in September. A Brazilianist,
Skidmore had been on the history faculty
at the University of Wisconsin for 22 years.
Among the attractions at Brown: its Center
for Portuguese and Brazilian Studies and
the shorter commuting time between Providence and Washington, D.C., where his
wife Felicity is a researcher at the Urban
Institute.

Foreign AffairsCaribbean Style
A new journal, modeling itself after the
establishment-oriented ForeignAffairs, has
been launched in the Caribbean by a consortium of investors and intellectuals. Con-

tributors to CaribbeanAffairshave included Michael Manley, Vaughan Lewis,
Selwyn Ryan, Alister McIntyre, and Gordon
Lewis. The publication is testimony to the
efforts by Trinidadian elites to shed the
isolationism of the Eric Williams era.

Bantam's
"Showdown"
Miami Herald book editor William
Robertson has reported (February 14,
1988) that Bantam Books paid a record
$250,000 for the U.S. rights to Jorge
Amado's Showdown. The fast-moving
novel has already sold more than 500,000
copies in Brazil. Bantam is making a major
U.S. marketing effort to ensure visibility and
sales. The story is situated in Bahia and

revolves around the lives of poor settlers
who are dedicated to developing Tocaia
Grande, a new city. True to form, the book
is heavy with sex and violence, but the
underlying themes of cultural pluralism and
social injustice permeate Amado's
narrative.

Watch Out
Bruce Bagley's departure from The
Johns Hopkins University to the University of Miami's Graduate School of International Studies is yet another indicator of the
growing strength of area studies at the
South Florida institution. Bagley's appointment complements GSIS's recent hirings
of Enrique Baloyra and Jiri Valenta.
Credit the school's dean, Ambassador
Ambler Moss, and the Interamerican Institute's director, Jaime Suchlicki, for persistent efforts to strengthen UM's international studies program. Expect a higher UM
profile in area studies, especially in the
fields of national security and comparative
foreign policy.

All That Jazzin Havana
Everyone has heard of Paquito de
Rivera, the Cuban jazz musician who now
lives in the United States. But does anyone
knowwhode Rivera's trumpeter in Havana
was? Cuba's Ninth Latin Jazz Festival was
dedicated toArturoSandoval,who is now
the country's top jazz-rock musician.

Out-Faxing

the Censors
Who hasn't been asked in recent months
to send something by fax to a colleague in
another city? The fax is the latest high-tech
toy to undermine office budgets. Lately, the
fax has played a key role in helping
Panamanian dissidents to beat the military
censors in their country. The Panamanian
News Center in Washington relies almost
exclusively on the fax machine to send
copies of U.S. newspaper articles on
Panama to numerous points throughout the
isthmian country. There, the anti-government opposition uses the fax to distribute
the articles more widely.
A

Hemisphere /Fall 1988

FATUE
B

President Manigat prepares to take on the "last crisis of traditional
Haiti"-before his ouster by the first of two recent military coups.
The crisis continues...

Leslie Manigat
on Haitian Modernization
and the Pursuit of Happiness
An Interview by Anthony P Maingot

nyourearlierscholarship youpositedthe idea ofstages in

Haitian history.What "stage" do you believe Haiti Is in right
now, and what are the major characteristicsofthat stage?
I think we are at the end of a model of society in Haiti. The best
way to understand our analysis of Haitian history and the evolution
along stages is to get an inspiration from the book by Daniel Lerner
on Turkey, The Passing of the Traditional Society.
It seems to me that the crisis that we are living now is the final
crisis of the Haitian traditional society, one which came out of the
Independence War and established itself after the assassination of
Dessalines, from 1806 to the Duvalier era. To follow the truth more
strictly, I should have said from the assassination of Dessalines to
the U.S. occupation. This is so because the crisis was there at the
time of the U.S. occupation. There was an aborted attempt to modernize Haiti by the Americans during the occupation. The old system
remained without being rennovated, changed, or modernized.
Therefore we have the last crisis now of the traditional society, and
the answer to that crisis is modernization.
The problem is, what type of modernization? When we speak of
stages, we are at the end of the traditional society, which is going
into its final stage. Of course, this crisis will last because it began
under the Duvalier, Francois the father, who gave a fascistoid
answer to that crisis. And, after that, his son Jean Claude gave
another answer: an attempt at liberalization but within the context
of an authoritarian regime led by the father. So it was a mixed, ambiguous response with finally an "opening up" of the country to outside forces but in disorder, what you might call capitalisme sauvage
under Duvalier the son, which finally explains Haiti today: the abandonment of Haitian sovereignty.
The state is no longer functioning to satisfy the basic needs of
the population but depends on help from abroad. Whether from
governments or from international organizations, this aid is a
substitute for the normal function of the state. That is why you can
Editor's Note: This interview took place in Port-au-Prince on March
19. The complete transcript may be obtained by contacting
Hemisphere's deputy editor.
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have about 300 NGOs [non-government organizations] taking care
of the basic needs in Haiti and assuming responsibilities which
should normally be the responsibilities of the state. It is evident,
therefore, that the answer given by Duvalier was not the correct one
to modernize Haiti. That's the reason we are coming with our own
answer to that crisis.
Modernization for us means "triple" modernization-first,political
modernization, which is democracy. This will take some time, but
we are definitely entering the process of the organization of Haiti.
That is the reason why I called February 2 "the first day of the year
one" of democracy in Haiti. Second, economic modernization,
which means a type of integrated development with a strong participation of the population itself in building the new economic structures of the country. And third, social modernization, which means
a more just society; we must fight against an unacceptable degree
of social injustice in the traditional society; we must build a more
equitable society.
But while doing that in the economic and social field, we must
preserve what we have called Haitian soul, Haitian cultural identity, basic Haitian cultural personality. I define Haiti, we have defined Haiti, as the country of joyful or cheerful misery. We have to fight
misery; however, we must be very careful not to eliminate this
capacity to smile at life, to be cheerful, to be joyful. Let us say-no
matter how sad it may sound to say so-to be happy within misery.
PresidentManigat, howdoyouperceiveyourrelations with

the following countries: the United States, the Dominican
Republic, the CARICOM countries, France, Cuba, and
Venezuela?
With the U.S., it is very easy to define our relationship. We are
in the Caribbean area at the southern border of the United States.
The United States is one of the two superpowers of the world, and
there is a tradition of friendly relations in certain fields with Haiti since
the independence of the two countries. Therefore we are interested
in strengthening this friendship, this solidarity.
But it is also true, again looking at history, that we have been also
victims of a degree of dependence which constitutes a negation or

a denial of national sovereignty. This has been the case in the political
field, as well as in the economic field. There is a feeling in Haiti that
in dealing with the United States we must preserve our national interest, our national dignity. We want to be friends, but like Carlos
Fuentes said, not satellites.
Since we consider it normal for Washington to defend and promote its own national interests, Washington must also consider that
it is normal that we defend and promote our own national interests.
Therefore the dialogue will be a dialogue between two partners, each
defending its interests, its views and conceptions.
What does Washington represent to Haiti? One, Washington is
a big Western democracy. In the political field there is a strong affinity, strong political aspirations, to build a viable democracy in Haiti
based on the political system of the United States, which is a more
traditional, classic democracy of the Western style. Second, the
Americans represent for us the biggest consumer market in the
world, and we are geographically close to that market. Third,
America is the leading power in the field of high technology. Technology will probably be the leading variable to
build the new society,to build the new civilizaI define Haiti,, we
tion. And fourth, the U.S. is one of the richest

countries in the world, a center of financial

Haiti, as the

resources and an important power within the
Or cheerful
world's financial organizations. We need,
therefore, to welcome American investments
in Haiti.
But again, we emphasize the fact that this must, in our opinion,
meet an equivalent good will from Washington, an effort to understand Haiti as a small nation, and also an effort not to try to put Haiti
on its knees, because I think this will be counterproductive, given
Haitian history and Haitian pride.
Could you brieflytell me something aboutyour relations with
the Dominican Republic, Cuba, the other Caribbean countries,
and finally,Venezuela and France?
Let us define ourselves quite briefly but strongly: we are a Caribbean nation. We are the first Caribbean nation as such, politically
speaking, and the new government wants to orient our effort, our
own people, toward the content and the meaning of that definition
of being a Caribbean nation. We want Haiti to be more associated
with its neighbors in the Caribbean area-to play a more active role
in the shaping of the Caribbean future, to be accepted as an important actor in the collective effort towards Caribbean unity. When I
was in Trinidad, it seemed to me that it was obvious to everybody
that Iwas a Caribbean man and Iwill be in power as a Caribbean man.
Many times I have made strong statements about the way we in
Haiti see the future of relations between Haiti and the Dominican
Republic. We are seeking a change in the dominant characteristics
in relations between the Dominican Republic and Haiti in order to
build a new era of cooperation between the two nations, the way
that Adenauer and DeGaulle did. However, to be partners, there
must be at least two; we therefore expect the same position, the
same disposition on the other side of the border. What does that
mean? First, there must be a change of conceptions on the other
part of the border, because if you conceive a new partner-not its
elite but its masses-as being inferior in racial and cultural terms,
it is difficult to fully accept this partner on an equal basis. There must
be an effort to change the Dominican mentality, to change their traditional conceptions of the Haitian masses. There is one thing which
is not well perceived on the other part of the border: that Haiti might
be poor in the economic and social field and the elites rich and

iser

opulent, but there is a popular culture in Haiti which is very rich. So,
when you perceive the masses as being culturally inferior, you don't
know the masses, because it is in the Haitian masses that we are
the most rich, diversified, and extraordinary country.
But I must add one thing. There is a possibility that there is a new
trend in the Dominican Republic, among the intellectuals and even
among the people themselves. I say this because, contrary to what
I have just said, there are some good practices and traditions of
friendship between the two countries. I have also detected in some
of the recent statements of the present Dominican government a
kind of disposition for that new type of relations. Since the present
party in power in the Dominican Republic has adopted, at least officially, a Christian Democratic label, maybe in Christianity, with its
strong message about the equal dignity of every human being, you
will find the source of inspiration for this new conception and attitude
in the Dominican Republic toward Haiti.
What do you perceive your relations with the CARICOM
countries to be?
We certainly know that during the presidential campaign I was the only one to raise the
problem of the English-speaking Caribbean as
our friends and brothers and to try to inject
of joyful
some Caribbean content in the list of issues in
rY
the campaign, for the future of Haiti. I believe
I have been called by someone the "Caribbean
man" among the candidates. That is so because I spent almost five
years in the English-speaking Caribbean, and I traveled more than
ten years in the area. Iam determined to take all possible initiatives
to favor and bring to fruition a rapprochement and association with
the English-speaking Caribbean.
But the problem is that this must correspond to some impulse also
from CARICOM, from our Caribbean brothers. I ask myself, how can
you have a man like Leslie Manigat in power-with what I tried to do
in the Caribbean, with the ideas that I have and positions I have
taken-and yet it is right at this moment that some reservations are
expressed about Haiti or about the Haitian government?
I don't understand, quite frankly, why a country like Barbados
seems to have taken such a strong position when I have only friends
in Barbados, among officials and among the population. I don't think
they are correctly informed about what is happening in Haiti and what
the position of the new government is. It is only now that we have
a chance for democracy, now that we have preserved the chance
for democracy in Haiti. Be assured that if it were not for our solution, there would have been chaos, civil war, a coup, or foreign intervention in Haiti. All of these alternatives would have been
undemocratic or anti-democratic.

have defined
ntry

How do you perceive your relations with Cuba?
People must realize that in all the Caribbean area we are the
closest neighbor of Cuba. They must also realize that we have had
a Haitian colony in Cuba since the beginning of this century and they
maintain some kind of Haitian feelings, if not a total Haitian identity. People must also realize that every day we have radio transmissions from Havana in Creole that any Haitian peasant with a small
transistor may listen to. Therefore Cuba has more of a presence in
Haiti than any other Caribbean island.
But here is something which is very important: because of the
political situation, because of the nature of the Cuban regime, we
have no official relations with Cuba. We have a strange situation in
which there is a presence, but this presence is not formalized in
diplomatic relations. Can we live with that? Of course we can. There
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is no problem. An important fact about Haiti is we have no enemies.
Our problem with Cuba is only a problem in that, unfortunately,
Cuba represents the introduction of the East-West conflict in the
Caribbean. Haiti does not want to be involved in the East-West conflict. We have all that we can handle with the North-South conflict.
We do not wish to add to our present problems, our present complications. That's why we don't think it is a matter of priority for Haiti
to resume diplomatic relations with Cuba.
Cuba is not obsessed, either, with the assumption of diplomatic
relations with Haiti. Cuba is more interested in developing peaceful,
friendly relations, and to find some ways of cooperation in the
economic and social fields. Our decision, therefore, is very simple:
we can live with Cuba as a neighbor without interfering in Cuban affairs and with no interference from Cuba in our own internal affairs.
I think that the Cuban problem will have to be solved in a regional
context, not in the national context.

PresidentManigat,could you concludethesecondquestion
by telling us something about Haiti's future relations with

But more than that, with eight years of exile in Venezuela, we have
some very strong personal and institutional links with Venezuela.
And there is one very serious point: since 1958 Venezuela has made
an experience of the democratic process, which we have observed with interest. I am not trying to exaggerate the virtues of
Venezuelan democracy, but I must say that I have seen in Venezuela
how parties deal with each other, how the liberties and freedoms
have been respected, how institutions function.
Of course, unfortunately for us, Venezuela is no longer in the
golden period of the oil bonanza, in what they sometimes called
"Venezuela Saudita." Unfortunately for us because at that time
Venezuela was helping other countries in Latin America, in the Caribbean, to an extent that has no precedent. But despite the limitations,
they still are a rich oil country and we think that we can cooperate
in many ways, not only in the financial field but also, for example,
in the model of relations between the military and the civilian
government.
President Manigat, could you address the question of

foreignaid generally,but veryspecificallythe relationshipof
the approximately300 NGOs in the processofdevelopment,

France and with Venezuela?
Look at the present Haitian government and you will see a lot of
people who have been trained in France. From the president to the
prime minister, the minister of external affairs, to other members
of cabinet. Given the aristocratic origin of Haiti

as you have outlinedit in this interview?
First, we must rethink the problem of foreign aid to Haiti. Foreign
aid has helped us to accelerate the process of

and the francophone character and tradition

modernization, the process of development.

We welcome foreign aid. But it must be foreign
of our elites, France is for us a very important
... the crisis tlhat we are living
partner. And France is a very important part- nOW Is the fin al crisis of the
aid directly to our country.
ner in the political sphere for a lot of reasons. Haitian
We would like, therefore, to see the aid be
tradit
II society....
France today is a countrywith a strong current
more efficient, to be really channeled to the
of modernization from which we may benefit.
masses. But there is also another issue. Since
But let me make some specific points.Today, in France, what do
we are benefiting from aid from various countries, there is a probwe see? We see the first possibility since DeGaulle to have a more
lem in the coordination of this foreign aid, how to incorporate it into
comprehensive North because, since DeGaulle, France has
a national scheme of development. Much aid goes through NGOs,
developed a conception of North-South relations which is, accordand we have 300 or more working in Haiti. But each NGO in Haiti
ing to what I know, (except for the Scandinavian countries, Sweden
is doing what it wants, according to their own scheme, their own profor example) the most humanistic one that the North has developed
grams, their own conceptions. Let us put it another way: I would say
toward the countries of the South.
that the sovereignty of the country has been, to a large extent, abanAlso, France has two islands in the Caribbean, Guadeloupe and
doned to the initiatives and responsibilities of the NGOs.
Martinique, where I have lived, which are very close to our hearts.
That is why we have decided to let the minister of external affairs,
I taught there, and we plan to develop our relations with them. They
whose ministry is the entry gate for any international contact of the
are officially part of France, so that is an additional reason why we
government, dedicate himself to the coordination and organization
are interested in France.
of our foreign economic relations. We have given the minister the
additional title of directeurgenerale de la cooperation internationale.
What is the status of your government's relations with
Again, there is another thing I would like to see result from foreign
Venezuela?
aid: foreign aid must generate more national production and enVenezuela for us is a special case because we think that
courage national participation in the building of the new society. We
Venezuela is symbolic of our relations with Latin America. We want
welcome that foreign aid when it is needed, but we don't want to
to be more associated, more integrated with Latin America, for a
be perpetually, for all Haitian history, dependent on foreign aid.
lot of reasons. One reason is historical: that is where our diplomatic
As a matter of principle, as a matter of interest, we want to diverrelations and solidarity started. But we also want to put an end to
sify our partners in the field of foreign aid, and we have good relaany ambiguity in the Haitian identity and position, because we have
tions with Germany-a country which has never ceased providing
long been the only purely black nation in Latin America and, addiaid. That's one good example which will serve us in our cooperationally, we are French-speaking and not Spanish. We are in a
with countries like Italy, Spain, but also with Third World countion
singular position within Latin America. But now that the world has
tries in Africa and particularly in Asia. With the newly developed naseen the evolution of Caribbean and African black nations, this is
tions in Asia we are sure that we can develop good and fruitful relano longer an oddity. The fact that we speak French is no longer an
tions in the field of economic-social mutual cooperation because
obstacle, because more and more Haitians speak Spanish. Besides,
they have already started the process.
French, after all, is a Latin language. Therefore, we should realize
President Manigat, it is frequentlynoted that in Haiti there
what the world is seeing: that Haitians are Latin Americans, too. We
are three urban economicsectorsin conflict,a conflictwhich
are definitely oriented toward that kind of closer association with
is structuralbut whichalso has a politicaldimension. To wit:
Latin America, and Venezuela represents for us the gateway to Latin
America.
the conflictbetween that sectorwhichyou traditionallyhave

iona
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called the commercialsector(commissionagents importing
forresale withinHaiti), the sectorwhich is involved in import-

substitutionmanufacturing,and the newest sectorinHaiti, the
industrial or assemblysectorgeared to export. How willyou
attempt to hannrmonize statepolicy towardsthese threegroups?
It is true that there are, if not conflicts of interest, at least divergencies of interest between these three sectors. The most traditional
one has been the commercial sector, the export-import trade sector. They have been present since the beginning of Haitian history.
They are part of the traditional system, and for a long, long time they
have been the only decisive factor in the economic field and in the
political field. They have been the traditional oligarchy. The second
sector, which is involved in import substitution, has something to
do with the Latin American trend, with CEPAL and so on, and has
been at least a more modern sector compared

with the first one. The third one, the assembly
industry, at the time of Jean Claude Duvalier
particularly benefited from the opening up of
the U.S. market and also from the new
redistribution of industrial activities at the world

Here in Haiti

for a lot of reasons. This makes this sector a precarious one, because
competition is such that it is enough for a'change in the monetary
situation of any state to jeopardize the existence and the strength
of this sector. By the simple effect of the change in the monetary
parity expressed in terms of dollars, the salary of the workers in
Venezuela, Mexico, or in the Dominican Republic may become lower
than that in Haiti. Nearly immediately, investors become interested
in transferring their dollar activities in Haiti to places where things
are cheaper in terms of dollars. So this is why one must watch the
evolution of events in this sector. And this is one of the primary
reasons why you cannot accept sudden increases in wages which
might jeopardize the creation of jobs as well as existing ones. If you
say the people are miserable because they are receiving only three
dollars a day, and that this is impossible, not acceptable, so we
should put the minimum wage at five dollars a
day, you are going to kill "the goose that laid

you Ssee people

the golden egg."

cenfronting I tottally
unacceptahbl e sitnation...and

Now, let us come to the last one, the more
traditional one: the commercial sector in the
strict sense of importlexport trade. Here there
is the problem of the tension between routine
they can stillIsmlie....They
scale,
Now, what is the national interest of Haiti,
and modernization. Some of the people involvcan smile at life , smile at
and how to harmonize these three sectors?
others.
ed have become accustomed to living with
These three sectors are correctly analyzed as
what we call in French a mentalit& de rentier.
They are suspicious of any move, any change
being three, but for us, operationally, there are
which could jeopardize their interest. They don't see the necessity
two. Why am I saying this? Remember what I said earlier: the main
problem of Haiti is modernization. Now, if you put our objectives in
to expand, to modernize, because it has always been like that, their
marginal profit, their security. They don't want to face the risk of
that light, you must analyze these three sectors in the following
terms: where is there archaism and where is there modernity? Tochanging. It is not, therefore, a true capitalist mentality, nor is it an
day the frontier line is not between the three sectors but within each
entrepreneurial mentality.
sector.
Yet, I must say that for the past few years there has been developing within that sector a more modern segment. I recently called that
One of the most dynamic and most promising sectors is the national industry working with local raw materials for national consumpsegment la bourgeoise d'esprit capitaliste. They understand more
tion. Industrialization must not be something artificial, it must corand more the necessity of change, the necessity of transition, the
respond to the profound realities of what we can call "deep counnecessity to abandon the oligarchic mentality and to accept a more
try." Now, what kind of economic activity is in keeping with that
democratic mentality, not only in the political field but also in
"deep country"? It is that industry which transforms local raw
economic relations, in social relations, with the unions as their partners. This latter is especially important because it is in that importmaterials into products for local consumption. The problems that
we have in that sector are, first, that production, unfortunately, is
export sector that you traditionally have found resistance to unions.
You also, of course, find this resistance in the other sectors. They
too weak. This is why this sector is interested in our policy of social
justice, because if you want to raise the buying power of the workers
have to change, to modernize their work relations and accept the
so that they become consumers of our own production, you must
unions as partners in the process of production.
make an effort towards social justice. That is why we find more
Finally, I must confess that today Iobserve some efforts towards
understanding, more comprehension, more support, from that secthe integration of the three sectors. For instance, right now, as we
tor than from any other sector in the society.
are speaking, there are attempts under way to harmonize the inOne other advantage I've seen in that area is that at the same
terests of these three sectors and even to try to put the three under
time that they are producing for local consumption, they can prothe same hat, through a kind of committee or other kind of instituduce for export. But in order to achieve that, they have to do two
tion. So there is an effort to reduce traditional divergencies and move
things that are crucial for the modernization process: first, stimulate
towards a more unified position favorable to economic and social
cooperatives of tomato growers, and secondly, rationalize landmodernization.
holding patterns-many smaller plots into more productive holdings.
President Manigat, there isa questionabout ruralHaiti,still
They are creating jobs while also producing for the local market and
the majority of Haiti, although that is changing very fast.
placing themselves in a position to export. So it seems to us that this
sector is one of the most important for the future of Haiti.
Agriculturefaces a dilemma. Again, it stems from conflicting
Now let us take the third one, the assembly industry. It is good
interests.
for the country, in a certain sense, because it has been the most
How will you reconcile: (1)protectionismto encourage local
dynamic sector in the national process for these past years. We must
productionofstaples(even thoughtheyhave high production
encourage its development, maintain its existence, because it is
costs);(2)the continuedreceiptanddistribution of free staples
creating jobs in Haiti. But now, what is the problem of this sector?
as aid;and (3) measures to minimize living costs by opening
It relates to the fact that Haiti has a strict parity with the dollar, one
up the market to imports, which veryoften come cheaperthan
for five, that we cherish, and we intend to defend that exchange rate
locallymanufactured products?
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It is true we are in the evolution of the country from a predominantly rural population toward a more equilibrated rural-urban balance.
But in spite of that trend, the country is still predominantly rural. With
70 percent of Haitians living in the countryside, the main part of the
population is still composed of rural dwellers, of peasants. Inattempting to understand where the national interest lies, you must take into consideration, first, who the 70 percent are. Second, we are in
a system of free enterprise. But at the same time that we accept
the market economy, we have the national interest to defend and
national interest also means national production.
Ifwe take these two observations into account, our problem is
the following: what does free enterprise, free trade, mean for Haiti
today? If we accept what I said earlier on, that Haiti is at the end of
a stage, the end of a system, that we are going toward modernization (which includes the process of industrialization), what does that
mean for Haiti?
Adopting the free enterprise system does not mean that one cannot use some kind of protection in order to protect the infant
economy, infant production. We are even more inclined toward protection because, when you look at the products which are in competition with our national products, you see that many of them are
subsidized. Let me use the example of rice. We were once an exporter of rice, but this sadly changed under the Duvaliers. Today we
face strong competition from cheaper rice. Our position concerning the rice issue is very simple: we must not permit the destruction
of our national production of rice. Now, does this mean that we shall
limit ourselves to protectionist policies, putting a high tariff on the
rice from abroad in order to protect our rice?
The answer is no. The answer is not to prohibit rice entering legally
through customs. Because if you do that, you are going to encourage
archaism, you are going to encourage the attitude of not changing
things, not modernizing production. The answer is to do what we
called in French, moduler, modulate a policy. On the one hand, not
to permit the destruction of the national rice industry, but at the same
time, to encourage the Haitian rice industry to modernize its production in order to be more competitive.
Thankyou President Manigat. Wouldyounowcare to make
a final statement for this interview?
Wewant to develop, to realize the economic and social modernization of our country. As we said, Haiti is still a peasant society, so
we have to pay special attention to the peasant sector when we
speak of modernizing the country. We must develop cooperatives,
but we must develop them through the original Haitian culture, using our strong, spontaneous cooperative spirit. That is why we have
created two new ministries, the Ministry of Cooperatives and Mutuality and the Ministry of Culture. Now, what will be the tool, the instrument for rural development? We want to cover the country with a
network of what we call la maison du peuple.
What is the role of maisons du peuple? It is, first of all, a center
where the population will find the services from the state-for example, medical care, information, practical education, debate about
local problems, and cultural activities. Finally, this maison dupeupie will be what we call in French un centre nodaldedeveloppement.
That is why there will be attached to each center a piece of land in
which people can experiment with plantings.
The maison will also create an atmosphere which should encourage cooperation and solidarity between the military and the
civilian, a new type of relationship between the police and the population and even a new type of orientation towards solidarity and, if
possible, the apprenticeship of common happiness.
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I have heard you expound on the concept ofhappiness. I
thinkitisthe first time I everhearda socialscientist talkabout
happinessin operationalterms as a variable;one usuallytalks
about it in terms of an ideal. Maybe you couldtell us abit about

this notion ofhappiness.
Let me say it very briefly and very simply. What is the objective
of development? I don't think it is richness because if it were richness,
then there is something terribly unjust in the world, because the
United States and the bigger countries have reached a degree of
richness that we will never reach unless we discover some very
precious resource that was unknown before. So the object of
development for us is not richness. It is a decent life, which is quite
different from richness. A modest life, to satisfy the basic needs. I
have called this the capacity to smile with life and with others, which
Isometimes define as happiness. After all, what is a smile? A smile
is not only an external expression. A smile is an internal expression.
The capacity to smile is something which gives an equilibrium to a
lot of things. The capacity to smile to oneself, to accept yourself,
must come first. That means not having any complex or unusual
stress, no obsession that accounts for unhappiness. That is why you
have to smile first to yourself, and second at life.
Here in Haiti you see people confronting a totally unacceptable
situation of a lack of water and they can still smile. You can come
to a peasant house where they are deprived of everything, but they
will serve you the best that they have. If all they have for themselves
is a cup of coffee, they will offer that cup of coffee to you. They can
smile at life, smile at others. I would even say that loving others is
the norm in Haiti. This does give a certain religious touch to the
problem.
If we are responsible leaders of the society, we should strive for
a goal in which-even in sometimes hard conditions-we find a feeling of solidarity, a feeling of peace and loving, a feeling we call
happiness.
I remember once at a meeting of the Caribbean Development
Bank we were discussing the future of Haiti with a group of so-called
experts. I injected these comments about the pursuit of happiness
in the analysis, and someone at the meeting mentioned, smiling as
a joke, that he was not interested in happiness. And I said, what a
pity, you should be.

Voodoo's New
Legitimacy
by BernardDiederich
Gro Roche's friendly face wrinkled into a smile as he caught his
breath, resting against a large rock in the lakou of his houmfort at
Lilavois, just a mile up the gravel road from Brigadier General Henri
Namphy's little ranch. The 75 year-old houngan could afford to smile.
He had provided his loas with a rich and bountiful ceremony. A huge
brown bull had been sacrificed on the afternoon of November 25, the
last day of the traditional rite at Gro Roche's place. On the eve of the
first democratic elections in 30 years, the turmoil gripping the country did not enter this secluded rural corner some 12 miles from the
capital.

Not that Lilavois remained untouched by national politics: the
ceremony-one of the most important in the voodoo pantheon-was
fundamentally a prayer for peaceful and successful elections. This
aspect of voodoo rarely enters into accounts of the folk religion, which
instead portray it as an exotic, sinister force.
Making voodoo the whipping boy for Haiti's ills is as old as Haiti
itself. Recent events indicate that this custom is alive and well, both
in Haiti and abroad.
In Haiti, the overthrow of Duvalier unleashed waves of popular
revenge against a regime regarded as evil. Inthe countryside the first
wave of popular justice against the hated Ti Macoutes was
followed by mob action against Ti Houngans who were Ti Macoutes,
then against houngans and mambos. There were signs that Catholic
youths and some priests, as well as Protestant pastors, were involved in an anti-voodoo crusade despite the church's earlier call for a
halt to revenge. The last wave was directed against loup-garous,the
mythical werewolves, which to many Haitians are terrifyingly real. People were intent on exorcising their own fears by killing evil. A man near
Gonaives accused of being a loup-garou and a chanpwell was hacked to death by a mob. His remains, tied to a telephone poll, were set
afire. Only three days earlier the victim had been adechouker involved
in the killing of another man singled out as a malfete.
Abroad, voodoo has helped to sell more books about the society
than have Haitian politics themselves. The morbid fascination with
voodoo helps to explain why events in Haiti have always aroused intense curiosity. Often the commentary evoked abroad is far stranger
than the events themselves.
Soon after the tragic election day, The Wall
Street Journal decided that the secret voodoo
Despite the

societies were responsible for the terrible

Journal asserted that the Duvalier dictatorship had allied itself with
the Bizango, which served the regime as a kind of secret police. It
quoted Davis as stating that the leaders of the secret societies almost
inevitably became powerful members of the Ton Ton Macoute, and
that the army is still riddled with members of the secret societies.
"If Haiti is to gain release from its powerful voodoo theocracy,"
warned The Journal, "it will need the skills and energy of many of
its exiles." Haitian leaders will need continued U.S. support, the
report added, "if they are going to prevail against the kind of sinister
force in Haiti that most Americans can only begin to comprehend."

From Zombies
to Secret Societies

sca

A few days later, The Journal published an article by Haitian anthropologist Michel S. Laguerre, a professor at the University of
California at Berkeley and the author of Politics and Voodoo: Stilla
Potent Combination in Haiti. Laguerre took to task the November
29 report.
"Clearly the world is correct in defining the carnage that took
place in Haiti last Sunday as a harvest of shame for the ruling junta
and the regular army," he wrote. But the outside reporters, analysts,
and politicians, he added, have taken "the simplistic road of
categorizing these events as rightwing, leftwing, interventionist, noninterventionist, etc., depending on their own ideological predilections." In fact, said Laguerre, "confusion about the functioning of
Haiti's army-led government stems from the inability of some
analysts to understand two important aspects
in the makeup of the army: its historical relapegoating
the
tionship to the Ton Ton Macoute Force and
I,what
participation of some of its members in secret

in

read

events in Haiti. Bizango bashing was in.
Haiti and abl
Haiti was said to be in the grip of these
societies."
emerges is V000 o00's
secret societies, in particular the Bizango. The
Laguerre noted that, in describing Duvalier's
remarkable
Icap
mystical misfits and nightmarish characters of
creation of the Ton Ton Macoute and neutraldver
ization of the armed forces, one more comHaitian folklore were alive and well. Bakas and
loup-garous, gangs of sorcerers, the chanpplication must be added to the puzzle: the
well, Bizango, zobop, viendendeng, and galipot were flying through
secret voodoo connection.
the rural night, bewitching and switching into animal form. They
Laguerre contended that: "Another major development in the argenerate a fear that keeps children from misbehaving, turns thieves
my during the Duvalier years was the extent to which soldiers and
chicken, and keeps the rural road clear of nighttime traffic. They also
Ton Ton Macoutes become involved in the network of voodoo secret
have a remarkable ability to trick writers into joining the chorus of
societies. The secret societies function in Haiti as a paramilitary
fools, along with bouqui and malice.
government with their own underground police force, judicial bodies
When tapping the Haitian's well-stocked memory bank of myths,
and spying agents. They even issue passports, without which one
a writer must be careful not to take literally everything that is said.
is ill-advised to travel in the countryside at night."
Writers for The Journal, in their zeal to explain what they called the
Since Francois Duvalier was recruiting without discrimination,
"Haitian Horror," seemed unaware of this fact.
a number of voodoo practitioners were incorporated into the Ton
On November 29, 1987, The Journal charged that "after the
Ton Macoute. General Namphy's disbanding of the Ton Ton
French left in 1804, the male voodoo priests, orhoungans, ruled the
Macoute had no impact on the sub-groups formed by such practicountryside through the use of native poisons and secret religious
tioners, for the simple reason that they have a long tradition and funcsocieties." Bringing the reader up to date, the newspaper made an
tion as both military and religious organizations.
even more outrageous charge: "It is clear that to this day much of
Laguerre reported that one soldier said that some of his comrades
Haiti is controlled by a voodoo theocracy called Bizango."
joined secret societies out of "fear for their own lives because of
The Journal's cited source was New York Botanical Garden
the suspected malevolent intent of their fellow soldiers and also
ethnobiologist Wade Davis, who, it claimed, "penetrated this world
because of their belief in the practice of voodoo as a way of getting
in search of the potion used to create zombies. He found it, but he
promotions." According to Laguerre, soldiers cannot protect
also uncovered the immense power wielded by the Bizango
civilians "when a secret society decides through its underground
sorcerer-priests." According to The Journal, in 1983 Davis interviewgoverning council to take action against an outsider."
ed a Bizango leader who bragged, "The [politicians] in Port-au-Prince
Laguerre's conclusion stressed that, for Haiti to establish
must cooperate with us, we were here before them and if we didn't
democratic institutions, "much effort must be expended to underwant them, they wouldn't be where they are. There are not many
stand the strength, the operation and the relationship of the secret
guns in the country, but those that there are, we have them." The
societies to the regular army." Foreign intervention, he argued,

overcome a

acity to
slity.
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would strengthen the secret societies, as it had in the past. As a solution, Laguerre advocated "bringing voodoo out in the open. Official
recognition would drain the secret societies of perhaps their most
powerful raison d'etre: secret protector of the national religion."
The Journal's editor, Robert L. Bartley, responded by personally
defending his analysis of Haiti. Bartley reassured the readers that
his sources vouch for the fact that the Bizango societies operate
as a shadow government in Haiti-with their own leaders, chains of
command, and means of discipline-and that the Duvalier government consolidated itself by championing the ancestral voodoo
religion against outside influences.
Not long afterwards, the fearsome image of Haiti received
Hollywood-style embellishment. The movie version of Professor
Davis's research, "The Serpent and the Rainbow," appeared this
past spring, thrilling horror-film fans with evil Macoute murderers
zapping zombies. The Macoutes do exist, but the movie's terrifying imagery represents the imagination and fears of foreigners.

The New Legitimacy of Voodoo
Despite the scapegoating in Haiti and abroad, what emerges is
voodoo's remarkable capacity to overcome adversity. Voodoo has
survived one of the most difficult periods in its tumultuous history,
and even managed to win the endorsement of Leslie Manigat during his short-lived presidency.
As Leslie Manigat's February 7 inauguration approached, the
Catholic Church faced a dilemma: to sing or not to sing a Te Deum
for the new president. The traditional Catholic benediction has
always been considered important in Haiti; it is the sacred aspect
of authority. Toussaint L'Overture, when he arrived in Port-au-Prince,
had a Te Deum sung at the cathedral where he preached. And the
Duvalieristas never tired of quoting St. Paul: "All authority comes

from God." If the Church would have blessed Manigat's inauguration with the traditional service, it would have been viewed as officially sanctioning the presidential election. But, according to one
Catholic priest, "The Church didn't have to make the decision. The
generals made it for them: They didn't ask for a Te Deum."
Absence of the blessing caused such widespread speculation
that Manigat, in his first televised koze an ba tonel avek pep la-a
tropical version of the fireside chat-found it necessary to explain
the circumstances. The new president denied that the Church had
refused to celebrate a Te Deum, saying that "one was never requested by the state for the inauguration." Yet Manigat did thank
"certain priests, certain bishops, and many of the faithful of the
Catholic Church who prayed for us at the time of the inauguration,"
as well as "the Protestant churches that in certain parts of the country organized ceremonies to ask God's blessing for the new govern-

ment."
He went on to say: "I thank the voodoo cult in particular. They
had thanksgiving ceremonies to draw God's attention-they believe
in God, too-to the government, so that it can be a good government,
so that the practitioners of voodoo can enjoy freedom and equal
treatment, just like any other religion in Haiti. The state is neutral
on this matter and ready to allow all religions to flourish normally,
on the condition, of course, that they respect the rules and the law."
Although such recognition doesn't mean that voodoo has suddenly become Haiti's quasi-official religion, it does mean that voodoo
can no longer be ignored. Voodoo has been decriminalized; the 1987
constitution recognizes voodoo as a cult with the same rights as
other religions. Recognition also means, as some houngans have
suggested by their actions, that voodoo is no longer content to play
the passive role of "suffering the sins of others."
Bernard Diederich is a consultant for Time magazine.
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The next president of the United States will inherit
the destructive legacy of Reagan policy in Central America.
But if Dukakis wins, will his administration do any better?

Undoing Reagan's Legacy
by Morris Blachman and Kenneth Sharpe

If

Michael Dukakis wins this fall's elections, Central America will
be one of the major foreign-policy dilemmas he faces. A Dukakis
administration will inherit a difficult situation made worse by eight
years of failed Reagan administration policies, and the U.S. public
will expect a new course of action. It is crucial that Dukakis recognize
the problems inherent in the Reagan legacy and work to reverse their
damage.
The legacy is clear. In El Salvador, policies meant to end the civil
war and consolidate a moderate government have deepened the
conflict. The insurgents remain a serious military force and retain
significant mass support, while the government of the gravely ill Jose
Napole6n Duarte has suffered serious erosion of support due to corruption, failu re to implement promised reforms, and inability to end
the war. The fragile political facade erected by Reagan policies could
come apart at any moment.
In Guatemala and Honduras, as in El Salvador, elected governments hold office, but harsh and corrupt military officers still
monopolize power. Fundamental political and agrarian reforms to
eliminate the sources of turmoil have not been undertaken. The
Reagan administration's funding of a contra army to oust the
Nicaraguan government has turned Honduras into a military base
of operations and destabilized the Honduran economy, promoted
capital flight, encouraged drug dealing and corruption among its high
officials, and strengthened the military at the expense of a fledgling civilian regime.
In Nicaragua, contra aid not only has sacrificed peace for war
and undermined development programs, but it has also further involved East-West issues in a basically local conflict by pushing the
Nicaraguans to militarize, seek increased Soviet arms shipments,
and maintain the presence of Cuban advisors.
Our major regional and European allies see the United States as
scuttling attempts to negotiate peace and security agreements,
while often backing disreputable, anti-democratic military officers
and political leaders. The Central American Accord (Esquipulas II)
provides the United States with a historic opportunity to forge a true
partnership in the region that could serve both U.S. and Central
American interests.
What's the smart, effective, principled policy the United States
needs in order to reverse eight years of failed Reagan policies?

Combining Principles
and Realism
Democrats have already laid a solid foundation in the primary
campaigns with cogent criticisms of the Reagan administration's
methods: its counterproductive use of force, immoral and ineffective proxy armies, bullying attitude toward our neighbors, flouting
of U.S. democratic procedures, and indifference to social,
economic, and political justice. It is equally important to make clear
how the goals of Democrats differ from those of Republicans, and
to anticipate the attacks against the Democratic agenda by the
Republican right.
The goals of the Democratic agenda are simple: peace and
security for the United States and Central America. These goals demand policies that not only minimize East-West intervention in local
conflicts but also foster equitable development and democratic
governance. No matter how much assistance the United States
pours into Central America, significant development cannot take
place until the region's governments implement the very reforms
that economic and military elites are blocking. Nor will there be
significant development as long as civil conflict is raging: pumping
aid intowar-torn countries does little more than superficially repair
damage and prop up local armies.
A Dukakis administration should put into action a five-point program to:
* De-escalate superpower rivalry in the region.
* Demilitarize the region.
* End support for mercenary activity.
* Encourage genuinely democratic institutions, values,
and practices.
* Reestablish the primacy of diplomacy, negotiated settlements, and true partnership with regional allies.
Such goals have broad party support. Yet they are vulnerable to
the charge that they add up to an idealistic, impractical approach
to U.S. security in a hostile world. Unless Democrats are willing to
challenge the web of distortions and misguided assumptions that
underlie this charge, their own policies will be condemned to
perpetuate the failures of the last eight years.

The Traps and Pitfalls
Morris Blachman is associate director of the Institute of International Studies at the

University of South Carolina. Kenneth Sharpe is professor of political science at
Swarthmore College.

The cases of Nicaragua and El Salvador illustrate that many
Democrats have been trapped by the Reagan agenda. The Reagan
Hemisphere /Fall 1988

Further, Duarte has been unable to stop the abusive interrogagovernment has managed to define the agenda for Nicaragua by
weaving together two dubious assumptions: the notion that vital
tion techniques, physical beatings, death threats, disappearances,
and assassinations that continue to be used against opponents.
security interests are at risk as long as the Sandinista government
remains in power; and the supposition that the United States has
Despite millions in U.S. AID support, no military officer has been conthe right and the responsibility to guarantee Nicaraguan democracy.
victed or even tried for human rights abuses, and the October 1987
Amnesty Law wiped out any chance of justice by dropping charges
The acceptance of these assumptions leads to one conclusion: the
against those involved in army massacres and military-connected
Sandinistas must be ousted, or forced to restructure their regime
death-squad actions.
through "democratization," which, to the
Reagan administration, means negotiated The problem is n
Failed reform, widespread government corouster.
ruption, decreasing wages, and repression
rogr
against peasant and labor organizations have
Protecting security and encouraging
outraged many of Duarte's former supporters.
democracy are two U.S. interests that a tacit accepti Ice of the Reagall
Dukakis administration does want to advance,
Widespread frustration led to the decisive
n'sunreallstic,
defeat of Duarte and the Christian Democrats
but ousting the Nicaraguan government by
in the March 1988Assembly elections. The vicCOstly, and di ngeirous
force serves neither objective. Few

it the

admlnistratio

ends.

Democrats have openly challenged the two
questionable assumptions, or even the distorted concept of
simplistically identifying democracy with "anti-communism" and
"ousting the Sandinistas." Instead, Democratic criticism has concentrated on the ineffective and immoral means used by the Reagan
administration, including the corruptness and authoritarian tendencies of its contra allies. Restricting criticism to the means implicitly
concedes the legitimacy of the Reagan administration's objective
to topple the Sandinista government.
As long as this agenda goes unchallenged, the Dukakis team risks
being trapped on the campaign trail by the question: "What are you
going to do to overthrow Nicaragua's Marxist revolutionary regime?"
In softer form, the question is: "If contra aid is reduced, how can
you guarantee that negotiations will lead the Sandinistas to
democratize?"
In fact, no U.S. policy can guarantee Nicaraguan democratization, especially if the "litmus test" is American-style democracy or
abdication by the Sandinistas. No matter how much more humane
and pluralistic the Nicaraguan government might be relative to El
Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, or compared with revolutionary regimes elsewhere, the Sandinistas will always fail the test.
Nicaragua is undergoing a social revolution: major reforms not only threaten historic privileges of wealth and power, but generate
disruption and opposition. Reluctance to give opposition groups the
power to block such reforms is likely to include curbs on civil liberties. A Dukakis administration must be forthright in telling the
American people that nothing can guarantee a regime that is to our
liking. The Reagan government has proven that it cannot be done
by war; Dukakis must show that diplomacy, although it holds no
guarantees, can facilitate democratization.
The trap for a Democratic alternative in El Salvador is set by the
false picture the Reagan administration has painted of a struggling
but popular "reformist democracy" confronting Soviet-sponsored
revolution. The reality is an increasingly unpopular elected civilian
government dominated by a repressive military. This situation could
soon come unraveled. If it happens under the Democrats, the
Reagan failure may be laid at their doorstep, trapping them into
choosing between unrealistic policies to "protect democracy" or
accepting responsibility for "losing" El Salvador.
The fact is that the Salvadoran leftist insurgency is a home-grown
movement with considerable support in some rural areas and
restricted Soviet, Cuban, and Nicaraguan assistance. U.S. aid of
over $2.3 billion since 1981 and a counterinsurgency campaign of
air assaults, bombing, and forced relocation of rebel supporters have
failed to end the civil war. No end is in sight, and U.S. aid only adds
to El Salvador's problems.
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tory by the right-wing ARENA party-headed by
death-squad leader Roberto D'Aubisson- represents popular rejection of the Duarte regime and Reagan policies, as well as the
absence of any moderate alternative within El Salvador's repressive
political climate. As long as the high command can rely on
Washington's aid, it would rather fight than engage in the dialogue
that many Salvadorans are demanding.
The realistic alternative in El Salvador is to promote a negotiated
settlement that protects opposition forces anxious to pursue nonviolent means and gives the insurgents a rationale for laying down
their arms. But the Reagan government has orchestrated the false
image that its policy is working and that more elections and more
U.S. aid will resolve the problems. Unless Dukakis begins now to
publicize the reality of El Salvador, the responsibility for this
deteriorating situation could fall on the Democrats after January
1989 when the Reagan image-making machinery collapses. The
situation could deteriorate in two ways: a severe crackdown by the
military that would plunge the country back into the brutality of
1980-84, or an escalated rebel offensive. If Democrats do not soon
challenge the Reagan agenda, they will be obligated to save what
falsely appears to be a democracy under seige.

A Democratic Agenda
A Dukakis administration need not be trapped. The problem is
not the Democratic program, but the tacit acceptance of the Reagan
administration's unrealistic, costly, and dangerous ends. At issue
is a Democratic agenda that addresses the United States' real national interests in Central America-guaranteeing U.S. security and
fostering regional peace, equitable development, and democracy.
When the Republicans ask: "What will you do about the Sandinistas
and how will you prevent revolution in El Salvador?" the Democrats'
response must be: "Those are the wrong questions. Republican
policies are undermining our real national interests. The Democratic
agenda will advance them."
Take security first. The idea sold by the Reagan government, that
Nicaragua poses a direct and vital threat to the United States, is
patently absurd. The United States does have security interests in
Central America-discouraging armed aggression by one country
against another, minimizing cross-border arms flows to insurgents,
encouraging demilitarization, and reducing the region's number of
foreign advisors. But the only true threat to the United States would
be if the Soviets were to alter the zone's strategic balance, for example, by putting nuclear missiles in Nicaragua.
That possibility is highly unlikely, given the potency of the Soviets'

arsenal of submarine-based missiles. A Dukakis administration
could make sure it remains unlikely by dealing directly with the
Soviets on the matter. The kind of understanding worked out after
the Cuban missile crisis could be extended to cover the whole region.
The principal way to protect U.S. security is to reduce superpower
tensions in the region.
How about our other security interests, such as preventing foreign
aggression and discouraging substantial material assistance to insurgent groups? These interests do not require that the United States
overthrow the Sandinistas. The latter know that such aggression
would lead to disastrous military confrontation with the United States.
If there were aggression, a Democratic administration could utilize
hemispheric agreements to mobilize international diplomatic,
economic, and, if necessary, military resources to stop it.
The flow of arms to El Salvador would be a concern, if there were
credible evidence that it occurs. For years Managua has offered to
negotiate verifiable agreements to assure that no such arms flows
take place. As president, Dukakis could agree to such negotiations.
If Managua followed through on its word, there would be no problem.
If not, the president could stop arms flows by appealing to
hemispheric diplomatic arrangements to impose multilateral sanctions against the Sandinistas.
How about our national interests in equitable development,
peace, and democracy? Their promotion is the only way to remove
the long-term poverty and inequality that underlie Central American
conflicts. A Dukakis administration could work with other countries
in the region to formulate a Central American

development plan. But economic assistance
makes no sense in the absence of the farreaching reforms necessary for development
to take place. This fact underscores the need
to throw the full weight of the United States
behind the Central American Accord as well
as the negotiated solutions advocated by the

Contadora countries.
Lasting peace requires equitable economic
development and an end to political repression: a population that is the enemy of its

government will always be on the verge of war

communist heartstrings to aid their repressive regimes, even ifthey
are faced by insurgencies.
But a Dukakis administration must also make clear the limits of
U.S. power to promote democracy. The United States has neither
the ability nor the responsibility to use force to impose a political solution. It must be generous with countries who respect human rights
and favor reform and development, but it owes nothing to those who
do not. Yet the United States should not, as John QuincyAdams rightly warned, go "abroad in search of monsters to destroy.
[America]...knows that by once enlisting under other banners than
her own...she would involve herself beyond the power of extrication, in all the wars of interest and intrigue, of individual avarice, envy and ambition, which assume the colors and usurp the standard
of freedom."

The Political Struggle to

Define a Democratic Agenda

A new Democratic agenda will confront opposition because the
Reagan agenda has mythologized reality, usurped and distorted
traditional, moderate symbols such as democracy and human rights,
and inflamed popular fears of threats to America. Thus, a
Democratic administration must lead a political struggle to redefine
the nation's foreign-policy agenda by challenging the myths, reclaiming the symbols, and confronting popular fears.
Challenging the myths involves Democratic
efforts to counter the misleading portrayal of
No
ho
El Salvador as a nascent civilian democracy
assistance thie Un
under siege by Soviet-linked guerrillas. It also
involves efforts to put to rest the erroneous nopour Into Ceo l
tion that the Sandinistas represent a threat to
significant de velolpment cannot U.S. security, and that the United States can
and should impose a political solution in
take place No til ti

matter

wmuch

iited States

ntra America,

governments

he region's

Iement the
Imp
very reforms 1that economic
and military elite sare
blockl .

with it. Because peace and development demand political and social reforms, the United
States has a stake in encouraging the consolidation of governments
dedicated to the welfare of their peoples. But the Democrats must
explain to the public that encouraging democracy is different from
imposing democracy, and that their efforts will minimize direct U.S.
intervention into the politics of other countries.
A Dukakis administration could foster democracy not only by advocating elections, but by providing steadfast support for human
rights. If elections in Central America are mere disguises for official
violence and repression, they will be locally discredited. Fostering
democracy means publicly condemning gross and systematic violations of human rights no matter where they happen, in countries of
the left or the right. It means providing full-scale U.S. diplomatic support to non-violent opposition movements of the right, center, and
left; speaking up for those imprisoned or disappeared; actively backing the work of human rights monitors and international human rights
organizations; and refusing to tolerate abuses even during civil wars.
Above all, U.S. interest in fostering democracy is served by refusing to consider any but humanitarian aid to governments of the left
or the right that are g ross and systematic violators of human rights.
Right-wing tyrants must no longer be allowed to pull our anti-

Nicaragua.
Reclaiming the symbols is essential if the
American people are to understand that advocating human rights and democracy means,
for example, challenging the distorted identification of anti-communists with "democrats"
or "freedom fighters." A Democratic administration must publicize the reliable evidence of contra brutality, corruption, and authoritarianism. It must convince the U.S. public
that non-lethal aid, which sustains the contra army in battle, is not
"humanitarian" aid, and that elites who defend the unrestrained pursuit of wealth in the name of free enterprise are not defending
democracy and freedom. And it must criticize press censorship and
the people's courts should they reappear in Nicaragua.
But a Democratic administration must also make clear that the
killing and terrorizing of journalists in Guatemala and El Salvador
is as much press censorship as the closing of a newspaper, and that
the disappearance of hundreds of arrested citizens in these countries is a far graver violation of democratic principles than the jailing of suspected contras by people's courts. It must insist that a
democracy is not constituted by electing someone to office who has
little or no power; that a reform government is not achieved by electing someone with reformist credentials; and that respect for human
rights cannot be equated to a decline in death-squad killings, while
arbitrary arrests, disappearances, and torture continue.
Regarding the fears of the American public, Democrats must confront both the fear of "another Vietnam" and the fear of "another
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Cuba." Democrats have already taken on the first fear, speaking
to the unease many feel about being drawn into future quagmires.
But the fear of "another Cuba" remains powerful and unchallenged.
The key is to accept the kernel of truth around which the big lie
is built, to educate people to distinguish real threats from false
threats, and to show them how preoccupation with false threats
blinds them to the smart alternatives that will reduce the real threats.
That means recognizing that there is a major rivalry between the
United States and the Soviet Union and ensuring that the United
States has the military capability to defend itself against real military
threats. But not all international turmoil stems from the Soviet threat.
The United States needs to reduce the chances that the superpower
rivalry will inflame and complicate other forms of turmoil.
Central America is an ideal place for a Dukakis administration
to start winding down Cold War tensions. Firmly putting forward concrete measures to reduce superpower rivalry and de-escalate conflicts would do much to defuse irrational fears and convince the U.S.
public that Democrats understand, and can effectively deal with,
real threats.
Regarding U.S. security issues, a Dukakis administration could
immediately pursue Gorbachev's offers to negotiate reductions of
arms shipments to Nicaragua in the context of a regional settlement
that complements the Guatemalan peace accords. Dukakis and his
fellow Democrats could enter into bilateral discussions with
Nicaragua to negotiate mutual security concerns. And they could
initiate bilateral consultations with Cuba about Central America.
Given Cuba's involvement in the region, it makes sense to talk with
its government.
Regarding Central American regional security issues, a Dukakis
administration could throw its full weight behind the Guatemala accords. It would therefore back the Contadora-mediated negotiations
to help the five Central American presidents resolve their political
and security issues. That would mean encouraging a negotiated
solution to the conflicts in Guatemala and El Salvador, as well as
Nicaragua-a solution that includes all political forces. Democrats
would have to make continued economic and military aid conditional
on such a negotiated settlement.
Dukakis and his associates could back efforts to have international forces monitor and, where necessary, patrol the Honduran
and Nicaraguan borders to minimize cross-border arms flows and
incursions. They could support efforts to remove foreign military advisors from the region. And they could take the lead in pressing for
a Caribbean Basin treaty with verifiable and enforceable provisions
prohibiting offensive strategic weapons in the region.
These measures to help demilitarize the region, reduce superpower conflict, and negotiate peaceful settlements are only the first
steps. It is essential that the long-term U.S. interests in equitable
development and democracy also be pursued. Such interests demand immediate steps to help all countries with postwar reconstruction: the resettlement of insurgents and refugees, the provision of
medical care to the injured, and the rebuilding of infrastructure.
But they also demand U.S. help in creating political arrangements
that address the region's deep-rooted problems of poverty, inequality, and repression-the causes of turmoil and insecurity. Here
Democrats can back a regional, multilateral economic plan that
would allow any country, independent of its ideology, to participate
if it demonstrated a serious commitment to equitable development
and human rights. Thus, development aid would be available to those
governments seriously interested in the welfare of their people.
A Dukakis administration could lead the political struggle against
the unrealistic policies and counterproductive Central American
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agenda of the Reagan years. Its policies could protect the real national interests of the United States in security, peace, equitable
development, and democracy. And by challenging the lies, reclaiming the symbols of democracy and human rights, and confronting
irrational fears, it could gain the popular acceptance these policies
toward Central America deserve.
Editor's Note: A previous version of this article appears in Tikkun,
3:3 (1988).

The Central
American
Accord
by Francisco Rojas Aravena
For Central America, the last year has been a time of intense and
fragile negotiation. The convergence of national and regional crises
with shifts in Latin American-wide and East-West alignments has
presented Central American governments with an urgent set of
challenges. Such challenges have compelled the zone's leaders to
set up channels not only to renegotiate the terms of domestic governance and isthmian geopolitics, but also to assert control over Central America's position in the wider world. The Central American Accord (known also as Esquipulas II)marks the beginning of a new era
for the region, particularly in its relations with the United States. At
all levels, the obstacles to peace and democracy remain formidable.
Yet the strides taken toward domestic and regional conciliation provide grounds for optimism.

Antecedents
Since the late seventies, questions of regional and extra-regional
crisis have pervaded Central American affairs. These questions
generated two contrasting responses: U.S.-based military initiatives
and Latin American-based diplomatic initiatives. Standing at loggerheads, each response ensured the other's failure. The consequences were prolonged Central American instability and the
escalated threat that war would engulf the isthmus as a whole.
By early 1987 developments on both fronts-the outbreak of the
Iran-contra scandal and the failed "tour of mediation" by the Contadora participants and the secretaries-general of the OAS and the
UN-underscored the state of paralysis. As the Reagan hardliners
and Contadora alike fell into disarray, the combination of isthmian
economic crisis, Soviet reformism, and thawing U.S.-Soviet relations
further disposed the region's leaders to negotiation. President Oscar
Arias of Costa Rica responded by proposing a peace plan that places
diplomatic responsibility squarely in Central American hands.

The Making of the Accord
The Arias initiative led to a meeting of the presidents of
Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica in

conciliatory measures-an end to its state of emergency, direct
Esquipulas, Guatemala. On August 7, 1987, the presidents signed
dialogue with the contras, extended amnesty, and a willingness to
a set of agreements intended to lay the foundations for regional
hold elections-helped the U.S. Democrats to defeat Reagan's campeace and democratization. The path-breaking agreements took the
paign for new contra aid. All signs pointed to the renewed impetus
world by surprise, especially since they were achieved without the
of the peace process, including March's Hamburg meeting of the
participation or consent of the dominant player in the zone, the
foreign affairs ministers of Western Europe, Central America, and
United States. The signing of the Central American Accord left the
the Contadora nations, which restated European backing of the
its
conReflecting
Reagan government with no clear line of action.
Peace initiative.
tinued misreading of the region's affairs as
Central America inaugurated a course of
Inmid-March, however, the Honduranwes the
Nicaraguan border clash and the increased
peace through negotiation, the Reagan adpresence of U.S. troops in that area threatenof pragmatism,
ministration replaced its special ambassador
to Central America, the pragmatic Philip Habib,
edtoundothe fragile progress. Growing U.S.which manag :o put the
with hardliner Morris Busby. Meanwhile, the
breaks on nfro
Panamanian tensions made matters worse.
Fortunately, Secretary of State George Schultz
Soviet Union welcomed the Esquipulas inannounced that negotiations in Nicaragua
intoroests.
Soviets
the
to
relieve
itiative since it promised
should continue. And with its policy toward
of a high-priced ally in a low-priority region. And
Panama in disarray, the United States did not attempt militarily to
for Cuba, the initiative meant the possibility of reduced East-West
overthrow Noriega. Under these circumstances, the Nicaraguan
tensions over Central America and improved relations with the
American
Latin
at its late-March meeting with the contras at Sapoa,
government,
the
fact
that
the
was
United States. No less important
reasserted local commitment to peace by adopting agreements to
governments comprising the Contadora Group and its Support
free political prisoners, allow the return of Nicaraguans in exile,
Group began preparing for a new, subordinate role in Central
guarantee freedom of expression, and provide for elections. Vital
America.
to these agreements was the naming of Nicaraguan cardinal ObanThe Accord addressed both domestic and regional problems by
do and OAS secretary-general Soares as guarantors.
calling for the establishment of a national reconciliation commisSince the meeting at Sapod, the Nicaraguan dialogue has had
sion in each country, an executive committee of Central America's
its ups and downs. So have the chances for dialogue elsewhere. For
foreign ministers, and an international commission for verification
example, if Nicaraguan developments have raised hopes for a new
and monitoring. Only the international commission incorporates
round of negotiations between the Guatemalan guerrillas and the
representatives from outside the region, as among its members are
Cerezo government, the Guatemalan army's anti-Cerezo actions
officials from Contadora, the Contadora Support Group, and the
most certainly have not. In El Salvador, escalated guerrilla warfare
secretaries-general of the OAS and the UN. Yet worldwide legitimacy
and ARENA's recent electoral victory make negotiations and reconwas bestowed in the form of the Nobel Peace Prize to Oscar Arias.
ciliation highly unlikely; Duarte's grave illness adds more uncertainty
to Central America's most polarized situation. As for Honduras, the
military's mounting power does not augur well for democracy, particularly in light of reduced U.S. commitment to the Nicaraguan conDuring the initial stage, progress was rapid, and reciprocal contra forces and Panamanian general Noriega's ability to stand up
all
kindsfidence grew out of inter-country ministerial meetings of
against U.S. pressures.
economic integration, finance, health, culture, and so forth. Since
The fact remains that the Central American Accord in itself is a
then, progress has been slow. It is no surprise that problems have
regional achievement. In the midst of crisis, Central
fundamental
centered on questions of national reconciliation and cease-fire, as
has
taken strides toward reorienting not simply intraAmerica
their
bolster
to
start
the
governments and rebels have sought from
regional politics and diplomacy but also its relations with Latin
negotiating leverage. Thus, going into last January's key presidenAmerica, Europe, and, most important, the United States. In so dotial meeting in Alajuela, Costa Rica-whose purpose was to set in
ing, it has recognized that the basis of isthmian stability and developmotion far-reaching solutions-Central America faced a climate of
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Where has Reagan's anti-drug diplomacy gone wrong?

Winning Battles, Losing the
War: U.S. Anti-Drug Policies
in Latin America
by Bruce Michael Bagley

Since

President Reagan declared "war" on drugs in the early 1980s, U.S. foreign policy toward Latin America has entered an
era of drug diplomacy. Control of drug trafficking now ranks with immigration, foreign debt, and communist expansion in Central
America as a leading issue in U.S.-Latin American relations. In 1988
drug trafficking has been a principal point of friction between
Washington and Panama, Mexico, the Bahamas, Jamaica,
Paraguay, Bolivia, Peru, and Colombia. In these countries, drug trafficking not only has assumed major economic proportions; it has
either presented fundamental challenges to central authority or at
least added complicating dimensions to the imperatives of
governance.
The rationale for drug policies in these countries, therefore, extends beyond the issue of drug abuse to basic questions of domestic
governance and foreign relations. The growing threat posed by drug
lords to various Latin American governments, combined with U.S.
concerns about the massive inflow of drugs, constitutes a potential basis for U.S.-Latin American cooperation.

Dimensions of the U.S.Latin American Drug Trade
Supply
Nine Third World countries account for the bulk of the illegal marijuana, cocaine, and heroin smuggled into the United States each
year. Some 90 percent of all the marijuana imported into the United
States (11,650 tons in 1986) originates in four Caribbean Basin countries: Mexico (35-40%), Colombia (20-25%), Jamaica (10-15 %), and
Belize (5-10%). The United States itself produces an additional 2,100
tons annually. Virtually all the cocaine (105-7 tons in 1985) is
cultivated in three South American nations: Peru (50%), Bolivia
(40-45%), and Colombia (5-10%).
Colombia emerged in the mid-1970s as the principal site of cocaine refining and since then has controlled roughly 75 percent of
all the refined cocaine exported from the Andean region to the United
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States. Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia are believed to have smuggled
some 30 tons of cocaine to Western Europe in 1985. In the last three
years, several other South American countries-Venezuela, Brazil,
Ecuador, Paraguay, and Argentina-have also surfaced as coca producers. This occurred as the United States and Latin American
governments stepped up enforcement operations, thereby forcing
some grower-dealers to find cheaper and safer locales for cultivation and processing.
Mexico is Latin America's only heroin-producing country. Of the
estimated 6.45 metric tons of heroin smuggled into the United States
in 1986, about 39 percent was grown in Mexico. About 50 percent
of the remainder came from the Golden Crescent (especially
Pakistan, the world's largest producer) and the Golden Triangle
(especially Burma).

U.S. Demand
There are 20-25 million marijuana smokers in the United States,
5.3 million regular users of cocaine, and 0.5 million heroin addicts.
In 1986 the wholesale value of all illegal drugs smuggled into the
country was around $25 billion. At retail or street prices, the U.S.
public annually spends as much as $130 billion on illicit drugs. The
potential for profit is obviously immense at all levels of the industry,
though most profits are made in the distribution process once the
drugs have entered the country. It is not known how deeplythe major trafficking organizations penetrate and profit from the distribution chain below the wholesale level, but Colombia's Medellin Cartel
makes $4-6 billion annually in the cocaine trade.

The U.S. War on Drugs
Without question, the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 represents
the most comprehensive effort in U.S. history to lower domestic demand for illegal drugs and to reduce the inflow of narcotics into the
United States. The Act includes provisions designed to attack the
drug problem on a variety of fronts simultaneously: tougher lawenforcement in U.S. cities; more ambitious anti-drug school and community programs; intensified testing in the work place; expanded
treatment and rehabilitation programs for users; lengthier prison
sentences for traffickers; increased federal support for state en-

forcement efforts; augmented interdiction at the border; and additional resources for eradication, crop substitution, and enforcement
programs abroad.
From fiscal year (FY) 1981 to FY 1988 federal spending on drug
control tripled, rising from $1.2 billion to $3.9 billion. The U.S. military
was ordered to become more active in support of civilian enforcement programs. A General Accounting Office (GAO) report released in June 1987 indicates that the total cost of the U.S. Defense
Department's interdiction activities jumped from an insignificant
$4.9 million in FY 1982 to approximately $387 million in FY 1987.
Allocations of U.S. foreign aid reflect the Reagan administration's
emphasis on financing the anti-drug war. Between FY 1980 and FY
1987 U.S. allocations for overseas narcotics control efforts more
than tripled, surging from some $40 million to over $200 million annually. As a percentage of total U.S. aid to Colombia, for example,
State Department narcotics aid rose from 30 percent in FY 1984
to 70 percent in FY 1987. Congress moved to link foreign aid to what
countries do or fail to do about drug trafficking. For instance, the
United States imposed sanctions on Bolivia in 1986 and 1987, mainly
because Bolivia had not acted seriously to eradicate its coca crop.
In 1988 the Reagan administration, under congressional pressure,
decertified General Noriega and Panama. Further, several U.S. congressmen initiated efforts to decertify Mexico, Bolivia, Peru,
Paraguay, and the Bahamas. They did so despite President Reagan's
contention that such punitive measures would not only damage U.S.
relations with those countries, but also inhibit future cooperative efforts between them and the United States in the war against drug
trafficking.
As the Reagan administration and the U.S. Congress have gotten "tougher" with the governments of Latin America's drugproducing countries, the U.S. "drug warriors" have scored some
impressive victories. Cocaine seizures, for example, vaulted from
2 tons in 1981 to 27 tons in 1986, with local and state enforcement
agencies capturing similar amounts. In the same year, federal
agents captured a half ton of heroin, 9 tons of hashish, and 1,106
tons of marijuana. In May 1987 the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) completed a three-year, undercover drug enforcement
operation. Dubbed "Operation Pisces," this effort resulted in the
confiscation of cocaine worth some $270 million at U.S. wholesale
prices. Likewise, Operation Alliance-a multi-agency task force
created in 1986 and intended to curtail the flow of drugs across the
U.S.-Mexican border-reported that seizures of marijuana in FY 1987
had doubled the previous year's total and that cocaine confiscations
had escalated by 400 percent. Arrests on drug charges have increased sharply, as have average prison sentences for offenders.

Why U.S. Policies Have
Not Worked
Despite the increased resources, manpower, drug seizures, and
arrests, the evidence indicates that "...worldwide production of illicit opium, coca leaf and cannabis is still many times the amount
currently consumed by drug abusers" (U.S. State Department, International Narcotics ControlStrategyReport, March 1987, p.40).
U.S. narcotics experts estimate that interdiction programs catch
just 3 percent of marijuana imports and 10 percent of cocaine imports; thus, increased drug confiscation probably means that more
drugs are being smuggled into the United States. Reinforcing this
conclusion is that between 1981 and 1988 the price of a kilogram
of pure cocaine plunged from about $60,000 to under $10,000. The

widespread availability of cocaine and other drugs in the United
States, the epidemic in crack use, and the notorious growth of drugrelated crime and violence also suggest that America's drug plague
is worsening.
Nevertheless, the most serious accusation is not that the U.S.
government is losing the war on drugs, but that the Reagan administration never launched a full-scale attack. U.S. policies have
been stymied by inadequate resources, lack of bureaucratic coordination, and inconsistent leadership. They have also frequently been
subordinated to other concerns of U.S. foreign policy, especially national security.

Inadequate Resources
Three months after signing the 1986 anti-drug statute, President
Reagan submitted his FY 1988 budget in which he proposed to
eliminate $1billion from drug allocations. Among the key cuts: $225
million from state and local enforcement; half the funds for drug treatment; and $400 million out of drug education (from $500 million to
$100 million). Although some protests were voiced by congressional
leaders, in practice Congress proved willing to restore only a small
portion of Reagan's cutbacks. The administration's subsequent decision not to request reauthorization in FY 1989 for $1 billion in federal
funding for local law enforcement, education, and rehabilitation programs further undermined the war on drugs. Given that Reagan had
already lowered federal spending on drug treatment and prevention from $200 million in 1982 to $126 million in 1986, and then
deliberately delayed FY 1987 disbursements until the end of the
fiscal year, by 1988 many governors, mayors, and local officials were
frustrated and confused about Washington's real priorities. As Congressman Charles Rangel (D-NY) put it, "These cuts seriously call
into question the Administration's commitment to an effective national drug abuse strategy" (The New York Times, October 26,1987,
p. 13y).

Lack of Coordinationand Leadership
In 1984 President Reagan created the National Drug Enforcement
Policy Board to centralize U.S. government anti-drug programs. In
March 1987 he broadened the Board's authority to include not only enforcement but also prevention, education, and treatment activities. Headed by Attorney General Edwin Meese and Health and
Human Services Secretary Otis Bowen, the 17 members of the
Board include all cabinet officers and representatives from the vice
president's office, the Office of Management and Budget, and the
CIA.
Despite Reagan's formal bureaucratic reorganization, however,
recent reports by the GAO and the House Committee on Government Operations have found that responsibility for U.S. drug policy
remains "diffuse and overlapping" (The New York Times, October
26, 1987, p. 13y). The House report was especially critical of the
Board's inability to resolve long-simmering inter-agency "turf battles" and its delayed implementation of mandated studies and
programs.

Clashes of Interests and PolicyPriorities
In the Asian heroin-producing countries, many of which share
borders with communist powers, the struggle against communist
expansion has always had diplomatic priority over the war against
drugs. It is hard to envision the United States ever imposing sanctions on Pakistan, even though that country is the world's top heroin
producer, or on the Afghan "freedom fighters," despite their deep
involvement in opium cultivation and transport. When President
Reagan met with a number of Afghan guerrilla leaders at the White
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House in November 1987, he apparently never even broached the
annually in South American countries that produce cocaine. These
topic of drugs.
countries themselves spend perhaps another $20-30 million; CoIn Latin America, too, the war on drugs has often been suborlombia accounts for most of that figure. Yet, from U.S. wholesale
dinated to interests of U.S. security. Panama, Honduras, Jamaica,
markets alone, at least $3 billion a year flows into Colombia (with
and the contras are examples. Both the Carter and the Reagan adadditional profits deriving from other markets and not all profits beministrations tolerated Noriega for years because he was a useful
ing repatriated to Colombia). The cocaine industry probably employs
close to a million people in the Andean countries (counting coca
"asset" despite growing evidence that he was involved in the drug
farmers and hired agricultural labor) and, by
trade. U.S. intelligence sources linked Noriega
to drug trafficking as early as 1972. A secret
equally conservative calculations, returns beU.S. policies have been
1985 study written by the U.S. Army's Southern
tween $1 billion and $1.5 billion a year to South
Stymied by in ade quate
American economies. The Medellin Cartel,
Command charged the Panamanian Defense
Forces with involvement inthe narcotics trade. resources, la ck of
which accounts for an estimated 75 percent
According to former National Security Counbureaucratic
of the refined cocaine smuggled into the United
rdination,

e

cil Chief-Economist Norman Bailey, the State

coor

and inconsisttent
Department's attitude was "lukewarm," the
Pentagon did not want to "rock the boat," and
the CIA actively opposed doing anything: "He's an important asset"
(The New York Times, April 10, 1988, p. 10y).
In Central America, the U.S.-backed contras have repeatedly
been accused of involvement in drug trafficking, although no hard
evidence that implicates the principal contra organization, the Fuerzas Democrdticas Nicaraguenses, has ever been made public. The
CIA did have suspicions that other contra factions may have been
involved, but it never pursued them aggressively because of the
Reagan administration's heavy commitment to the contra movement. In contrast, with less than conclusive evidence, Washington
has frequently accused the Sandinista government in Managua of
active participation in the drug trade.
As with the contras, numerous allegations of Honduran military
involvement in the narcotics trade have surfaced in recent years.
A DEA agent based in Honduras between 1981 and 1983 reported
that Honduran army and navy officers were involved in the transshipment of drugs through Honduran territory and in the protection of
drug traffickers. DEA Chief John Lawn explained that the evidence
was too "weak" to merit investigation. The DEAoffice in Honduras
was finally shut down in 1983 because it had not been "productive."
According to one Reagan administration official: "It wasn't that there
was a coverup. It's that people knew certain questions shouldn't be
asked" (The New York Times, April 10, 1988, p. 10y).

leadership

States, rivals many Fortune 500 companies in
the scope and sophistication of its multinational

operations. The resources available to the
Cartel buy a formidable arsenal of protection-firepower, fast aircraft
and boats, informants and intelligence networks, and compliant
government officials.
Colombia and Mexico are the cornerstones of the war on drugs
in Latin America. But, in spite of some achievements (like spraying
marijuana and the extradition of king-pin Carlos Lehder), there have
been many setbacks. Illicit drug traffic has been the most
acrimonious of issues between the United States and these two
countries since the mid-1970s.
U.S. policy toward Colombia provides a useful case study of the
inherent contradictions in the current U.S. war on drugs in Latin
America. One of the most serious deficiencies of U.S. strategy is
the tendency toward making decisions unilaterally within a
cooperative framework. When Colombia's share of America's drug
market increases or in the wake of unfortunate personal incidents,
Washington abandons its binational cooperative approach and acts
without consulting or even warning Bogota. Sequentially, the pattern is roughly as follows: worsening narco-relations, unilateral
American initiative and/or damaging incident, chargecountercharge, deteriorating relations in general, escalating rhetoric
from officials and media, mediation by cooler heads, binational conferences followed by words of praise for one side by the other, and
improved cooperative efforts. The cycle is then repeated (Richard
Craig, "U.S. Anti-Drug Policy and U.S.-Colombian Relations," 1988).

Drug Trafficking and U.S.Latin American Relations

Options

In practice, U.S. drug diplomacy has accomplished little besides
raising the level of tension in relations with Latin America during the
1980s. There has been too much pressure and too few incentives,
too much finger-pointing and too little cooperation. The United States
has not provided Latin America with the economic or technical
resources necessary to combat drugs; nor has the U.S. government
developed a coherent drug-fighting strategy in the region. To become
more effective, U.S. policies will have to confront the reality of the
situation: the increasingly lucrative and violent drug trade poses a
serious threat to the very existence of several Latin American
governments, who would certainly control the drug trade if they
could. The governments of the United States and Latin America must
recognize the common enemy-the drug-trafficking industries-and
formulate a comprehensive strategy to reduce the influence of the
drug trade in both the United States and Latin America.
Adequate resources are the most crucial factor in any drugcontrol program. U.S. drug-control expenditures total $40-50 million

What can U.S. policy do to address both the domestic and international sides of the drug-traffic equation? On the domestic side,
any plan of action should strive to reduce demand, an approach that
calls for increased funding of anti-drug abuse programs and innovative ideas about the problem's roots. Complementing this approach should be stepped-up law enforcement in the United States
against traffickers and users.
On the international front, the United States could take the lead
in building up hemispheric drug-fighting capabilities. This would
mean providing Colombia and other countries with the tools (e.g.,
aircraft, weapons, communications equipment, and tracking
devices) to "colonize" and establish a credible presence in remote
drug-trafficking zones-some of which are patrolled by hostile guerrilla forces. In many Latin American countries, more extensive and
more sophisticated security systems for top government officials
and judges would have to be part of the package. But such measures
cannot occur in isolation: parallel institutional reforms must be im-
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plemented in drug-producing countries.
The United States could also undertake to "Americanize" the antidrug war. In so doing, the United States would take over drug enforcement functions that drug-producing countries cannot perform,
as long as those countries consent. Examples of Americanization
are the trial of Colombian drug traffickers in U.S. courts and the U.S.
Army-supported operation against cocaine laboratories in Bolivia
in the summer of 1986 (Operation Blast Furnace). But the introduction of U.S. military forces was condemned by all segments of
Bolivia's political establishment, and the Blast Furnace model has
been rejected by other governments in the region. Moreover, extradition seems to be on hold in Colombia-an understandable if
undesirable consequence of intensified drug-mafia violence and
threats. Americanization is therefore a risky approach and should
be used only in the most extraordinary circumstances.
Most important of all, the United States could help Latin America
find economic alternatives to the drug trade. One way, of course,
is through direct economic aid (which the United States does not
provide to Colombia). Another way is through reduced import barriers for legitimate exports-textiles, sugar, coffee, and so forth-and
the extension of the Caribbean Basin Initiative system to additional
Latin American nations that commit themselves to serious efforts
against drugs. Economic development in the region is the sine qua
non of any successful campaign against drug trafficking.

A Colombian
Town in Agony

kidnappings, an assault on a marine squad 60 kilometers from
Sincelejo (the capital of Sucre), a murder of a teacher in Colozal,
and a civic revolt in San Onofre against a political leader (his house
was set on fire).

The Decomposition of Sucre
Peace in Sucre was obviously a mirage. It could not last with
unemployment rates of 25 percent and with a 70 percent malnutrition rate among the state's children. Its capital lacks water and has
the highest energy costs in Colombia. Its municipalities have been
abandoned to God's mercy, and there is a high level of land concentration and a progressive pauperization of peasants. The
"regional" hospital in Sincelejo announces on the radio that it lacks
even a piece of gauze to treat the victims of the corralejas (the running of the bulls in the local stadium), which has claimed, so far, three
dead and ten wounded.
A central factor in the decomposition of Sucre is its political
class-ravenous and corruptible like few in the country. The misuse
of parliamentary aid, the personal appropriation of financial
allotments for public works, and the customary practices of
shameless plundering of public service agencies become even more
shameful when they take place in such a poor and needy state.
The fact that 20 years after it was declared a capital elected ofwater for Sincelejo is
ficials have still not procured
example of their inperhaps the greatest
f
d
t
in
hzn.

by Enrique Santos Calderdn
The state of Arauca has been the site of a scandalous
propriation of petroleum rights by local leaders and politicia
corruption has done nothing but encourage an already a
guerrilla presence in a strategic region shaken once more
attempts against pipelines and petroleum installations.
The case of Arauca is merely a reflection of what is ha
in Sucre. Just a week in this coastal cattle state is enough
one to appreciate the explosive situation it faces. Sucre is
duct of extraordinary social conditions, unrestrained corn
tion by its political class, and a recent but intense guerrilla threat.
Less than two years ago Sucre was a paradise of
peace. It had managed to escape the armed subversion
that some time ago plagued the neighboring states of C<
doba, Bolivar, and Antioquia. Today, it is a totally differer
of place. The guerrilla movement has established a prese
permeates this zone, which is not exactly mountainous or jui
The area's cattle ranchers have been threatened and
of them dare to visit their farms. Many of the farms have bee
by the "godfathers of Medellin," that is, Ochoas and comp,
don't haggle over prices and don't seem to be intimidated by
"This is going to get worse than the Cateca," the most pes
ranchers say. They also say that the guerrillas "recruit
farmers and pay their families up to 100,000 pesos ($390)
farmer they take. In the few days I spent in Sucre, there v
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This is how the people of Sincelejo remain in the same rut. The
well-to-do buy water at exhorbitant prices from a water truck that
delivers it to their houses, while at the crack of dawn an army of
women and children from the town must go to faraway reservoirs
to obtain theirs. Yet all of the people, at the top and at the bottom,
continue to put up with and elect the same officials responsible for
such prolonged trampling. When will they learn their lesson?

By Means of Rum and Money
The elections for mayor will soon be held. It is interesting to see
the "prize candidates" who have ventured into important cities such
as Corozal or Since. One of these individuals was recently censured
publicly and fired from his post as director of Sucre's Department
of Public Works. Another has been accused of masterminding the
murder of a Sincelejo reporter. Without doubt these twowill win; such
is the level of control through patronage-"by means of rum and
money"-that they exercise over the electorate.
One is uneasy leaving Sucre. Everywhere the air is heavy with
discouragement, a nervous pessimism among the well-to-do and
a hopelessness that could very well turn into desperation for the poor.
They have plenty of reason to feel this way, subject as they are to
double pillaging. On the one hand, the guerrillas extort and kill without
scruples, exterminating, as they go, any type of productive action.
On the other hand, the political class misappropriates without any
qualms the funds destined to improve the community's living
standard.
Let's not be surprised, then, if the next civic outburst in Colombia takes place in Sucre. This state, so full of possibilities, does not
deserve such a cruel destiny, and nothing lasts forever, including
the tolerance of abuse.
(Translated from El Tiempo by Lourdes Simon)
Enrique Santos Calder6n is a columnist for El Tiempo of Bogota, Colombia.

Editor's Note: In1988 mayors in Colombia were popularly elected
for the first time. Enrlque Santos Calder6n Informed Hemisphere
that the mayoral candidate in Corozal withdrew from the race
because of the article, while the candidate in Sincelejo ("Since")
was defeated.

Is Colombia
to Blame?
by Alfonso L6pez-Michelsen
During the last decade, Colombia's involvement in drug trafficking has become the stuff of headline news. The key item has been
the emergence of a group of smugglers, mostly from Medellin, that
terrorizes the country through assassination and other violent actions. Like any other issue involving sizable amounts of undercover
money, the stories are not always accurate. I have written the following notes to clarify a few widely misunderstood issues.
At what time, and for what reason, did there originate such a gigan-
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tic traffic of cocaine between Colombia and the United States? Surprisingly, 15 years ago such traffic was non-existent, with the exception of some marijuana and a negligible amount of cocaine.
The mushrooming of the drug business, now in the billions of
dollars, began at the end of the seventies. Anti-drug campaigns in
Turkey and the Middle East appear to have been the factors most
responsible for diverting this traffic to the Americas. Formerly, the
international mafia thrived on importing opium and heroin from Asia
to Europe through the port of Marseille and to the United States
through the Pacific ports. Prices began to skyrocket, however,
because of the successful anti-drug efforts and high transportation
costs. It was necessary, then, to locate a new, closer source of supply, such as Mexico or South America. This is why cocaine-lower
in price and easier to carry in short plane trips from Colombia to the
Florida coast-soon displaced opium and heroin and began to inundate the North American market. Awell-organized distribution program made the "new" drug accessible not just to the wealthy but
to low-income people as well. As a result, cocaine consumption in
North America grew geometrically in the course of a few years.
In the case of Colombia, two factors contributed to the escalating
business of cocaine exports to the United States. One was
geography: of all Latin American nations south of Panama, Colombia alone has the advantage of direct access to both U.S. coasts.
This advantage was already being exploited by Colombia's marijuana traffickers, who used their experience and organization as a
platform to launch the export of cocaine.
The second factor was the entrepreneurial nature of the
antioquefios-the people from Antioquia, a province of the Colombian west. The antioquefros have few of the characteristics of the
Caribbean or Andean peoples. Their origin could be Basque or
Jewish or both, as witnessed by both their physical appearance and
entrepreneurial ability. Medellin, the capital of Antioquia, is to Colombia what Monterrey is to Mexico or Barcelona to Spain: an isle
of aggressively capitalistic people. From early childhood the antioquerlos lead a life of hard work, endeavoring to make a fortune. It
is a Spanish environment of many virtues and many faults. That the
antioquelo is born to be enterprising is proven by the success of
the coffee business and, on a larger scale, by the development of
the textile industry, one of the largest and most efficient in South
America.
The business of exporting cocaine to the United States happened at ttie onset of Latin America's economic recession, a time when
there was a surplus of idle antioqueflos ready to enter into any type
of enterprise-good or evil. The latter happened. Unfortunately, the
same type of organization that made the Colombian Federation of
Coffee Growers one of the greatest multinational corporations of
South America also served to create the cocaine empire, with
Medellin as its capital. This occurred despite the fact that Colombia is not a prime producer of coca; it is, rather, the great processor
and trader of the substance that arrives from Brazil, Bolivia, Peru,
and Ecuador.
The curious thing about this process is that the United States was,
and still is, so late in realizing the magnitude of the problem. In
response to the first complaints about Colombian drug exports to
the United States, Colombia claimed that the basis of the problem
was the size of the U.S. drug market itself. The United States was
angered by this statement. I recall a New York Times editorial asserting that this demand-side argument was merely an excuse to
justify Colombia's passivity in the face of a booming drug trade. It
would appear that Colombia's duty was not only to eradicate coca
plantations but also to patrol the Caribbean, so that neither planes

nor boats could reach U.S. ports with cocaine. When the collaboration of the United States-the greatest military power of the continent and perhaps of the world-was requested for this task, the reaction was negative. The U.S. ambassador to Colombia stated that the
U.S. Atlantic and Pacific coasts were so vast that they could not compare with those of Colombia for purposes of vigilance. It was only
when the drug traffic acquired its present magnitude that the United
States took fundamental measures against the

traffickers. One long-overdue measure was
the freezing of bank accounts to prevent dollar
laundering. But what the U.S. government
spends on drug control is minuscule when
compared to the volume of money moved by
the coke capos.

Misinformation also persists about the

through the "sinister window" is being "repatriated," then these
are not dollar-laundering transactions but "black" stock investment
transactions that are being reversed. It is for such transactions that
tax amnesties were created. Thus, people who violated the exchange statute by taking dollars out of the country can easily reincorporate them into Colombia.
Clearly, we cannot place the responsibility for either the production or consumption of drugs on any single

to rove rse what is
fow ideotlfiel das S"Colomblian
problem," we IneeId a multifaceted Inter natlanlB
... In order

campaign.

downfall of the Extradition Treaty. In Colombia,
treaties are not approved in the same way as they are in the United
States. Instead of requiring only the senate's advice and consent-as
is the case in the United States-in Colombia treaties are approved
by law, debated in both houses and sanctioned by the president's
signature. In the case of the Extradition Treaty, in Colombia the approving law was repealed because of a technicality: it had not been
signed by the president himself but by a minister who believed he
was acting lawfully as the president's delegate during the latter's
absence from the country. The supreme court ruled that the law approving the treaty was unconstitutional on the grounds that it should
have been signed by the president himself and not by his delegate.
I disagree with this stance, but the fact remains that a supreme court
decision overturned the approval of the Extradition Treaty. It was
not, therefore, a turnaround by either the executive or the congress.
Rather, it was the result of a decision by the supreme court, whose
duty is not to design policies but to decide on the constitutionality
of the law.
Something similar has happened concerning interpretations of
the "sinister window." This term refers to the purchasing of dollar
checks by the Colombian central bank without demanding certification for the origin of the funds. I can hardly think of greater
misunderstandings than those surrounding these central bank
operations. In countries without exchange controls, such as the
United States, there is little awareness of how the two foreignexchange markets operate in other countries: the "official" market,
conducted by the central bank, and the "unofficial," black market,
involving clandestine, private transactions. The black market pays
a higher price per dollar than the official market: in Colombia the difference is presently around 14 pesos per dollar. Obviously, the black
market is the more propitious for selling dollars of a doubtful origin.
It is a sign of ignorance to argue that the purchase of dollars by
the central bank promotes laundering. True, cocaine dollars can be
sold to the central bank, but traffickers will profit more by selling them
on the black market, where they do not have to explain or justify the
source of their dollars. Should we expect traffickers to operate
through legal channels? Besides, they have many means of hiding
their funds. Most simply, they can opt not to bring them into the country; they can sell a few dollars in the black market for their operating
needs while depositing their enormous profits in Swiss bank accounts. One recent article in El Espectador of Bogota announced
that the amount of funds entering through the "sinister window" is
increasing, which is tantamount to admitting that dollar laundering
is increasing. The article added that Colombians are "repatriating"
monies from the United States because of last fall's plunge in the
New York Stock Exchange. Yet if capital that purportedly enters

country: the drug problem is eminently international and, as such, knows no boundaries.
Further, eradicating a vice through police pro-

cedures has never been successful. Neither
prostitution nor alcoholism nor tobacco respond to prohibition. Only by means of education and information about their negative consequences can vices be controlled. Successful
examples include the diminishing of cigarette consumption for fear
of cancer and the checking of prostitution for fear of AIDS. Hence,
in order to reverse what is now identified as a "Colombian problem,"
we need a multi-faceted international campaign.
Let us not forget that U.S. consumption of cocaine has contributed
$1.5-2 billion to the Colombian economy. This startling sum has
perhaps reduced Colombia's unemployment and increased its consumption of goods and services; at the same time, however, it has
corrupted public administrators and the police force. This situation
should be of great concern to the United States, as it already is to
Colombia and its neighbors. We Colombians would welcome a solution based on a fair analysis of the responsibility of each member
of the international community.
Alfonso L6pez-Michelsen served aspresident of Colombia from 1974 to 1978.
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Is U.S. Foreign Policy
its Own Worst Enemy?
Condemned to Repetition: The United States and Nicaragua
by Robert A. Pastor. Princeton University Press, 1988. 352 pp. Cloth. $24.95.

by HeraldoMuioz

In

recent years the academic world has

been flooded by a wave of writings on U.S.
policy toward Central America and,
specifically, on Washington's relations with
Managua. Unfortunately, the quality of this
literature does not always match the
challenges posed by the relevance and
complexity of the subject. Robert Pastor's
Condemned to Repetition: The United
States and Nicaragua, stands as an important exception. It is a clear, well-written, and
fascinating account of the evolution of U.S.
policy towards Nicaragua under the Carter
administration. The author, a former director of Latin American and Caribbean affairs
at the National Security Council (NSC), provides abundant and previously unknown
details about the critical period marked by
the fall of Somoza and the triumph of the
Sandinistas, laced with provocative interpretation of those details. Condemned to
Repetition is required reading for anyone
wishing to understand the motives and outcomes of U.S. policy toward Nicaragua.
Pastor's book is divided into sixteen
chapters. Chapter one outlines the purposes and basic arguments of the book,
while chapters two and three explore the
historical background of U.S.-Nicaraguan
ties. These second and third chapters are
unnecessary, as they repeat facts that
other works treat in greater depth. The best
part of the book is in chapters four to eleven,
in which Pastor gives a personal account
of the succession crisis in Nicaragua and
the Carter government's relations with the
victorious Sandinistas. The final chapters
attempt to explain the process of estrangement between Washington and Managua,
exploring the question of whether U.S.
leadership and Latin American revolutionaries are bound to repeat past mistakes,
Heraldo Mufloz, a political scientist, is director of

the Programa de Seguimiento de las Politicas
Exteriores Latinoamericanas, in Santiago, Chile.
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leading to inevitable confrontations. Pastor
furnishes a provocative set of policy recommendations on these issues.

Difficult Decisions
The author's account of U.S. policy making during Nicaragua's succession crisis
supports some conventional propositions
about decision making in U.S. foreign
policy. Not unusually, the State Department
and the NSC were sharply divided over
what course of action to pursue. According
to Pastor (p.156), the State Department
favored acceptance of the Sandinista victory as inevitable and a quick adjustment
to that imminent scenario, while the NSC
wanted to play alternative cards up to the
very end. Pastor asserts that this division
pitted political appointees against career
officials. The former, who sought to formulate policies that were defensible in the
United States, "were more inclined to advocate a North American approach to solving the problem: elections; while career officials were more attuned to the debate in
Managua and more disposed to.make the
opposition's case for pushing Somoza out"
(p.107).
Graham Allison's classic critique of the
"rational actor model" of foreign policy,
which assumes that government officials
make "consistent, value-maximizing
choices within specified constraints"
(Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban
Missile Crisis, 1971), is illustrated in the.
Nicaraguan case. Pastor suggests that
faulty intelligence gathering and communications, as well as bureaucratic infighting, plagued U.S. policy toward
Nicaragua. He observes that "by and large,
the U.S. government knew less about the
[Nicaraguan] Guard than Somoza knew
about the U.S. government," and that
"from at least 1976 to July 1979, there were
no independent, unauthorized contacts
between U.S. government officials and

Guard officers" (p.176). This point emerges
with striking clarity in the content of the final
settlement. Somoza agreed to leave on the
morning of July 17, 1979, following a
negotiation that included the replacement
of the Guard commander, integration of the
FSLN with the Guard, and enforcement of
a cease-fire. Nevertheless, when the NSC's
Special Coordination Committee on
Nicaragua met on July 16, its members
"did not know that Somoza was leaving the
next day" and did not know the details of
the arrangement negotiated by the U.S.
embassy in Managua (pp.182-83). In
Pastor's view, this problem occurred
because the principal members of the U.S.
mission in Managua were themselves out
of touch with local developments (p.154).
Beyond the theoretical aspects of decision making, Pastor's work focuses on the
substantive side of the Carter administration's policies. The impression one draws
from Pastor's account of the intraadministration debates is that the Carter
presidency never grasped the depth of the
Nicaraguan and Latin American conviction
that the overthrow of Somoza was essential to ending the Nicaraguan crisis. Despite
the tough anti-Somoza stance advocated
by Assistant Secretary of State for InterAmerican Affairs Peter Vaky and special
representative William Bowdler, the Carter
government adopted a cautious stance
that seemed to favor the Nicaraguan dictator. This stance explains President
Carter's openness to appeals by Somoza's
supporters in Washington.
The United States' reluctance to abandon Somoza led to an effort at mediation,
which involved the Dominican Republic
and.Guatemala as well. Understandably,
most Nicaraguans and Latin Americans
viewed this effort as a play to keep Somoza
in power. Pastor candidly recognizes that
none of the Nicaraguans wanted such
mediation except Somoza himself, who

simply wanted to buy time. The most
moderate sectors of the anti-Somoza opposition considered the U.S. initiative a
"charade" (p.94). It seems that at some
points in history mediation or "neutrality"
is tantamount to taking sides. In the
Nicaraguan case, the Carter administration's attempt at mediation threatened to
undermine a quest for change.
One could suspect from the outset that
the mediation effort was condemned to
failure. From the U.S. perspective, such
failure was doubly negative: first, it served
to prolong the crisis; and second, as Pastor
claims, it strengthened the internal resolve
of the FSLN forces in the face of what they
considered a maneuver to strengthen
Somoza.
The FSLN's distrust of the Unites States
was further justified in view of the Carter administration's strategy of maintaining "two
pillars of power" in Nicaragua (p.15). Pastor
explains that this strategy sought to bolster
a moderate alternative to Somoza and to
preserve the National Guard. Pastor
himself agreed with these objectives
(p.153). Apparently, though, as the Guard
stepped up its savage repression of
Somoza's opponents and openly murdered
a U.S. television reporter, the Carter administration came to recognize that preserving
the Guard meant preserving the dictatorship: "Somocismo sin Somoza" (p.178).
Pastor himself agreed with the official
objective of "preserving the Guard" while
"obtaining Somoza's resignation" and
establishing an executive committee composed of moderate opposition members
who "could become an alternative source
of power when Somoza left" (p.153). But
Pastor now admits something he didn't
comprehend then: that, given the incestuous relations between the Guard and
the Somoza family, neither could have survived without the other (p.178).
The author describes in detail the
policies of those Latin American governments that unequivocally sided with the
Sandinista military campaign. Pastor concedes that for a long time the Carter administration did not fully realize "just how
different the Latin American view of the
Sandinistas was from its own" (p.139). Indeed, President Carlos Andres P6rez of
Venezuela and General Omar Torrijos of
Panama accomplished what the Carter administration failed to do: they predicted the
triumph of the final FSLN offensive (p.133).
Looking back, one cannot resist thinking
that the preservation of U.S. interests in
Nicaragua, as well as the satisfaction of

Nicaraguan popular demands, would have
been better served bythe proposals of Latin
American leaders, particularly Venezuela's
Perez. Simply put, their proposals sought
to force Somoza out and negotiate the
establishment of a new government in
which the Sandinistas would have effective
participation. Had the Carter government
taken the Latin Americans seriously,
perhaps the outcome of the crisis would
have been not only palatable to Washington
but also acceptable to the Nicaraguan
people.

...one cannot resist thinking
that the preservationof US.
interestsin Nicaragua,as
well as the satisfactionof

Nicaraguanpopular
demands, would have been
better served by the proposals
of Latin American leaders....
But the Carter government ignored their
ideas. Thus, P6rez pointed out that Somoza
remained in power "thanks to U.S. support," and Torrijos believed that, as always,
the United States '"istoo slow to recognize
new realities." The U.S. obsession with
Cuba's role-particularly strong among
"globalites" in the administration-made
Washington lose sight of how deep feelings
ran against Somoza and how inadequate
the East-West perspective was in grasping
the basic features of the Nicaraguan crisis.
Costa Rican president Rodrigo Carazo
reflected the opinions of a wide spectrum
of Latin Americans when he told Pastor why
Costa Rica worked with the Cubans to aid
the Sandinistas: "It was more important for
Somoza to fall than to keep out the Cubans"
(p.128).
The U.S. government imposed sanctions on Somoza in February 1979, a decision received with a "sigh of relief" by
moderate Nicaraguans and by Latin
Americans as a whole: "The United States
had finally acted" (p.120). But, as the inevitable fall of Somoza drew near, the
Carter administration's desperation reaffirmed widespread suspicions about the
United States' obstructionist role. According to Pastor, Zbigniew Brzezinski actually argued in favor of direct military intervention to impede the Sandinista victory. President Carter firmly opposed the proposal.

The case of Nicaragua highlighted the
limits of U.S. influence. Washington found
itself in the middle of Nicaraguan politics
but unable to control political outcomes. As
Pastor indicates, at some point the Carter
administration realized that it could not alter
the course of events in small and dependent Nicaragua and that it was a mere
bystander to a situation shaped primarily
by domestic forces.

Explaining the Past and Drawing
Lessons for the Future
The last three chapters of Condemned
to Repetition contain a set of reflections
about U.S. foreign policy that merit special
attention. Chapter 14 analyzes U.S. policy
toward not only Nicaragua but alsotoward
other countries that face succession
crises. This section (which would have
served as a useful guide to the reader if
placed at the beginning of the book) questions the "security motive" as a valid explanation of U.S. policy toward Cuba and
Nicaragua. Pastor writes that the "security motive" helps to elucidate "why and
when the United States became exercised
about developments in Nicaragua, and it
partially explains why the United States
identified with Batista and Somoza and confronted the Cuban and Nicaraguan revolutionary governments." But Pastor goes on
to say that the security motive does not tell
us "why the United States dissociated itself
from Batista and Somoza and why it initially respected the two revolutionary governments" (p.270).
One could argue that the United States
dissociated itself from Batista and Somoza
only when there was no other choice and
when doing so would no longer make a difference. Yet Pastor is right when he attributes contradictions in U.S. policy toward
such dictatorships to the "political
character, values and experience of the
United States, which has always given
more attention to the character and international behavior of regimes than have
most other nations" (p. 271). This assertion
leads to the hypothesis that national security interests do not enjoy undisputed
primacy in U.S. foreign policy.
Washington has often adhered to
criteria of "national security" by backing
military coups and maintaining cordial relations with dictatorial regimes. Not uncommonly, however, public opinion and Congress pressure the White House into
criticizing human rights violations and prodding dictatorships to adopt less rigid
political stances. Military governments
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typically respond by viewing the United
States not only with great mistrust but as
a decadent power, soft on communism,
which in the final instance is part of the
enemy camp. The only policy that military
regimes tend to accept is one of unconditional, uncritical support. Given the structure of the U.S. political system, such support is practically impossible.
In Pastor's judgment, "when the 'middle'
delegitimizes a dictator, U.S. officials are
compelled to follow the 'middle'. Even a
conservative administration cannot sustain
a policy of supporting a dictator if the middle groups in that country have rejected
him" (p.272). This thesis merits further
testing. Inmany instances of dictatorial rule
either there are no middle forces or they
wind up joining the armed rebellion. El
Salvador is a clear example. In such cases,
the U.S. government often tries to create
a centrist political sector. Pastor argues
that this "middle options preference" explains the decision not to overthrow
Somoza. A different explanation, however,
is that the United States chose not to overthrow Somoza out of an inordinate fear of
revolution and a proclivity to equate revolutionary change with security threats.
Nonetheless, one must agree with
Pastor's assertion that the United States "is
uncomfortable about supporting dictators
but also about overthrowing them" (p. 272).
This assertion may suggest that any U.S.
administration-even that of Ronald Reagan
-faces constraints in its prolonged and
close friendships with governments that
violate human rights and deny widespread
demands for democracy. Such governments eventually provoke adverse reactions from the media, church groups,
human rights groups, Congress, and
sometimes from policy makers within the
administration itself. Yet U.S. policy
likewise faces constraints from the opposite direction: Washington will not
engage in open confrontation with a
government that shares its anti-communist
and free-market world view.
Chapter 15 of Condemned to Repetition
outlines six moments between October
1978 and November 1984 when an alternative U.S. decision might have yielded a
brighter future for U.S.-Nicaraguan relations. Looking back, Pastor reflects that in
October 1978 he believed that pressures
against Somoza would not work. But then
he admits: "I now believe the U.S. should
have applied gradually escalating pressures" (p.289).
Pastor next analyzes crucial moments
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in which the Sandinistas missed the chance
to improve their relationship with Washington. He asserts that one of these missed opportunities occurred from early 1984 onward, when the Sandinistas "dismissed the
internal opposition and rejected any
dialogue with those in the armed opposition" (p.291). But on March 24, 1988, after
dismissing this possibility for six years, the
Sandinista government participated in
direct talks with the contra leadership.
Granted, circumstances had changed
substantially: the Sandinistas had practically defeated the contras in the battlefield; the
Iran-contra scandal had politically weakened the White House; and the talks stemmed from Central America's own Esquipulas
peace plan instead of from U.S. initiatives.
The Sapoa negotiations may well become
another lost opportunity, owing not to the
Sandinistas' lack of flexibility but to the
Reagan administration's strategy of confrontation.
The last chapter of Pastor's book contains a series of policy recommendations.
He suggests, for example, that the White
House should develop a better "support
system" to deal with succession crises.
Pastor therefore proposes that the White
House establish both a "historical office"
and ad hoc working groups to provide the
information necessary to make informed
judgments when dealing with the succession crises of dictatorships.
More significant, Pastor identifies four
options to guide U.S. policy during such
crises: "1) bolster the dictator, 2) aid the
revolutionaries, 3) let events take their
course, or 4) promote a democratic transition" (p.298). It is not surprising that he
recommends the last option. Nevertheless,
the enumeration of such options amounts
to a mere exercise in theory. In actuality,
a true democratic transition can be achieved only by withdrawing all support to the
dictator, thus favoring the revolutionary
forces.
Pastor goes on to outline a broad strategy aimed at the dictator, the moderate opposition, the military, other governments in
the region, and the revolutionaries. The
most interesting part of this outline is that
which relates to the revolutionary governments. Here Pastor makes a highly commendable proposition: "The United States
needs to demonstrate to all those on the left
in Latin America that itcan live with-indeed,
that it welcomes-genuine social change
and justice in Latin America" (p.310). He
describes other steps to adopt regarding
succession crises, seeking all the while to

"expand and consolidate democracy in the
Americas" (p.311).
Is the United States condemned to
repeat the same errors it made when confronted by revolutions such as those of
Cuba and Nicaragua? Pastor says no. He
nonetheless argues that old approaches
need to be replaced by two new ones. First,
the United States and revolutionaries need
to rethink the patterns of their past conflicts,
and second, big nations like the United
States and small ones like Nicaragua need
to discard stereotypes and find a new, less
destructive relationship (p.313). Each side,
Pastor argues, has expectations about the
other that have some basis in reality. But,
through "confidence-building steps,"
perhaps the negative expectations can be
replaced by positive ones. The United
States, he reasons, "could recognize the
need of the revolutionaries for dignity and
equity, and the revolutionaries could accept U.S. security concerns" (p.314).
Pastor poses a welcome challenge. Today, some changes can be observed in the
direction of mutual understanding and
acceptance. Until now, however, Latin
Americans seem to have recognized U.S.
needs and interests much more than the
United States recognizes the need for
change in Latin America. Let us hope that
another repetition of Cuba and Nicaragua
will not have to pass before the United
States and Latin America reach the mature
relationship that has proven so elusive.

Aztec Destiny
The Great Temple of
Tenochtitlin: Center and
Periphery in the Aztec World
by Johanna Broda, David Carrasco, and
Eduardo Matos Moctezuma. Berkeley, Los
Angeles, and London: University of California
Press, 1987. 185pp. Clotb. $38.00.
Written mainly for specialists, this book
consists of three long and well-documented
essays by archaeologist Eduardo Matos
Moctezuma, ethnohistorian Johanna
Broda, and religious historian David Carrasco. The essays analyze aspects of the
recent discoveries at the Templo Mayor
(1978-82), the most important pyramid in
the city of Mexico-Tenochtitlin. The considerable number of insitu artifacts and untouched edifices gives us an awesome vision of the complex ceremonialism and
symbolism of Aztec life. The Templo Mayor,

with its twin shrines dedicated to Huitzilopochtli (the principal Aztec tribal god)
and Tlaloc (the ancient rain god), occupied
a relatively small area within the ceremonial
precinct but constituted the focal point of
local and imperial cult.
At its beginnings (phases I-Ill) the Templo
Mayor-the principal materialization of the
Aztec "manifest destiny"-was a humble
and austere edifice. Following an expansive political boom, the Aztecs enhanced
and enlarged the temple through a series
of superimpositions and reconstructions.
The offerings from the pyramid and surrounding areas provide the largest body of
information now available. In his chapter
"The Templo Mayor of Tenochtitlan:
History and Interpretation," Eduardo
Matos recounts the earlier excavations in
the area and gives his own interpretations
of the double cult to Tlaloc and Huitzilopochtli. He also gives the first detailed
cataloguing of the offerings, "giving a
general idea of their content and of the construction period to which they belong"
(p.39). According to Matos, the offerings
were first deposited at the time of the
original construction (ca.1375-90); however, since that pyramid has not been uncovered, the sequence of ceremonial items
actually begins a bit later (ca. 1390) and
concludes at the time of the Spanish conquest (1519-21). About 7,000 objects found
in more than 100 offerings are known today.
In the chapter "Templo Mayor as Ritual
Space," Johanna Broda examines the
mythical content of the ritual objects found
in fills and caches. Using archaeological,
ethnohistorical, and ethnographic information, Broda advances provocative hypotheses regarding the complex hill-waterfertility elements involved in the extraordinary ceremonies that took place when offerings were deposited in the temple. Broda
warns us against simplistic interpretations
and insists that among Middle American Indians, particularly the Aztecs, nature, ritual,
and society had relations that developed at
different cultural levels and different
historical times.
David Carrasco's chapter on "Myth,
Cosmic Terror and Templo Mayor" explores what religious historians call the "vision of place" through the analysis of two
important mythic episodes: the birth of
Huitzilopochtli in Coatepec and the creation
of the Fifth Sun in the sacred city of
Teotihuacan. He explains how the Aztecs
employed these archetypes to establish
dominance over peripheral communities
by forcefully incorporating them into the

Aztec world.
Regarding the Templo Mayor, many
puzzles remain to be solved. For example,
Matos and Broda call attention to the
absence of direct representations of Huitzilopochtli in his principal site of worship in
Tenochtitlan, and to the presence of Olmec,
Teotihuacan, and Toltec objects in the
caches. In addition, a significant group of
similar stone sculptures of a deity probably
linked with the old god, the God of Turquoise
and Fire (Huehueteotl-Xiuhtecuhtli), was
discovered in different locations of the
pyramid.
Do the objects from past civilizations
denote the existence of a consciousness
of cultural heritage that preceded the M6xicas? Does the absence of Huitzilopochtli
and the proliferation of the images of Tlaloc
(a ctonic-pluvial god) and HuehueteotlXiuhtecuhtli (a god associated with the
mythical center) show that our knowledge
of the intricate rituals performed in the
Templo Mayor remains incomplete? Did
both Tlaloc and Huehueteotl-Xiuhtecuhtli
represent only the mythical spaces of
"center" and "below" in the temple? Did
the cult of Huitzilopochtli not leave any
trace in the temple because his offerings,
associated with the successive architectural changes, were not buried but burnt?
The excavations of the most important
Aztec temple have been the object of local
and foreign scholarly attention. This book
is a good example of international cooperation in the study of one of the most
remarkable pre-Columbian civilizations.
What is more, it demonstrates the varying
approaches of scholars from different fields
to the study of Aztec religion and culture.
Although the authors are aware that considerable research remains to be done, the
book's data and interpretations are
impressive.
Xavier Noguez
El Colegio de Mdxico

Andean Culture
on the Make
The Andes Viewed from the City:
Literary and Political Discourse
on the Indian in Peru 1848-1930
by Efrain Kristal. New York: Peter Lang
Publisbing, Inc., 1988. 240pp. Clotb. $41.00.
Efrain Kristal's The Andes Viewed from
the City analyzes literary writings on "the

Indian" in Peru, focusing on such writings
as a product of the intra-elite political
debates of nineteenth-century urban Peru.
The book is innovative because it regards
Peru's indigenista literature not as mere
description of the Indian, but rather as
discourse grounded in the epoch's socioeconomic and political transformations.
Each of the book's well-organized
chapters is dedicated to a particular period
and to the literary and political discourse of
a particular socioeconomic group. The first
chapter elaborates upon the importance
of Narciso Arestegui's novel El Padre
Horin(1848) as a reflection of the critical
position of the liberal landowners regarding
the clergy's abuses of the Indian. Of greater
depth were the ideas of the miningcentered export oligarchy, which called for
education of the Indian and opposed the abduction and conscription of Indians into the
army. These ideals emerge in Ladislao
Graria's Se bueno y serbs feliz (1861),
Juana Manuela Gorriti's Si haces mal no
esperes bien (1861), and Juan Vicente
Camacho's No era ella (1862).
Opposed to the ideals of the export elite
were the nascent Peruvian industrialists,
whose interests in building a modernized
nation are primarily represented by the
works of Gonzalez Prada and by Clorinda
Matto de Turner'sAves sin nido, Indole, and
Herencia. Turner is no longer portrayed as
the writer who initiated indigenista literature, but as someone who followed a tradition begun much earlier. Kristal views her
as an important member of Gonzalez
Prada's literary group, whose journal Circulo Literario set out the group's literary
guidelines. As a result of the book's emphasis on Matto, the reader achieves a
deepened understanding of her role as an
intellectual, especially during the tense
political conflicts between industrialists and
the export oligarchy during the second
presidency of Nicolas de Pierola. These
conflicts became all the more acute during
the subsequent presidency of Augusto B.
Leguia. Regarding the latter period, the
ideology of the export elite is restated in
Francisco Garcia Calder6n's Le Perou
Contemporain (1907), together with the
novels and short stories of his brother
Vicente Garcia Calder6n.
The significance of Kristal's book is that
it analyzes the indigenista literature of
nineteenth-century Peru as apolitical construct rooted in the evolving material
realities of urban society. Thus the book
underscores the interrelation of the writing
of this literature with the economic, social,
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and political dynamics of the era. Kristal's
emphasis represents a major contribution
not only to the study of nineteenth-century
Peru, but more generally to scholarship on
the production of literature as a cultural
form.
Josefa Salmdn
Loyola University
of New Orleans

A Tale
of Two Cities
Rethinking Ciudad Guayana
by Lisa Peattie. Ann Arbor: University of
Micbigan Press, 1987. 184pp. Paperback.
S13.95. Cloth. $27.95.
In 1961, at the junction of the Orinoco
and Caroni rivers in the south of Venezuela,
a Venezuelan development agency, the
Corporaci6n Venezolana de Guayana,
created a new city. Rather, it created two
different cities: the planned city and the real
city. As Lisa Peattie puts it, "the form of the
built environment that was the result of the
planning process bears a rather loose relationship to that proposed in the plan"
(p.154). And it is precisely this difference
between the CVG's plan and the reality of
Ciudad Guayana that Peattie seeks to
explain.
Peattie's criticism of the conventional
planning practices in Ciudad Guayana in
the early 1960s touches on many of the
issues now being raised by other scholars
and practitioners, such as John Friedmann,
for whom planning in Latin America has
been largely a "technocratic illusion."
What is distinctive about Peattie's contribution to the theoretically overburdened
literature on Latin American urban planning
is its method-a type of participant
observation-and its straightforward, narrative style. She is telling a story, and a
rather compelling one.
Peattie was contracted in 1962 to serve
as the CVG project's sociologist/anthropologist, charged with the task of identifying social problems emerging from the
planning and development process. While
it seems that she had very little influence
on the project's decisions, her position on
the planning staff and her involvement with
the community gave her a unique view of
the planning of the new city. Peattie has
already written one book about the city, The
View from the Barrio (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1968), from the
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perspective of some of the "subjects" of
planning in a poor barrio of Ciudad
Guayana. In contrast, Rethinking Ciudad
Guayana focuses on the CVG's engineers,
economists, architects, and planners. The
explanation of the divergence between the
plan and the reality of Ciudad Guayana
centers on an analysis of the planners'
discourse, which Peattie understands as
essentially "a form of action embedded in
society" (p.171).
A series of dichotomies emerges from
her analysis, some of these being quite
familiar: technocratic planning and political conflict, the Platonic city and the
Aristotelean city, intellectual production of
urban plans and the self-production of communities. For Peattie, each of these
dichotomies expresses but one aspect of
the permanent contradiction between the
two primary functions of planning: accumulation and legitimation. The purpose
of planning in Ciudad Guayana was to
legitimize a project of state-capitalist
development, which involved the construction of both a dam and a foreign-owned
aluminum plant.
The process of planning was itself
generally exclusionary and undemocratic.
The planners claimed to represent the
general interest-the ideals of progress and
modernization-above conflicting interests
in the community. But when confronted
with phenomena such as the growth of irregular subdivisions for workers' housing,
the planners' attitude toward the people
was one of contempt. The result of the plan
was a city dominated by the Venezuelan
state and a number of large corporations,
and characterized by a marked spatial
separation between the rich and the poor
as well as unequal access to services and
amenities.
Peattie arrives at no new or startling conclusions about planning, her main argument being that planning practices in
Ciudad Guayana purposefully ignored the
way the development of the city benefited
some and disadvantaged others. The
book's most distinctive thematic aspect is
its excellent treatment of the symbolic
representations of the social reality-maps,
plans, architectural drawings, and statistical analyses-that constitute the discourse
of planning. The book's least satisfactory
aspect is the reproduction of correspondence between Peattie and her brother, a
classics scholar, concerning the nature
and meaning of urban design. Although the
political argument for the development of
a community's built environment is sound,

the book treats the complex theme too
simply. Nevertheless, this same straightforward exposition of other, more familiar
themes in planning and urban design gives
the book great appeal for both specialists
and non-specialists.
William Cartier
Universidad de Los Andes

Characterizing
the Military
The Evolution of the Cuban
Military: 1492-1986
by Rafael Fermoselle. Miami: Ediciones
Universal, 1987. 586 pp. Paperback.$21.95.
Cuban history has revolved around two
poles: sugar and the military. It is impossible to understand the politics of the island
without wrestling with these two powerful
forces. While the literature on the impact
of sugar on Cuban development is extensive, the same cannot be said about the
literature on the military. Yet armed forces
(both national and foreign) have shaped
politics in Cuba, as in most Latin American
countries, since pre-colonial times. The
latest link in the long chain is the Revolution
of 1959. Led by Fidel Castro, the Revolution
reached power through violent means,
although dictator Fulgencio Batista's
departure from Havana cannot be strictly
considered a military defeat. Since 1959
the army (first the Rebel Army and later the
FuerzasArmadas Revolucionarias, or FAR)
has been the principal pillar of Castro's
regime. The lidermdximo prides himself in
being a military man and commander-inchief. Under his command, the state has
militarized Cuban society, an uncommon
phenomenon in Latin America. The military
in Cuba, therefore, shares common features with its Latin American counterparts,
while at the same time manifesting unique
characteristics.
Rafael Fermoselle's The Evolution of the
Cuban Military: 1492-1986 is the first attempt to study military history in Cuba from
the fifteenth century to the 1980s, although
half the book is devoted to developments
after 1959. The book is divided into three
chronological sections: the Colonial Period,
the Republic, and the Revolution in Power.
These sections are also organized chronologically, integrating larger political
developments with military history. A
lengthy section covers Cuba's policy of
military internationalism in the Western

Hemisphere, Africa, and the Middle East.
The book also includes a series of valuable
appendices on the current organization
and leadership of the Cuban armed forces,
information that is not readily available
elsewhere.
Fermoselle's point of departure is that
the "Cuban character," which he defines,
albeit in a sketchy manner (pp.3-9), is
somehow responsible for the continuous
presence of the military in Cuban life. After
presenting this underdeveloped and questionable proposition, the author enters into the historical account. Here is where the
strength of The Evolution of the Cuban
Military lies. The book does a good job of
intertwining political and military history, as
good as can be expected of a book which
covers 494 years in 456 pages of text. A
significant amount of the material
(especially in the discussion of recent
history) derives from primary sources.
The collection of data on the top leaders
of the FAR makes this volume an important
reference source. For the specialist, this
might be its major attraction. For the nonspecialist, the broad historical account,
minus the details, might be of greater appeal. Several charts (for instance, "The
Flow of Intelligence in Cuba," p.342) and
concepts (such as the "new class") are
also worthwhile contributions. Fortunately, the information is presented in a
readable style that makes potentially dry
material palatable.
In spite of its strengths, The Evolution of
the Cuban Military suffers from weak
analysis and the absence of a theoretical
framework. There is little discussion of the
concept of militarization, the pattern of civilmilitary relations, ideology and militarism,
and Cuba in comparative Latin American
or communist-regime perspective. At times
the information is sketchy, and throughout
the volume the author, tongue in cheek,
editorializes without substantiating his
remarks (e.g., "People with a tendency
toward fanatical activism seem to find it
easy to change their ideological masters."
[author's italics], p.279). This same
carefree attitude is reflected in the usage
of the term "adventures" to describe
Cuba's massive and well-planned deployment of troops abroad (specifically, in
Angola and Ethiopia). In this episode of
military history, the author should have
stressed the discontinuity, rather than the
continuity, in the role of the military after
1975.
A discussion of the potential role of the
FAR in a post-Castro succession would

have been of interest, although speculative
by definition. But, as Fermoselle himself
recognizes: "this study...only covers the
highlights....It would take several books to
do justice to the subject" (p.18).
Fermoselle's book is a useful contribution to the study of the Cuban armed forces
and adds to the growing literature on the
military in Latin America. If used in conjunction with James Morris's The Cuban
Military: Status and Outlook (Miami: Institute of Interamerican Studies, University of Miami, 1988), Fermoselle's volume
would be even more valuable, for the two
works examine complementary aspects of
the Cuban military.
Damian J. FernAndez
Colorado College

Challenging
the U.S.?
Continuidad y cambio
en las relaciones America LatinaEstados Unidos
edited by Monica Hirst. Buenos Aires: Grupo
Editor Latinoamericano, Colecci6n Estudios
Internacionales, 1987. 358 pp. 515.00.
This volume is a collection of eight articles on relations between the United
States and several Latin American countries. The case studies include Argentina
(Roberto Russell), Brazil (Monica Hirst),
Chile (Heraldo Muiioz and Carlos Portales),
Colombia (Bruce M. Bagley and Juan G.
Tokatlian), Cuba (Rafael Hernandez), Mexico (Guadalupe Gonzalez G.), and Peru
(Laura Madalengoitia U.). A final essay by
Alberto van Klaveren deals with Latin
American-U.S. relations from a more
general, comparative perspective. The
authors are members of the Working Group
on Comparative Foreign Policies of Latin
America, organized by the Program for
Joint Studies on Latin American International Relations (RIAL). This collection is the
first product of their collective work.
Continuidadycambio focuses on developments during the last decade, particularly during the first four years of the Reagan
administration. Its main purpose is to
assess the degree of international
autonomy attained by each country and by
the whole region, departing from an
analysis of the United States as the
hegemonic actor in the hemisphere. The
factors used in evaluating this autonomy
include the role of internal and external actors in the making of national foreign

policies, the bilateral diplomatic agenda of
1981-85, and the medium-term prospects
for relations among the countries.
The chapters are rich in information, intelligent from the analytical standpoint, and
successful in dealing with the various
issues. Although the essays do not produce
startling conclusions-at least for those acquainted with the evolution of Latin American-U.S. relations in the last decade-they
provide a wealth of information and comprehensive interpretations of the evolving
nature of bilateral relations. Most valuable
in this regard are the articles on Argentina,
Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru; these
articles evaluate the influence of domestic
factors-political and economic variables
and decision-making processes-in shaping the dynamic interaction between Latin
American foreign-policy behavior and U.S.
initiatives and reactions. In contrast, the
studies on Chile and Cuba, though interesting in themselves, mainly focus on the
U.S. side of the relationship and do not provide a clear picture of the domestic
elements that shape foreign policy.
Van Klaveren's concluding chapter
gives an excellent comparative review of
the case studies. The chapter discusses
how the studies measure up to the group's
initial objectives and how they contribute
to the understanding of bilateral relations.
The common perspective elaborated in
the volume's introduction, however, is not
always respected by the authors, whose articles cover varying periods and examine
differing issues. This is obviously the outcome of analyzing, on a case by case basis,
dissimilar national and international situations that require distinct approaches.
While such divergence does not diminish
the informative and analytical value of the
book, it is difficult to find themes that
facilitate comparative conclusions. What
clearly stands out is the diversity of situations in Latin America and the varying
degrees to which these countries have
managed to affirm their autonomy at the international level.
Continuidadycambio represents an important contribution to the understanding
of Latin America's contemporary relations
with the United States. Also, it serves as a
valuable bibliographic reference book.
Specialists should look forward to the
publication of other fine studies by the
members of this group, especially the announced work on Central American foreign
policies.
Aldo C. Vacs
Skidmore College A
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A listing of recent books
on Latin America and the Caribbean
Compiled by Marian Goslinga

Anthropology
and Sociology
Aciertos y fracasos sociales del catolicismo argentino. Nestor Auza. Buenos Aires:
Docencia, 1987. 2 vols.
Los africanos y nuestra isla. C. Albert. Santo
Domingo: Editora Buho, 1987. [About Hispaniola.]
Am6rique Latine: Introduction a I'ExtremeOccident. Alain Rouqui6. Paris: Editions du
Seuil, 1987. 446p. 140F.
And Here the World Ends: The Life of an
Argentine Village. Kristin Hoffman Ruggiero.
Stanford University Press, 1988. 226p. $32.50.
Asi piensan los salvadorefios urbanos,
1986-1987. Ignacio Martin-Baro, Arely Hern ndez. San Salvador: UCA Editores, 1987.
130p.
Autoritarismo y control social: Argentina.
Uruguay-Chile. Emilio Garcia Mendez.
Buenos Aires: Hammurabi, 1987. 285p.
$13.70.
The Burden of Support: Young Latinos in

an Aging Society. David E. Hayes-Bautista,
ed. Stanford University Press, 1988.
$29.50.

22

4p.

CinematografIa y lucha ideoi6gica: reflexiones sobre cine en Nicaragua. Carlos
Mohs. Managua: Universidad Centroamericana,
1987. 316p. $10.00.
Crises in the Caribbean Basin. Richard Tardanico, ed. Sage Publications, 1987. 263p.
$29.95.
La desinformaci6n de la prensa en Costa

Rica: un grave peligro para la paz. Mario
Zeled6n Cambronero, ed. San Jose: Estudios
Sociales, 1987. 282p. $8.50.
Dindmica de la poblaci6n de habla In.

digena, 1900-1980. Luz Maria Vald6s, Maria
Teresa Men6ndez. M6xico: Instituto de Antropologia e Historia, 1987. 110p. [About
Mexico.]

Mujeres en Ia Nueva Espatia: educaci6n y

Dindmica migratoria argentina, 1955-1984:
democratizaci6n y retomo de expatriados.
Alfredo E. Lattes, Enrique Oteiza, eds. 2nd ed.
Buenos Aires: Centro Editor de America
Latina, 1987. 2 vols.

vida cotidlana. Pilar GonzalboAizpuru. El Colegio de Mexico, 1987. 323p. $27.90.

El Salvador 1987: salvadoreflos refugiados

A mulher e seu direito a sadde; por uma
politica de sadde no Brasil. Jose Aristodemo
Pinotti, Anibal Faundes. Seo Paulo: Manole,

en los Estados Unidos. Segundo Montes.
San Salvador: Instituto de investigaciones,
Universidad Centroamericana Jose Sime6n
Catnas, 1987. 263p. $12.50.

Haiti's Influence on Antebellum America:
Slumbering Volcano in the Caribbean.
Alfred N. Hunt. Louisiana State University
Press, 1988. 196p. $25.00.

1988. 181p.
Mdsica de Guatemala: cuadernos de
folklore. Direcci6n General de Bellas Artes,
Departamento de Folklore. Guatemala:
Distribuidores Centroamericanos, 1987.112p.
$10.00.

El negro an el Ped y su transculturaci6n

Hispanic USA: Assimilation or Separatism?
Thomas Weyr. Harper & Row, 1988. 384p.
$22.95.

linguistica. Fernando Romero. Lima: Editorial
Milla Batres, 1987. 176p.

A igreja no Brasil: diretorio liturgico. Conferencia Nacional dos Bispos do Brasil.
Brasilia: CNBB, 1988. 305p.

Nicaragua, trinchera teol6gica: para una
teologla de Ia Iiberaci6n desde Nicaragua.
Giulio Girardi, B. Forcano, Jose Maria Vigil,
eds. Managua: Centro Ecum6nico Antonio
Valdivieso, 1987. 438p. $15.00.

Indios da Amazonia: de maloria a minoria,
1750-1850. Carlos de Araujo Moreira.
Petropolis, Brasil: Vozes, 1988. 348p.
La inmigraci6n judia al Perd, 1848-1948.
Le6n Trahtemberg-Siederer. Lima: Tipo-Offset
Sesator, 1987. 322p.
Inside Nicaragua: Young People's Dreams
and Fears. Rita G. Gelman. New York: F.
Watts, 1988. 160p. $12.90.

Passage of Darkness: The Ethnobiology of
the Haitian Zombie. Wade Davis. University
of North Carolina Press, 1988. $29.95.
El periodismo en El Salvador bosquejo

hist6ricodocumental, precedidode apuntes
sobrea la prensa colonial hispanoamericana.
Italo L6pez Vallecillos. 2nd ed. San Salvador:
UCA Editores, 1987. 478p. $17.50.

Landlords and Capitalists: The Dominant
Class of Chile. Maurice Zeitlin, Richard E.
Ratcliff. Princeton University Press, 1988.
328p. $45.00; $12.95.
Lines to the Mountain Gods: Nazca and
the Mysteries of Peru. Evan Hadingham.
University of Oklahoma Press, 1988. 320p.
$15.95.
Memorial por Colombia: dependencia,
miseria, violencia. Eduardo Umana Luna;
Lucia de Esguerra, ed. Bogota: Editorial Inca,
1987. 215p. $12.50.
Mexican-American Folklore. John O. West.
Little Rock, Ark.: August House, 1988. 242p.
$9.95.

A modema tradligo brasileira. Renato Ortiz.

Presencia del diablo en la tradici6n oral de
Iberoam6rica. Flix Coluccio, Marta Isabel
Coluccio. Buenos Aires: Ediciones Culturales
Argentinas, 1987. 248p.
Primary Medical Care in Chile: Accessibility Under Military Rule. Joseph L. Scarpaci.
University of Pittsburgh Press, 1988. 208p.
$24.95.
Puerto Rican Houses in Sociohistorical
Perspective. Carol F. Jopling. University of
Tennessee Press, 1988. 320p. $34.95.
Racismo: algo mis que discriminaci6n.
Maria Teresa Ruiz. San Jose: Departamento
Ecumenico de Investigaciones, 1987. 181p.
[Historical study of racism in the Caribbean.]

Seo Paulo: Brasiliense, 1988. 222p.
Marian Goslinga is the Latin American and
Caribbean librarian at Florida International
University.
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Los movimientos sociales an el Caribe.
G6rard Pier re-Charles. Universidad Aut6noma
de Santo Domingo, 1987. 389p.

Los refugiados centroamericanos. Universidad Nacional deCosta Rica, Universidad para
la Paz. Heredia: Universidad Nacional, 1987.
259p.

Sandinismo, marxismo, cristianismo: la
confluencia. Giulio Girardi. 2nd ed. Managua:
Valdivieso, 1987. 457p. $13.50.

Jos6 Bonifacio. Octavio Tarquinio de Souza.
Belo Horizonte, Brasil: Itatiaia, 1988. 278p.
[Reprint of the 1972 ed.]

Undiscovered Islands of the Caribbean. Burl
Willes. Santa Fe, N. Mex.: John Muir Publications, 1988. 256p. $12.95.

Ser mujer on Nicaragua: testimonios de
mujeres haciendo revoluci6n. Clara Murguialday, ed. Montevideo: Cotidiano Mujer,
1987.

Jos6 Figueres: una vida por la justiciasocial.
Tomas Guerra. Heredia, Costa Rica: Centro
Editor de America Latina, 1987. 292p.

Viajes y cronistas on Ia Amazonia colombiana. Beatriz Alzate Angel, ed. BogotA:
Araracuara, 1987. 366p. $19.95.

Sport and Society in Latin America: Diffusion, Dependency, and the Rise of Mass
Culture. Joseph Arbena. Greenwood Press,
1988.
Sugar is Made with Blood: The Conspiracy
of La Escalera and the Conflict Between
Empires over Slavery in Cuba. Robert L.
Paquette. Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press, 1988. 352p. $29.95.
Todos Santos in Rural Tlaxcala ASyncretic,
Expressive, and Symbolic Analysis of the
Cult of the Dead. Hugo G. Nutini. Princeton
University Press, 1988. 490p. $75.00
Victimas de la violencia en Centroam6rica.
Walter Pereira, et al. San Jose: Equipo Centroamericano de Trabajo Psicosocial, 1987.
102p. $12.50.
Violencia y crisis de valores en el Peru.
Jeffrey L. Klaiber, ed. Lima: Pontificia Universidad Catblica del PerO, 1987. 396p. $13.00.
Where the Dove Calls: The Political Ecology of a Peasant Corporate Community in
Northwestern Mexico. Thomas E. Sheridan.
University of Arizona Press, 1988. 256p. $29.95.
With Open Arms: Cuban Migration to the
United States. Felix Roberto Masud-Piloto.
Rowman & Littlefield, 1988. 150p. $28.95.

Biography
Biografladel poder. Enrique Krauze. Mexico:
Fondo de Cultura Econ6mica, 1987. 8 vols.
$138.50. [Porfirio Diaz, Francisco I. Madero,
Emiliano Zapata, Francisco Villa, Venustiano
Carranza, Alvaro Obreg6n, Plutarco E. Calles,
Lazaro Cardenas.]
Biografla minima del doctor Juan Jos6
Ar6valo Bermejo. Jaime Barrios Archila.
Guatemala: Ministeriode Educaci6n, 1987.82p.
El coronel Francisco Bolognesi y el expansionismo chileno. Gustavo Pons Muzzo. Lima:
Editorial Bruno, 1987. 308p.
A Dream of Maya: Augustus and Alice
LePlongeon in Nineteenth-Century Yucatan.
Lawrence Gustave Desmond, Phyllis Mauch
Messenger. University of New Mexico Press,
1988. 147p. $19.95.
La ideologia politicadel Dr. Francia.Adriano
Irala Burgos. Asunci6n, Paraguay: Dipp, 1988.
[Reprint of the 1975ed.]

Mi general Torrijos. Jos6 de Jesis Martinez.
San Jose: Legado, 1987.355p. $15.00.
Pinochet: penultimo round. Roberto Mero.
Buenos Aires: Legasa, 1987. 382p.
Ram6n Torres M6ndez: pintorde la Nueva
Granada. Efrain SAnchezCabra. BogotA: Fundaci6n Cafetero, 1987. 236p. $35.50.

Economics
La CGT [Confederaci6n General del
Trabajo de la Republica Argentina] y el
sindicalismo latinoamericano: historia
critica de sus relaciones. Daniel Parcero.
Buenos Aires: Fraterna, 1987. 247p.

Las cooperatives caficultores en Costa
Santander y la educacl6n: Ideario educativo
del "hombre de las leyes" y su influencia en
los colegios santanderinos. Javier Ocampo
L6pez. Tunja, Colombia: Colegio de Boyaca,
1987.98p.
Ulises Heureaux: biograffa de un dictador.
Mu-Kien Adriana Sang Ben. Santo Domingo:
Editora Corripio, 1987. 350p.
The Violence of Love: The Pastoral Wisdom
of Archbishop Oscar Romero. James R.
Brockman, ed. and trans. Harper &Row, 1988.
256p. $19.95; $12.95.

Description and Travel
Bogotb ayer, hoy y mafnana. Juan Mosca, ed.
Bogota: Villegas, 1987. 303p. $49.50.
The Caribbean: A Cultural Journey. Carolyn
J. Curran. New York: Gumbs &Thomas, 1988.
200p. $24.95.
Descubriendo el Vaile del Colca: Discover-

ing the Colca Valley. Mauricio de Romana,
Jaime Blassi, Kordi Blassi. Barcelona: Grupo 3,
1987. 204p. $70.00.
The Discoveryof the Amazon. JoseT. Medina,
ed. 2nd ed. Dover, 1988. 480p. $9.95.
Ecuador. Kevin Kling. Thames &Hudson, 1988.
$40.00.
Haiti. TrudyJ. Hanmer. NewYork: Watts, 1988.
96p. $9.90.
Mexico Through Russian Eyes, 1806.1940.
William H. Richardson. Universityof Pittsburgh
Press, 1988. 304p. $29.95.

Rica. Jos6 D.Cazanga S. San Jose: Alma Mater,
1987.351p.
La crisis global del capitalismo en M6xico,
1968.1985. Alejandro Alvarez. M6xico: Ediciones Era, 1987. 178p.
De la corresponsabilidad a la moratoria: el

caso de la deuda externa peruana,
1970.1986. Drago Kisic Wagner. Lima: Fundaci6n Friedrich Ebert, 1987. 369p.
La deuda externa de Am6rica Latina y la
banca Internacional. Luis de SebastiAn. San
Salvador: UCA Editores, 1987. 197p.
Deuda externa: problema revolucionario
para Am6rica Latina. Z. A. Osorio. Lima: Ediciones RA, 1987. 205p.
Deuda o desarrollo hacia la emancipaci6n
de Am6rica Latina. Luis Alva Castro. Lima:
Editorial Etcetera, 1987. 127p.
Development and External Debt in Latin
America: Bases for a New Consensus.
Richard Feinberg, Ricardo Ffrench-Davis, eds.
University of Notre Dame Press, 1988. 272p.
$29.95; $16.95.
Economia chibcha. Armando Suescun
Monroy. BogotA: Ediciones Tercer Mundo,
1987.113p. $3.95.
La economia subterr6nea de M6xico. Centro
de Estudios Econ6micos del Sector Privado.
Mexico: Editorial Diana, 1987. 93p.
Estabilizaci6n y ajuste estructural en
Am6rica Latina. Santiago Roca, ed. Lima:
Escuela de Administraci6n de Negocios para
Graduados, ESAN, 1987. 534p.

La estructura de la industria uruguaya. MarThe Savage and the Innocent. David MayburyLewis. Rev. ed. Boston: Beacon Press, 1988.
288p. $11.95. [About Brazil.]

tin Buxedas, Jose Roca, Luis Stolovich.
Montevideo: Fundaci6n de Cultura Universitaria, 1987. 148p.

Travels and Archaeology in South Chile.
Junius B. Bird. University of Iowa Press, 1988.
264p. $25.00.

External Constraints on Economic Policy
in Brazil, 1889-1930. Winston Fritsch. University of Pittsburgh Press, 1988. 250p. $49.95.
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Foreign Investment, Debt, and Economic
Growth in Latin America. Antonio Jorge, Jorge
Salazar-Carrillo, eds. St. Martin's Press, 1988.
350p. $60.00.
Guatemala: Is agroexportaci6n y las rela.
clones Intemacionales. Fernando Gonzalez
Davison. Guatemala: Editorial Universitaria,
1987.215p.
La industria en la economla mixta de
Nicaragua. Geske Dijkstra. Managua: Coordinadora Regional, 1987.83p. $8.50.
Inside Development in Latin America: A

Report from the Dominican Republic, Co.
lombia and Brazil. James Lang. University of
North Carolina Press, 1988. 368p. $37.50.
La inversi6n publica y redistribuci6n
especial de Ia poblacl6n en el Peru,
1970-1986. Pedro Vidaurre Delgado. Lima:
Universidad Nacional Mayor de San Marcos,
1987.
Japan's Economic Strategy in Brazil:
Challenge for the United States. Leon Hollerman. Lexington Books, 1988. 320p. $39.00.
Labor Migration in Jamaica: White Capital
and Black Labor. Elizabeth McLean Petras.
Westview Press, 1988. 297p.

Land, Power and Poverty* Agrarian Transformation and Political Change in Central
America. Charles D.Brockett. Allen and Unwin,
1988. 256p. $37.50.

Las relaciones econ6micas y diplomiticas
del Brasil con sus vecinos de Ia Cuenca
Amaz6nica, 1974-1985. Gino F. Costa. Lima:
Centro Peruano de Estudios Internacionales,
CEPEI, 1987. 99p.
Underdeveloping the Amazon: Extraction,
Unequal Exchange, and the Failure of the
Modern State. Stephen G. Bunker. University
of Chicago Press, 1988. 280p. $14.95.

History andArchaeology
Andanzas de Herndn Cort6s. Artemio de
Valle-Arizpe. Mexico: Panorama, 1987. 222p.
9800 pesos mexicanos.
O antl-semitismo na era Vargas: fantasmas
de uma geragio,1930.1945. Maria Luiza Tucci
Carneiro. Sao Paulo: Brasiliense, 1988. 587p.

Biografia de la pampa: cuatro siglos de
historia del campo argentino. Ricardo Luis
Molinari. BuenosAires: Gagliagone, 1987.213p.
$80.00.
Border Fury: A Picture Postcard Record of

Mexico's Revolution and U.S. War Preparedness, 1910.1917. Paul J. Vanderwood,
Frank N. Samponaro. University of New Mexico Press, 1988. 293p. $27.50.

Cartas y cronistas del Descubrimiento y Ia
Conquista. FranciscoCarrillo. Lima: Editorial
Horizonte, 1987. 252p.
Colonialism and Agrarian Transformation
in Bolivia: Cochabamba, 1550.1900. Brooke
Larson. Princeton University Press, 1988. 424p.
$65.00; $25.00.

Oil and Mexican Foreign Policy. George W.
Grayson. Universityof Pittsburgh Press, 1988.
224p. $19.95.

La conversion des indiens de Nouvelle
Espagne. Christian Duverger. Paris: Editions
du Seuil, 1987. 135F.

Partidos, sindicatos y nuevos movimientos
sociales en Am6rica Latina. Julio Godio.
Buenos Aires: Punto Sur, 1987. 179p. $5.60.

The Emergence of Latin America in the
Nineteenth Century. David Bushnell, Neill
Macaulay. Oxford University Press, 1988. 335p.
$32.50.

El problems agroalimentario en Colombia.
Absal6n Machado, ed. Bogota: Universidad Nacional de Colombia, 1987. 147p. $6.95.

La realidad latinoamericana: esquemas de
integracl6n. Gregorio Iriarte. Buenos Aires:
Ediciones Paulinas, 1987. 205p. $6.30.
Relaciones econ6micas intemacionales de
Am6rica Latina. Ram6n Bahamonde Bachet,
ed. Lima:Centro Peruanode Estudios Internacionales, CEPEI, 1987.
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desarrollo hist6rico. Fernando GonzAlez
Davison. Guatemala: Editorial Universitaria,
1987. 137p. $7.50.
Historia del Perd antiguo. Humberto Vargas
Salgado. Lima: Ediciones Sagsa, 1987. 200p.

A invengio republicana: Campos Sales,
as bases e a decadencia da Primeira
Republica brasileira. Renato Lessa. Sao
Paulo: Vertice, 1988. 173p.
The Many Faces of Cuillapan: A Historical

Digest of a Sixteenth-Century Dominican
Monastery and Church Complex and Village, Oaxaca, Mexico. Eleanor F. Sleigh. Orlando, Fla.: Pueblo Press, 1988. 200p.
Nonviolent Insurrection in El Salvador: The
Fail of Maximiliano Hemindez Martinez.
Patricia Parkman. Universityof Arizona Press,
1988. 260p. $35.00.
Peruvian Prehistory: An Overview of PreInca and Inca Society. Richard W. Keatinge,
ed. Cambridge University Press, 1988. 364p.
$49.50.
Secondary Cities of Argentina: The Social

History of Corrientes, Salta, and Mendoza,
Brazil: The Forging of a Nation. Roderick
Barman. Stanford University Press, 1988. 400p.
$42.50.

Nicaragua: cuesti6n agraria y participaci6n
campesina. Vera Gianotten, Ton de Wit,
Rodrigo Montoya. Lima: Centro de Estudios y
Promoci6n del Desarrollo, Desco, 1987. 99p.
$9.00.

The Political Economy of Argentina. Guido
Di Tella, Rudiger Dornbusch, eds. University of
Pittsburgh Press, 1988. 288p. $49.95.

Guatemala, 1500.1970: reflexiones sobre su

O espelho e a imagem: o escravo na
historiografIa brasileira, 1808.1920. Luis
Carlos Lopesa. Rio de Janeiro: Achiame, 1987.
126p.
Estados y naciones en los Andes: hacia una
historia comparativa Bolivia-ColombiaEcuador-Peri. J. P. Deler, Y. Sait-Geours, eds.
Lima: Instituto Franc6s de Estudios Andinos,
1987.2 vols.

Food, Conquest and Colonization in
Sixteenth-Century Spanish America. John C.
Super. University of New Mexico Press, 1988.
160p. $24.95.

1850-1910. James R.Scobie. Stanford University Press, 1988. 2 88p. $42.50.
Trilogia do terror a implantagio, 1964.
Wanderley dos Santos; Nancy Valadares de
Carvalho, ed. Sao Paulo: Vertice, 1988. 213p.
[About Brazil.]

Language and Literature
El Arbol en Ia poesia guatemalteca. J. Francisco Rubio. Guatemala: Cenaltex, 1987. 442p.
Form and Function in Chicano English.
Jacob Ornstein-Galicia, ed. Melbourne, Fla.:
Krieger, 1988.
Funciones sociales y conciencia del lenguaje: estudios sociolinguisticos on M6xico. Hector Mufioz Cruz. Xalapa, Mexico:
Universidad Veracruzana, 1987.187p. $9.00.
La imaginacl6n en Is obra de Delmira
Agustini. Ileana Loureiro de Renfrew.
Montevideo: Editorial Letras Femeninas, 1987.
183p.
Latinismoyespafol dominicano. Belarminio
Diaz Diaz. Universidad Aut6noma de Santo
Domingo, 1987. 104p.
Lives on the Line: The Testimony of Contem.
porary Latin American Authors. Doris
Meyer, ed. University of California Press, 1988.
280p. $25.00.

Mario contra Macunaima: cultura e politica

em Mario de Andrade. Carlos Sandroni. Sao
Paulo: Vertice, 1988. 158p.
O menino na literaturabrasileira. Vania Maria
Resende. Sao Paulo: Perspectiva, 1988.244p.
O negro e o romantismo brasileiro. Heloisa
Toiler Gomes. Sao Paulo: Atual, 1988. 113p.
A poesia negra no modemismo brasileiro.
Benedita Gouveia Damasceno. Campinas,
Brasil: Pontes, 1988. 142p.

Comentarios sobre la constituci6n san-

dinista (1987): 6republica presidencial o
monarqufa absoluta? Eduardo Ortiz Ortiz. San
Jos6: Lehmann Editores, 1987. 156p.

El Salvador: Testament of Terror. Joe Fish,
Christina Sganga. New York: Olive Branch
Press, 1988. 160p. $17.95; $9.95.

Constitucl6n y r6gimen politico en el
Paraguay. Justo Jos6 Prieto. Asunci6n: Dipp,
1987.348p. $30.00.

Ensayos sobre la transici6n democritica
en Ia Argentina. Carlos Altamirano, et al.; Jos6
Nun, Juan C. Portantiero, eds. Buenos Aires:
Punto Sur, 1987. 418p. $9.30.

Continuidad y cambio en las relaciones
Am6rica Latina-Estados Unidos. Monica
Hirst. Buenos Aires: Grupo Editorial Latinoamericano, 1987. 358p. $15.00.

The Giant's Rival: The USSR and Latin
America. Cole Blasier. Rev. ed. University of
Pittsburgh Press, 1988. 264p. $24.95; $9.95.
bHacia donde va el estado uruguayo?:

Raining Backwards. Roberto Fernandez.
Houston: Arte Piblico Press, 1988. $8.50.
Rub6n Darfoen Costa Rica. Alejandro Montiel
Arguello. San Jose: L6pez Tercero, 1988. 119p.
The Trinidad Awakening: West Indian
Literature of the Nineteen-Thirties. Reinhard
W. Sander. Greenwood Press, 1988.

Crisis centroamericana y politica de las

Gerbnimo de Sierra, ed. Montevideo: Cultura
Universitaria, 1987. 252p. $18.00.

Crisis de la izquierda en Costa Rica. Roberto Salom Echeverria. San JosB: Editorial
Porvenir, 1987. 168p. $8.50.

Hemispheric Security and U.S. Policy in
Latin America. Augusto Varas, ed. Westview
Press, 1988. 200p. $37.50.

Crisis in Allende's Chile: New Perspectives.

La iglesia y el Estado en Colombia. Juan
Pablo Restrepo; Ferndn Gonzalez, ed. Bogota:
Inca, 1987.2 vols. $17.95. [Reprint of the 1885
ed.]

Edy Kaufman. Praeger, 1988. 416p. $45.95.
You Can't Drown the Fire: Latin American
Women Writing in Exile. Alicia Partnoy, ed.
Pittsburgh: Cleis Press, 1988. 200p. $21.95;
$9.95.
Zumbi, Tiradentes e outras historias contadas pelo Teatro de Arena de Slo Paulo.
Claudia de Arruda Campos. Sao Paulo:
Perspectiva, 1988. 170p.

Politics and Government

Cuban Race Politics: The Shaping of
Castro's African Policy. Carlos Moore. Center
forAfro-American Studies, Universityof California at Los Angeles, 1988.

Delimitaci6n de espacios oceinicos: el
caso colombo-venezolano. Adolfo J. Garcia.
BogotA: Universidad Externado de Colombia,
1987.231p. $12.95.

Administraci6n yelecciones: la experiencia
dominicana de 1986. Julio Brea Franco. San
Jose: Capel, 1987. 84p. $6.50.

Democracia y dictadura: el destino de una
idea bolivariana. Abelardo Villegas. Universidad Nacional Aut6noma de Mexico, 1987.
137p. 2700 pesos mexicanos.

Argentina, 1943-1987: The National Revolution and Resistance. Donald C. Hodges.
University of New Mexico Press, 1988. 352p.
$24.95; $13.95.

Democratizaci6n, desarrollo nacional e
integraci6n regional de Am6rica Latina.
Marcos Kaplan. San Jose: Capel, 1987. 98p.
$6.50.

Between God and the Party: Religion and

Los derechos humanos on el sistema interamericano: recopilaci6n de instrumentos

Politics in Revolutionary Cuba. John M. Kirk.
University Press of Florida, 1988.
A bomba pacifica: o Brasil e outros cenarios
da corrida nuclear. Federico Tullgraf. Sao
Paulo: Brasiliense, 1988. 248p.
Canada and the Commonwealth Caribbean.
Bryan D. Tennyson, ed. University Press of
America, 1988. 396p. $29.75; $17.25.

The Caribbean in World Affairs:The Foreign
Policy of the English-Speaking States.
Jacqueline Braveboy-Wagner. Westview Press,
1988. 150p. $16.95.

Children of Colonial Despotism: Press,
Politics, and Culture in Cuba, 1790.1840.
Larry R. Jensen. University Press of Florida,
1988. 211p. $22.00.

bisicos. Daniel Zovatto G. San Jos6: Instituto
Interamericano de Derechos Humanos, 1987.
357p.

Legal Opposition Politics under Authoritarian Rule in Brazil. Maria D'Alva Gil Kinzo.
St. Martin's Press, 1988. 336p. $45.00.

La mujer en el Chile militar. Maria Elena
Valenzuela. Santiago: Cesoc,1987.249p. $6.90.
Nicaragua: Politics,Economics and Society.
David H. Close. London: Pinter, 1988. 221p.
$35.00.

Operaci6n Gavin: M6xico en la diplomacia
de Reagan.Carlos Ramirez. M6xico: El Dia en
Libros, 1987. 227p. $7.20.
Partners in Conflict:The United States and
Latin America. Abraham F. Lowenthal. The
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1988. 256p.
$10.95.
El pensamiento socialista en Chile: an.
tologla, 1893.1933. Eduardo Deves, Carlos
Diaz, eds. Santiago: Documentas, 1987. 234p.

de Marx no Brasil. Leandro Konder. Rio de
Janeiro: Campus, 1988. 222p.

Politics in Central America: Guatemala, El
Salvador, Honduras and Nicaragua. Thomas
P. Anderson. Rev. ed. Praeger, 1988. $37.85;
$14.85.

Disparen sobre Contadora. Stella Calloni,
Rafael Cribari. Montevideo: Ediciones La Hora,
1987. 190p. $9.00.

The Politics of Military Rule in Brazil,
1964.1985. Thomas E. Skidmore. Oxford
University Press, 1988. 384p. $29.95.

EE.UU. y el r6gimen militar paraguayo,
1954.1958: documentos de fuentes
norteamericanas. Anibal Miranda, ed. Asunci6n, Paraguay: El Lector, 1987.215p. $20.00.

Realityor Illusion: Warand Peace in Central
America. Frank McNeil. Scribner, 1988.
$19.95.

A derrota da dial6tica: a recepg o das ideias

Relaciones Centroam6rica-M6xico, 1978Eisenhower and Latin America: The Foreign

The Civil Wars in Chile: The Bourgeois
Revolutions that Never Were. Maurice Zeitlin.
Princeton University Press, 1988.265p. $14.95.

concentraci6n de poder y democracla.

superpotenclas. Jorge Mario Salazar Mora.
San Jose: Alma Mater, 1987. 127p.

PolicyofAnticommunism. Stephen G. Rabe.
University of North Carolina Press, 1988. 237p.
$29.25.

1986: de la concertaci6n a la confrontaci6n.
H. Rodrigo Jauberth Rojas. Mexico: Centro
de Investigaci6n y Docencia Econ6micas, 1987.
459p.
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The Soft War: The Uses and Abuses of
U.S. Economic Aid in Central America. Tom
Barry, Deb Preusch. Grove Press, 1988. 320p.
$18.95.

,Subditos o allados?: la politica exterior
de Estados Unidos y Centroam6rica. Francisco Rojas Aravena, Luis Guillermo Solis
Rivera. San JosB: Editorial Porvenir, 1988.156p.
Urban Nationalism: A Study of Political
Development in Trinidad. Alvin Magid. University of Florida Press, 1988. 294p.

Venezuela's Movement Toward Socialism:
From Guerrilla Defeat to Innovative Politics.
Steve EIIner. Duke University Press, 1988.31 Op.
$43.50.

Reference
Biographical Dictionary of Latin American
and Caribbean Political Leaders. Robert J.
Alexander, ed. Greenwood Press, 1988.

Costa Rica: bibliografla comentada sobre su
crisis.Jorge Rovira Mas. Universidad de Costa
Rica, 1987.64p. $12.95.
Diccionario biogrifico del gobierno mexicano. Presidenciade la Rep0blica, Unidad de
la Cr6nica Presidencial. 2nd, rev. ed. Mexico:
Fondo de Cultura Econ6mica, 1987. 841p.
$57.60.
Diccionario hist6ricobiogrfico: peruanos
ilustres. Camila Estremadoyro Robles. Lima:
Eureka, 1987. 506p.

Dictionary of Brazilian ULiterature. Irwin Stern,
ed. Greenwood Press, 1988.
Ecuadorian Biographical Dictionary.
Gustavo R. Arboleda. Virginia, Minn.: Latin
American Press, 1988. 194p. $20.00.

Enciclopedia ilustrada del Peru. Alberto
Taurodel Pino. Lima: Promoci6n Editorial Inca,
1987.6 vols. $400.00.
Introducci6n a los estudios bolivianos
contemporineos, 1960.1984: manual de
bibliografia.J. M. Barnadas. Cusco, Perj: Centrode Estudios RuralesAndinos "Bartolom6 de
las Casas," 1987. 514p. $35.00.
Latin American Culture Studies: Information
and Materials for Teaching about Latin
America. Gloria Contreras, ed. 2nd, rev. ed. Instituteof Latin American Studies, University of
Texas at Austin, 1988. 450p.
Mexican American Biographies: A Historical
Dictionary, 1836-1987. Matt S. Meier. Greenwood Press, 1988. 270p. $45.00.
La violencia en Colombia. J. Noe Herrera C.
Bogota: Herrera, 1988.
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PAPERBACK

PERSPECTIVES

Partners in Conflict

Military Rule in Chile

The United States and Latin America

Dictatorshipand Oppositions

Abraham F. Lowenthal

edited by J. Samuel Valenzuela
and Arturo Valenzuela

"A thoughtful, wide-ranging analysis of U.S. policy
in Latin America and the Caribbean, with recommendations to match. One theme is pervasive: U.S.
dominance has declined because of underlying
economic, social, technological and military trends
that have wrought fundamental changes in the
distribution of power in the hemisphere.... An

important book." -Foreign

Affairs

With a sense of urgency, Abraham Lowenthal calls
for a new direction in U.S.-Latin America relations and recommends specific steps the United States can
take to forge a new partnership in the Western
Hemisphere.
$10.95 paperback, $24.50 hardcover

"A valuable sourcebook on the Chilean military
regime." - Choice

"Essential reading-for anyone interested in contemporary Chile and concerned about the country's
future." -Harold Blakemore, Third World Affairs
Now available in paperback, Military Rule in Chile
offers a critical but dispassionate evaluation of the
Chilean economy, society, and polity under the military rule of General Augusto Pinochet. Contributors
include Genaro Arriagada Herrera, Manuel Barrera,
Ricardo Ffrench-Davis, Alejandro Foxley, Manuel
Antonio Garret6n, Heraldo Mufioz, Brian H. Smith,
Arturo Valenzuela, J. Samuel Valenzuela, and
Pilar Vergara.
$12.95 paperback, $35.00 hardcover

Transitions from
Authoritarian Rule

Forthcoming

Latin American Debt

Prospectsfor Democracy

A Twentieth-Century Fund Book

edited by Guillermo O'Donnell,
Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead
with a foreword by Abraham F. Lowenthal
"The first book in any language that systematically and
comparatively focuses on the process of transition
from authoritarian regimes." -Abraham F.
Lowenthal, from the foreword
Noted scholars examine the process of democratization in Latin America and southern Europe, combining extensive case studies with a comparative overview
and a synthesis of conclusions.
availablein four separatepaperbackvolumes Southern Europe
$10.95
Latin America
$10.95
Comparative Perspectives $10.95
Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies

THE

OHNSHOPKNS

Pedro-Pablo Kuczynski
Former Peruvian cabinet minister and international
investment banker Pedro-Pablo Kuczynski brings a
unique perspective to a problem that marks a serious
threat to world economic stability.
"An insightful analysis of the Latin American debt
problem by a well-informed participant and continuing observer. Kuczynski poses the right questions
and offers relevant policy answers." -Albert Fishlow,
University of California, Berkeley
$12.95 paperback,$32.50 hardcover
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